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ABSTRACT 
 
Colonialism and compromise:  
The Shanghai Municipal Council and  
the arrest of communists, 1927-1937 
 
by 
 
LAW Kwok Fai Peter 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 Pressured by the Chinese authorities and the Foreign Office, the Shanghai 
Municipal Council was forced to compromise with the Nationalist government on the 
issue of the arrest of communists in the Settlement between 1927 and 1937. Planning 
for a gradual retreat in the face of fervid Chinese nationalism, the British government 
had no choice but to ask the Shanghai Municipal Council to satisfy the demands of 
the Chinese. Meanwhile, confronted with the communist assassinations and open 
assaults, the law and order in the International Settlement was under serious threat if 
the Shanghai Municipal Council refused to cooperate with the Nationalists.  
My research is a study of the cooperation between the Chinese authorities and the 
Shanghai Municipal Police in arresting communists. The judicial autonomy of the 
Settlement authorities was severely weakened following the use of three legal 
processes involved in the treatments of communists, namely, arrest, extradition and 
reformatory measures.  
This topic has a policy implication. As one of the greatest colonial powers, Britain 
used to exercise great influence around the world. Britain and her white settlers strive 
for the survival of their informal empire in China at the expense of sacrificing their 
judicial autonomy. My thesis offers a new conceptualisation and periodisation of 
British decolonisation in East Asia. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“…I am not a criminal. The only thing that the law has against me is that I have other views of 
government and so my offence is nothing other than political. On this offence if the government of this 
country should sentence me to death I can have nothing to say in the matter. I admit that I am a 
communist and I do not fear if the outcome is death for me.”1                                                                                       
                                                              Jiang Cinan 蔣次南, the 3rd accused 
 
This thesis tells the story of the weakened judicial independence of the Shanghai 
International Settlement during the inter-war period. By doing so, I offer a broader 
concept in studying the British decolonisation in the Far East. It challenges 
prevailing understandings that decolonisation is defined based on the transfer of 
sovereignty by examining the loss of the British judicial autonomy in China. I 
attempt to discuss the role of the British imperial presence in modern China by 
studying interplay between the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang, the 
Shanghai Municipal Police and the British diplomatic bodies in the Shanghai 
International Settlement during the early twentieth century. The arrest of communists 
and its aftermath is the focus in my research. I will demonstrate two major directions 
in this thesis. Not only will I argue that British imperial strategies in China were 
changed following the strengthening of the Kuomintang, but I will also suggest that 
the British decolonisation in East Asia was started in the mid-1920s.  
The first argument raised in this thesis is about the readjustments of the British 
imperialism in China. As John Darwin observes in his book The Empire Project, 
British ruling strategies depended on realities and local circumstances in different 
colonies although the British world-system still operated throughout the empire. 
                                                 
1
 “Extract of proceedings in Shanghai Special District Court for 17th October, 1932” in Case against 
Chien Tou Seu, ref. D4131, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 (electronic 
resources), records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Record Group 263, Farmington Hills, Mich.: 
Gale, a part of Cengage Learning, 2010 
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Instead of imposing any single policy on all dependent territories, politicians at 
Whitehall had to manage the empire based on local factors found in different colonies 
such as religion, ethnicity, and regional interests.
2
 In other words, the British 
government could just implement policies according to local circumstances in 
different part of the Empire. Similarly, Edmund Fung and Robert Bickers illustrate 
explicitly on how Britain responded to the challenge of the rising Chinese nationalism 
in the Inter-war period. Edumnd Fung argues that the British Foreign Office 
anticipated the gradual transfer of power from Britain to China provided that the 
Kuomintang government could maintain a stable trading environment to foreign 
commercial firms.
3
 He also states that the British diplomatic bodies were making a lot 
of financial concessions to the Chinese government in the 1920s concerning the issue 
of the treaty revision.
4
 In his work Britain in China, Bickers highlights localisation 
policies adopted by the British government between the 1920s and 1940s. More 
influential Chinese were appointed in senior positions of the Shanghai Municipal 
Council, its police force, British enterprises and even church organisations.
5
 British 
merchants also attempted to establish good relations with Kuomintang officials as well 
as Chinese merchants.
6
 In short, the above authors try to examine the shift of British 
policies in response to local conditions, especially looking at socio-economic changes 
in the Republican China.    
  What this thesis contributes to the academic arena is to discuss the relinquishment of 
                                                 
2
 John Darwin, The empire project: the rise and fall of the British world-system, 1830-1970 
(Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3 
3
 Edmund S.K. Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat : Britain's South China policy, 1924-1931 
(Hong Kong : Oxford University Press, 1991), 172-173 
4
 Edmund Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
242 
5
 British firms hired more Chinese employees. Foreign staffs were even requested to learn Chinese. 
See Robert Bickers, Britain in China: community, culture and colonialism 1900-1949, (Manchester : 
New York : Manchester University Press, 1999), 158-210 
6
 Swire offered Song Ziwen 30 percent share of the China Navigation Company in 1935. See Robert 
Bickers, Britain in China, 171-182 
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the legal autonomy of the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force. I argue that 
British foreign policies towards the Nationalist government had largely been redrafted 
by the 1920s, changing from legal controls to the economic dominance in Shanghai. 
Meanwhile, British expatriates in the early twentieth century Shanghai were 
abandoned by the British metropole in a legal context. The judicial procedure 
employed by the Shanghai Municipal Police and its Kuomintang counterparts in 
handling communists is used as an example to illustrate how the loss of the judicial 
independence and the policing power of the Shanghai International Settlement 
connected to the readjustment of British imperial policies in the Far East. In fact, the 
judiciary autonomy of the Settlement was of utmost importance in reflecting the 
power and the sovereignty of the Shanghai Municipal Police and British expatriates. 
Three legal processes including arrest, extradition and reformatory, which were 
involved in handling communist suspects found in the International Settlement, could 
show how the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to compromise with the 
Chinese authorities regarding the treatment of communists. With a view to 
suppressing communism effectively, the Kuomintang demanded the Shanghai 
Municipal Police for simplification of arrest procedures when arresting communists 
hiding in the Settlement. Later, the Chinese authorities furthered requested the 
Shanghai Municipal Council to extradite important communist convicts immediately 
and to hand over communist prisoners to the Soochow reformatory. The above 
demands violated legal procedures of the Settlement. Therefore, the Shanghai 
Municipal Council’s permission in respond to the Kuomintang’s requests 
demonstrated the transfer of legal power in Shanghai from the British authorities to the 
Chinese government. 
  Meanwhile, surrendering the legal power of Britain in Shanghai to China 
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unavoidably led to conflict of interests between British settlers in Shanghai and 
policy-makers in London. Indeed, it was true that British expatriates in Shanghai 
shared the same Britishness with their kith and kin in Britain. In Empire and 
globalization, Magee and Thompson study how cultural and ethnical influences 
affected the integration of the global economy under the British dominance from the 
mid-19
th
 century to the eve of the First World War. The authors believe that cultural 
significances provided private initiatives for white settlers to trade with each other in 
the British Empire.
7
 Therefore, the unpopularity of communism in Britain mentioned 
by Andrew Thorpe may also spread to other communities of white settlers in the 
Empire during the inter-war years.
8
  
  Contradictions between different British interest groups were attributed to the nature 
of the informal empire. As Jurgen Osterhammel observes, the informal empire 
survived with the presence of political and business institutions whereas the formal 
empire was under direct control from the British colonial authorities.
9
 In the case of 
the British informal empire in China, the Chinese sovereignty was still respected to a 
certain extent as Chinese territories were not formally annexed by Britain except 
Hong Kong. China was still entitled with the rights to retain its own currency and 
army, to draft its foreign policies, and to receive recognitions from other countries.
10
 
Instead of managed by the Colonial Office, Shanghai and other treaty ports in China 
had been governed by municipal governments managed by British expatriates under 
the protection of the extraterritoriality since 1854. Given that these municipal 
                                                 
7
 Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and globalization: networks of people, goods 
and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914 (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 
8
 Andrew Thorpe, The Failure of political extremism in inter-war Britain (Exeter : Dept. of History 
and Archaeology, University of Exeter, 1989), 2-4 
9
 Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel, Imperialism and after: continuities and 
discontinuities (London: German Historical Institute, 1986), 299, 307 
10
 Ibid, 290 
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governments were self-subsidised and only dealt with affairs relating to western 
interest, treaty ports in China cost little financial burden to Britain.
11
 In Shanghai, 
the British concession was amalgamated with other foreign concessions to form the 
Shanghai International Settlement in the mid-19
th
 century. [Appendix 1 shows the map 
of Shanghai in the 1930s.] Subsequently, the Shanghai Municipal Council was found 
as the local government of the International Settlement. [Please refer to appendix 2] 
Yet, this Council, which was dominated by British members, was only responsible to 
the interests of its multi-national taxpayers in the Settlement.
12
 Moreover, foreign 
settlers in Shanghai even had their own armed forces to defend themselves. Founded in 
1850s, the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps maintained 
the law and order inside the settlement.
13
 As a result, British subjects in China enjoyed 
a very large degree of freedom. They could establish their own business companies 
and missionary stations almost without any restrictions in Shanghai. Therefore, the 
role of the British government in Shanghai was very limited. The British government 
could provide diplomatic and military protection for their fellow subjects only if it 
received requests from the Council.
14
 Therefore, municipal governments controlled 
by white settlers in the informal empire had different considerations and calculation 
compared to the British metropole.   
Consequently, the relinquishment of the legal autonomy in Shanghai aroused 
antagonism between the British government and British settlers in Shanghai. As John 
Darwin states, it is a mistake to think that Whitehall policy-makers imposed the same 
imperial policy on different dependent territories because of “variable costs and 
                                                 
11
 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British imperialism, 1688-2000 (New York: Longman, 2002), 363 
12
 Ibid, 168-169 
13
 Ibid, 166 
14
 Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 3 
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benefits for different sections of British society”.15 In fact, the British government 
prepared for a gradual retreat from Shanghai in the 1920s. The two main concerns 
that the British Foreign Office had were to prevent anti-British antagonism and to 
retain the British economic influence in Shanghai.
16
 Facing the rise the Kuomintang 
government, British officials realised that it was no longer possible to preserve the 
Shanghai Settlement by force.
17
 But they refused to completely repudiate the 
extraterritoriality and would not return the Shanghai Settlement to China 
immediately. This was because British officials and entrepreneurs worried that the 
progress of legal and political reforms implemented by the Kuomintang was still far 
from meeting the Anglo-Saxon standard, causing unfavourable conditions for British 
investments in China.
18
 Yet, the British Foreign Office recognised that if it did 
nothing to please the Chinese public and the Kuomintang, anti-British strikes and 
demonstrations could lead to further suspension of trades and heavy casualties. 
Therefore, as Edmund Fung argues, the British government adopted the policy of 
“combining conciliation with firmness” in Shanghai before returning the Settlement 
to China.
19
 Whitehall policy-makers not only dispatched troops to defend Shanghai, 
but it also gradually made political and legal concessions. By doing so, the British 
authorities hoped that the Nationalist government could stop agitating any 
anti-British activities in China and protected British economic interests in Shanghai. 
With the support of British merchants, the British Foreign Office began to intervene 
in the administration of the Settlement by pressuring the Shanghai Municipal Council 
                                                 
15
 John Darwin, The empire project, 14 
16
 Edmund Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat, 5 
17
 Ibid, 7 
18
 G.W. Swire, The Possibilities of the Shanghai Negotiations, 14
th
 April, 1932, Avon Papers, 3; 
“Enclosure No.II in H.M Minister’s despatch to F.O of 7th June, 1929”, FO676/316, British Foreign 
Office papers, 2 
19
 Edmund Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat, 10 
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to carry out various reforms alleviating anti-British feelings in Shanghai.
20
 In the 
case of handling communists in the Shanghai Settlement, the British authorities were 
sympathetic to the Kuomintang in suppressing communist activities in China not 
only because of their hatred of communist disturbances, but also because of their fear 
about the rise of the Kuomintang. This thesis shows how the British Foreign Office 
intervened in the extradition of communist suspects who were also Chinese residents 
protected by the Shanghai Municipal Council, and illustrates in what ways Britain 
implemented Chinese penal regulations in the jails inside the Settlement. Hence, 
Britain abandoned British expatriates by sacrificing the legal independence of the 
International Settlement.     
  However, British settlers in Shanghai found it difficult to relinquish their legal 
autonomy. As a part of colonial policing networks, the Shanghai Municipal Police 
exchanged intelligence about the movements of notable communists with other 
British military and police authorities. With a view to maintaining the law and order, 
the Shanghai Municipal Police were even trustworthy partners of the Chinese 
intelligence authorities in suppressing communist activities and anti-foreign 
demonstrations. Under the command of the Special Branch chief T.P. Givens, the 
Shanghai Municipal Police established a mutual understanding with Chinese agents 
when arresting communists. Violations of settlement judicial procedures and legal 
practices were very common to make arrests more effective and efficient. As 
Georgina Sinclair argues, British laws and legal procedures were inapplicable in 
colonies.
21
 Compared with their kith and kin in the British metropole, colonial police 
officers in the empire experienced a different policing context because they served 
                                                 
20
 Robert Bicker, Britain in China,116-117 
21
 Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80 
(Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 2006), 5 
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the sovereign state rather than colonial subjects.
22
 Therefore, colonial policemen 
tended not to abide by regular legal procedures since the survival of the British 
imperial interest was more important.
23
 But the idea of imperial policing suggested 
by Georgina Sinclair cannot directly be applied in the context of the British informal 
empire in Shanghai. It was true that police forces could decide how to execute arrest 
orders. Yet, it was necessary, if not essential, for police officers to seek instructions 
from the higher authorities of the Settlement when they received requests from China 
concerning political issues such as extradition and reformatory. Therefore, only by 
studying the disappointments of British settlers can we truly realise the decline of the 
British imperial presence in Shanghai.  
After spending years living in Britain, many foreign settlers shared similar legal 
spirits and policing ideas with their kith and kin at home.
24
 Coherence of judicial 
values possessed by British expatriates echoes Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. 
Thompson’s idea concerning the pan-imperial and cultural unity among British 
migrants overseas.
25
 In fact, the British policing developed along the line of 
Anglo-Saxon tradition that “the law reflected the will of the people, which every free 
man had an obligation to uphold” and differed from the Roman beliefs emphasised 
                                                 
22
 Ibid, 2 
23
 Ibid, 7 
24
 Dr. Kiebtner, former adviser to Jiang Jieshi, stated that the institutional differences of the police 
systems between the two foreign concessions and China caused conflicts between the Chinese 
authorities and the International Settlement. The Shanghai Municipal Police arrested the communists 
based on evidence, whereas the Chinese policemen could apprehend someone based on reasonable 
suspicions." See “Interview with Dr. Von Kiebtner" in Shanghai Gonggong Zujie 
Gongbujuzongbanchu Youguan Jingwuchu Guanyu Kelaina Boshi Fabiao Guanyu Guomindang 
Zhengfu He Jiang Jieshi Dui Shanghaizujie Taidu De Tanhua De Baogao (1929-1930) [上海公共租
界工部局總辦處有關工部局警務處關於克萊納博士發表關於國民黨政府和蔣介石對上海租界態
度的談話的報告 (1929-1930)] [Report made by the Shanghai Municipal Police concerning Dr. 
Kiebtner on the attitude of the Nationalist Government and Jiang Jieshi towards in the International 
Settlement] in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930, ref.: U1-6-22, 30th 
December, 1929 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 1-3   
25
 Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and globalization : networks of people, goods 
and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914, (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 
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on controlling social stability by a “centralised force”.26 With the progress of 
democracy in Britain, the police system in the metropole had to further reform itself 
in order to recognise the evolution of civil citizenship in the 19
th
 century.
27
 Indeed, 
British expatriates in Shanghai were entrenched in the above judicial perception. 
Many British settlers, including Municipal Advocates, the Council Secretary, and 
even some senior police officers were keen to uphold the British traditional legal 
system in the settlement. They blamed the Shanghai Municipal Police and the 
Kuomintang for subverting formal legal procedures and practices in handling the 
communists under the jurisdiction of the settlement. In their perspectives, violation 
of legal procedures not only caused injustice on the accused, but it also challenged 
the judicial integrity of the International Settlement. As a consequence, British 
expatriates were discontented that their legal autonomy was weakened by the British 
Foreign Office and the Kuomintang.   
In addition, British pressure groups also worked against their home government. 
Antoinette Burton stresses that socio-political debates in Britain were framed by 
imperial issues. Pressure groups drew upon imperial matters in order to urge their 
home government to reform. Burton argues that primary intentions of domestic 
campaigners were to ‘evaluate the successes and failures of Anglo-Saxon values and 
“colonial” projects’.28 Similarly, Andrew Thompson discusses how pressure groups 
and the media in Britain drew the parliament’s attention to the empire in the 19th and 
20
th
 century.
29
 This thesis illustrates how the Howard League for Penal Reform and 
                                                 
26
 Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80 
(Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 2006), 4 
27
 Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80 
(Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 2006), 5 
28
 Antoinette Burton, Empire in question: reading, writing, and teaching British imperialism 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 264 
29
 Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: the empire in British politics, c. 1880-1932 (Harlow, 
England ; New York : Longman, 2000) 
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the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence highlighted the 
limitations of the British and the Settlement authorities when dealing with the 
extradition and the imprisonment of communist suspects. To conclude, British 
settlers in Shanghai were abandoned by the British government as they could no 
longer enjoy their legal autonomy in the International Settlement.  
  The second issue that I attempt to renegotiate is concerning the periodisation of the 
British decolonisation. I argue that the 1920 decade was the beginning of the British 
decolonisation in Asia. Prevailing understandings on the term decolonisation mainly 
refers to the change of flags in colonies. Different national flags replaced the Union 
Jack, flying at different government offices. In accordance of John Darwin, the final 
stage of the British decolonisation only took place when Britain transferred its 
political sovereignty back to its colonial subjects in the post-war era. Failing to 
exercise effective political control on the Empire, the British imperial presence 
eventually came to an end in the 1950s and the 1960s.
30
 Apart from Darwin, many 
scholars also put their focus on the post-war period when studying the topic about the 
western decolonisation. Ronald Hyam in his book Britain’s Declining Empire 
attributes the inevitability for the collapse of the British Empire to several post-war 
factors such as rising nationalism in colonies and the Cold War.
31
 Similarly, John 
Springhall suggests that nationalism and international pressure led to the downfall of 
the western imperialism after 1945.
32
  
  Yet, I am inclined to show my agreement with Robert Bickers who suggests that 
the origins of the British decolonisation should be traced back to the inter-war period, 
                                                 
30
 John Darwin, Britain and decolonisation : the retreat from empire in the post-war world (New 
York : St. Martin's Press, 1988), 6 
31
 Ronald Hyam, Britain's declining empire: the road to decolonisation, 1918-1968, (Cambridge ; 
New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
32
 John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945: the collapse of European overseas empires , 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Palgrave, 2001) 
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especially in the late 1920s.
33
 Apart from its political definition, decolonisation can 
also be understood in a cultural point of view. According to “Rethinking 
Decolonization”, A. G. Hopkins highlights that white dominions only obtained full 
independence from Britain when they abolished their socio-economic connections to 
their Kith and Kin in Britain after the Second World War. During the inter-war period, 
white dominions became politically autonomous after agreements were signed 
between themselves and Britain in the 1920s. However, white dominions still 
economically and culturally linked to the British metropole.
34
 Thus, Hopkins argues 
that such status was not a complete independence for these dominions. Instead, the 
actual decolonisation found in white dominions has only begun since the 1960s, 
when British cultures connecting Britain and its dominions became less significant. 
Not only were white settlers deprived of British citizenships, but their courts also 
stopped appealing to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
35
 The British 
monarchy had only symbolic meaning towards white dominions. Consequently, the 
British decolonisation in white dominions was fully accomplished when white 
settlers finally relinquished their cultural concept of Britishness and developed their 
own national identities.
36
 
  Likewise, the forfeit of the British judicial independence in the Shanghai 
Settlement signified the beginning of the British decolonisation in the early 20
th
 
century China. Since the rise of the Nationalist government in the late 1920s, white 
settlers in Shanghai had been deprived of their own jurisdiction to handle 
communists found in the Settlement. With a view to eliminating political rivalries of 
the Kuomintang, the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police forces had to 
                                                 
33
 Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 18 
34
 A. G. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization" in Past and Present, August 2008 (Vol. 200, No. 1), 
218 
35
 Ibid, 229 
36
 Ibid, 235 
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relinquish their British legal values when dealing with sensitive cases relating to 
communism. The Settlement Police started to ignore warrants details stated by the 
court to arrest communists. More importantly, the Council not only extradited its 
own residents engaging in communists activities to the Chinese authorities, but it 
also handed over its “repented” and “non-repented” prisoners to the Soochow 
reformatory. Therefore, these actions violated British legal and policing values which 
respected the will of the people, the rule of law, and the humanitarianism.
37
 As a 
result, the failure of British settlers to uphold their judiciary values unavoidably 
signified partial disappearance of Britishness, resulting in the British decolonisation 
in a legal context.  
British imperial policing in Shanghai 
The imperial policing also forms an indispensable part relating to the British 
imperialism. I argue that collaboration with a foreign country was one of the ways for 
police forces in different colonies to maintain social stabilities during the British 
decolonisation. Many historians study how imperial police forces reacted when the 
British supremacy was challenged by colonial subjects. In accordance with Charles 
Jeffries, the imperial policing was mixed with military component when existence of 
colonial regimes was under threat. The semi-military model of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary in Ireland was widely used to suppress disturbances and wars 
threatening the British imperial presence in the inter-war period.
38
 When the Second 
World War was over, Britain even invested more resources in policing its empire 
where independence movements prevailed. In Policing and decolonisation, David 
Anderson and David Killingray state that the Colonial Office began to centralise 
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police forces overseas, carrying out institutional reforms to strengthen its control 
towards colonial policemen.
39
 Meanwhile, the police authorities also set up special 
branches to collect intelligence, working with Security Services (MI5) in the United 
Kingdom to suppress anti-British activities.
40
 Similarly, Georgina Sinclair argues that 
the power of colonial police forces rose rapidly during post-war period. With a view to 
protecting the imperial presence in the face of high-tide nationalism, colonial police 
officers obtained more autonomy in developing intelligence and military precaution 
measures.
41
 Hence, the above authors mainly concentrate on studying uses of force 
and the intelligence gathering of the colonial police during the British decolonisation 
in post-war period.   
   Alternatively, I suggest that the collaboration between the Shanghai Municipal 
Police and the Kuomintang was another way to suppress communism in the British 
Empire. Instead of the Shanghai Municipal Police, the Kuomintang had become the 
real authority enjoying the “escalation” of police power in the settlement since the 
1920s. Facing the pressure from the Chinese authorities, the Shanghai Municipal 
Council reluctantly violated legal procedures. However, the Shanghai Municipal 
Police were very keen to facilitate arrests of communists. Indeed, the Shanghai 
Municipal Police shared lots of similarities with its counterparts in other British 
dependent territories. Composed of approximately 6,200 police officers and clerical 
supernumeraries from China, Japan, India, and western countries, the Settlement 
Police was under the command of the Shanghai Municipal Council dominated by the 
British. Senior ranks were predominately filled by the Europeans.
42
 These policemen 
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also shared similar anti-communist sentiments with other British imperial police 
forces overseas.
43
 Thus, arresting communists was necessary in order to protect 
British interests in Shanghai.  
    Yet, the Shanghai Municipal Police took a more active initiative to suppress 
communist activities in the Settlement compared to their bosses in the Council. As 
David Anderson and David Killingray note, police forces not only had to defend 
interests of propertied classes, but they also had to maintain social stabilities.
44
 The 
Kuomintang regime had persecuted communists in China since the death of Dr. Sun 
Zhongshan in 1925. The actions that illustrate the Kuomintang’s determination in 
eliminating communists were its military campaigns encircling and exterminating 
communist troops 剿匪 led by Mao Zedong 毛澤東 and Zhude 朱德 in rural areas 
during the early 1930s.
45
 In urban area, under the commands of the Nationalist 
government and the Green Gang leader Du Yuesheng 杜月笙, gangsters based in the 
French concession passed through the International Settlement and eventually purged 
all communist societies in Zhabei 閘北 area in early 1927.46 The Shanghai 
International Settlement, which enjoyed a status of political neutrality, became a 
refuge for communists to hide. As a consequence, communist activities had become 
one of the festering problems in Shanghai since the mid 1920s. Many strikes and 
demonstrations agitated by communist members created disturbances in the 
International Settlement. S. A. Smith illustrates the efforts of communists in agitating 
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the mass to openly revolt against warlords and the colonial authorities in the early 
1920s. He also discusses the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party in creating 
disturbances in the May Thirtieth incident and armed uprisings against warlords in 
Shanghai.
47
 In her work Underground, Patricia Stranahan further argues that 
changing communist strategies in Shanghai were a result of political persecutions by 
the Kuomintang. Communists began to abandon original Marxist idea advocated by 
the Commintern, ingratiating themselves with other patriotic organisations to establish 
united fronts in Shanghai against the Kuomintang and imperialists.
48
 Worse still, the 
massacres of some communist traitors’ family by the Red Brigade even exposed 
significant security crisis in two foreign concessions, creating embarrassments and 
challenges to the foreign police authorities in the early1930s.
49
  
    With a view to safeguarding the law and order in the settlements, both the 
Shanghai Municipal Police and the French Concession Police decided to ally with 
the Kuomintang to arrest communists at all cost.
50
 The settlement authorities not 
only exchanged confidential intelligence with the Chinese authorities, but they also 
allowed Chinese agents to join Settlement policemen in conducting raids on 
communist bases. More importantly, the Shanghai Municipal Police even violated 
legal procedures when arresting communists even though such practice contradicted 
to the will of the Council in defending the legal integrity of the Settlement. During 
arrests, police officers ignored the content stated in warrants and sometimes even 
apprehended suspects without first applying for warrants from the court. Therefore, 
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the collaboration between the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Kuomintang in 
arresting communists could benefit both the Settlement and the Chinese authorities in 
maintaining social stabilities in Shanghai.  
The Kuomintang and the strengthening of China 
Apart from looking at the British perspective, this thesis also has an implication on 
the history of modern China. I argue that the rise of republican China in the late 
1920s appeared in the form of diplomatic interventions, dominating municipal 
administrations and the legal structure of the Shanghai International Settlement. After 
the completion of the northern expedition by General Jiang Jieshi蔣介石 in 1927, the 
Nanjing government pushed hard to modernise China with a view to repealing the 
extraterritoriality. Shanghai was one of test points for the Nationalist government to 
modernise the country. In the existing literature about the history of republican China, 
historians mainly concentrate on how the Kuomintang attempted to strengthen the 
whole country through increasing its control in societies internally.  
  The Kuomintang consolidated its political power in Shanghai by establishing its 
city government. Christian Henriot illustrates the modernisation of municipal 
administrations in the Kuomintang controlled Shanghai in 1920s and 1930s.
51
 In 
"Designing China's urban future", Kerrie L. MacPherson shows how the Greater 
Shanghai Plan 大上海計劃 had been advocated since the 1910s. A modern urban 
planning was an evidence to show China’s determination in restructuring the country 
and counteracting foreign influences in Shanghai.
52
 Only by creating a modernised 
Chinese municipality could justify the ability of the Chinese government to recover 
the Shanghai International Settlement and the French Concessions in the future. 
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Meanwhile, the Kuomintang also attempted to infiltrate its influence into foreign 
concessions through an informal way. In The Shanghai Green Gang states that the 
Chinese authorities inwardly allied with a triad society called the Shanghai Green 
Gang 上海青幫, controlling labour class people in two foreign concessions. 
The Nationalist government also tightened its control in socio-economic aspects. 
Economically, the Kuomintang exerted its influence in the financial sector of the 
country. Zheng Huixin 鄭會欣 examines the Kuomintang’s attempt to modernise the 
economy of China by carrying out fiscal reforms, clearing debts and seeking for 
foreign assistances.
53
 Parks Coble studied how the Nationalist government decided to 
emasculate the political power of the Chinese capitalists and to develop the 
modernisation of economic sectors in Shanghai under its supervision.
54
 On the other 
hand, the Chinese authorities imposed social regulations on the public based on 
western models. Penal reform was one of the ways to modernise China. In his book 
Crime, punishment, Frank Dikötter discusses the evolution of the Chinese penal 
system from the late Qing period to the end of the republican era. In particular, he 
studies significances of changing cultural and social customs of prisons in modern 
China. The establishment of the reformatories and the restructuring of prisons were 
reformative means used by the Nanjing government to re-educate its fellow 
countrymen who were always regarded as uncivilised in the eyes of westerners.
55
  
The Chinese judiciary and policing system also experienced reforms when Jiang 
Jieshi rose to power. As Frederic Wakeman observes in Policing Shanghai, the 
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Nationalist government attempted to reform the Chinese police system in Shanghai by 
learning from western legal models.
56
 But he also attributes the failure of the 
modernisation of the social institution in Shanghai to the “lamentable durability of 
governmentalised autocracy” under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi.57 Yao Yuan 
examines legal mechanisms of the Shanghai Provisional Court and the Shanghai 
Special District Court under the control of the Kuomintang, showing the gradual 
cancellation of western judicial privileges in the Shanghai International Settlement.
58
  
    Instead of studying the internal strengthening of republican China, this thesis 
attempts to examine in what ways the Kuomintang used diplomatic means to elevate 
the international reputation of the Republic of China and to achieve its political 
motives in the 1920s and 1930s. The International Settlement was under threat if the 
Shanghai Municipal Council refused to cooperate with the Chinese authorities. The 
Kuomintang could utilise anti-foreign sentiments to their advantage in coercing the 
Settlement authorities and even demanding for immediate relinquishment of the 
extraterritoriality possessed by foreign expatriates. Pressured by the British Foreign 
Office, the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to compromise with the 
Nationalist government concerning arrests of communists in the Settlement between 
1927 and 1937. As a result, warlord Wu Peifu 吳佩孚 of Zhili clique 直系 and 
later the Nationalist government successfully pressured Britain and other western 
powers to review the agreements of the unequal treaties accepted by the Qing Court. 
Diplomats from western countries eventually signed two rendition agreements with 
China in 1926 and 1930 relating to the repudiation of some western legal privileges 
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in Shanghai. Not only did the Shanghai International Settlement have to gradually 
return the Shanghai Mixed Court to China, but it abided also by the Chinese law 
codes and relevant prison regulations. Indeed, this could externally raise the 
reputation of China in the international stage. More importantly, this diplomatic 
victory also provided the Kuomintang with legitimacy to suppress its political 
rivalries through implementing Chinese law codes in foreign concessions and 
controlling the Settlement courts.  
    As a result, the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force were forced to 
satisfy the political motives of the Kuomintang regime at the expense of their judicial 
autonomy and British legal values. The Settlement authorities were enthusiastic in 
arresting communists not only because communists had detrimental effects on 
British commercial interests in Shanghai, but also because they were political 
rivalries of the Kuomintang. Therefore, although the British Foreign Office didn't 
physically return the settlement to the Nationalist government, its compromise 
concerning the transformation of the settlement court under predominant influence of 
the Chinese government would unavoidably serve the Kuomintang's desire in 
eliminating its political counterparts. The following chapters show the Shanghai 
Municipal Police arresting people based on the Chinese criminal codes 中華民國刑
法, extraditing communist suspects to the Chinese authorities in accordance with the 
decision made by Chinese judges, and handing over communist prisoners to 
Soochow reformatory according to the regulations governing reformatories 反省院
條例. It was true that the Kuomintang was able to recover its judicial power from 
Britain and successfully accomplished its political intentions in foreign concessions 
through diplomatic means. Hence, diplomacy took an important role in suppressing 
communist activities in the International Settlement during the Nanjing decade.  
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  This thesis is divided into two parts. Chapter 2 gives an overview of complex 
political conditions in Shanghai and the changing Sino-British relations in the early 
20
th
 century. I discuss how the paralysation of foreign trade by Chinese nationalism 
altered the attitude of the British Foreign Office towards the future of Shanghai. Then, 
I address in what ways the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to compromise 
with China concerning the transformation of the judicial system in the settlement 
under the pressure of the British metropole. The judicial reconstruction in foreign 
concessions in the late 1920s was the backdrop for arrests of communists. The second 
part of this thesis illustrates legal procedures concerning apprehensions of communists 
and its aftermath. In Chapter 3, the increasing internal violence in the International 
Settlement compelled the Shanghai Municipal Police to cooperate with the Chinese 
authorities to apprehend communists by ignoring details stated in court warrants. 
Arrests were almost carried out based on mere suspicions of the Chinese intelligence 
officers. Chapter 4 reveals the surrender of the International Settlement’s jurisdiction 
power to China in cases about communist extraditions. The Shanghai Municipal 
Council was deprived of its legal capacity to defend its Chinese residents and its own 
judicial authority in the settlement. The role of the British diplomatic bodies in 
extradition cases are also examined here. Chapter 5 explores that the Shanghai 
Municipal Gaol functioned in line with Chinese prison regulations not only by 
allowing Kuomintang delegates to examine prisoners’ thoughts, but also by sending 
their convicts to the Soochow reformatory 蘇州反省院 established for reshaping 
ideologies of political offenders. British penal values emphasising humanitarian 
treatments were therefore abandoned.  
  The steady release of sources in the Shanghai Municipal Archive 上海市檔案館 
allows me to explore further for this sensitive topic. Some of the internal 
21 
 
 
correspondences between the council secretary, senior officers of the police force and 
the municipal advocate allowed me to understand their original judicial values and 
political motives in response to Chinese requests. Police daily reports and intelligence 
reports also provided me with an overview about arrest processes and individual 
judgments made by the settlement court. Special Branch files available in National 
Archives and Records Administration of the United States also facilitate my research. 
The annual reports of the Shanghai Municipal Council found in the special collection 
department of the University of Hong Kong provided me with basic information 
regarding structures of municipal institutions and criminal figures in the Settlement. 
Memoirs of communists convicts can be found in the Shanghai Library 上海圖書館, 
describing contrasts between being imprisoned in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol and 
being incarcerated in the Soochow Reformatory.  
Materials stored in the United Kingdom were useful in realising the mentalities of 
British diplomats. Foreign Office papers kept in the National Archives at Kew and in 
Adam Matthew online database illustrate actions and considerations of the British 
government towards the treaty revision and some individual cases of communist 
arrests in the International Settlement. The Cadbury Research Library of the 
University of Birmingham has a good collection of Chamberlain family papers, of 
which Austen Chamberlain’s private papers revealed the determination of Whitehall 
policy-makers and British businessmen to retain British economic interests in 
Shanghai at the expense of some privileges.  
Last but not least, the Ministry of Justice of the Bureau of Investigation 法務部調
查局 in Taiwan (the Republic of China) keeps some memoirs and reports of those 
Chinese intelligence officers involved in apprehending communists during their 
collaborations with the Shanghai Municipal Police in the 1920s and 1930s. Their 
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testimonies can illustrate how increasing communist assassinations in the settlement 
had forced the municipal police to cooperate with the Chinese authorities without any 
hesitations by early 1930s. Insistence of the Settlement Police on formal legal 
procedures before the occurrence of the security crisis could be shown in these 
memoirs as well. There were miscellaneous telegrams and dispatches written between 
Jiang Jieshi and his subordinates showing details of different individual communist 
cases in the Academia Historica 國史館 and the Kuomintang Archive 中國國民黨
黨史館 in Taibei 臺北.  
To conclude, this thesis examines how Britain and her white settlers strive for the 
survival of their interests in China through sacrificing their judicial autonomy in 
Shanghai. It is hoped that this thesis can provide new conceptualisation and 
periodisation of British decolonisation in East Asia. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE KUOMINTANG, CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND  
THE SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS, 1927-1937 
“The more gradually the changes are made and the more willingly reforms are introduced, the more 
secure will be the interests of the settlement and the better its relations with the Chinese 
authorities.”59 
Sir Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) 
  In spite of the fact that the Chinese formed a large population and contributed a 
large sum of revenue to the British concessions, the Shanghai Municipal Council 
mainly concerned foreign interests and ignored ordinary Chinese people. Neither did 
Chinese children enjoy educational opportunities in the Settlement, nor were Chinese 
workers protected by any industrial ordinances. More importantly, the 1920 decade 
made a drastic change in socio-political conditions in China and threatened the 
survival of the British informal empire. Despite the establishment of the Republic of 
China in 1912, continuous diplomatic defeats and internal political fragmentations 
led to instabilities and anti-foreign sentiments in China since the late 1910s. An array 
of incidents such as the Japanese succession on the German sphere of influence in 
Shandong and the bloodshed between different warlords further aroused the 
awareness of Chinese citizens about the safety of their own country. With a view to 
saving their motherland, Chinese intellectuals introduced many western thoughts to 
modernise their country during the May Fourth Movement in 1919.
60
 Communism, 
which was regarded as one of “remedies” to cure wounds of China, was advocated 
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by some pioneers such as Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, Li Dachao 李大釗. They were 
motivated by the success of the October Revolution in Russia in 1917.
61
 Thus, the 
Chinese Communist Party was found in a context of strong national sentiment in 
1921 and became one of main characters appearing in this thesis.  
  Triggered by the municipal police’s suppressions on Chinese civilians on May 
thirtieth [Please refer to appendix 3], the fervid Chinese nationalism caused 
disturbances in the Shanghai international settlement. Consequently, a shooting 
incident ended up with huge casualties. Strikes, boycotts and even assassinations 
occurred frequently in 1925 and 1926. Western enterprises in China became chief 
targets attacked by the Chinese. When Jiang Jishi rose to power in China, he even 
promised to Chinese merchants that he was going to “restore the Settlement within 
three years”. Worse still, communists even made good use of the Chinese nationalism 
to initiate more mass demonstrations and even murdering cases. Therefore, during 
the 1920s and 1930s, the turmoil in Shanghai not only paralysed British-invested 
factories and companies, but it also created anxieties and strains among British 
communities.
62
 Meanwhile, after the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1927, 
the warlord era ended and China was unified by Jiang Jieshi. The Nationalist 
government therefore could concentrate its effort in abolishing foreign concessions 
recognised by the former Qing Court. Such circumstances marked the shift of British 
foreign policies in China. 
  Confronted with unfavourable circumstances, the British Foreign Office planned 
for readjustments of imperial policies in China. In 1929, the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs Austen Chamberlain instructed his colleagues that “The more gradually the 
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changes are made and the more willingly reforms are introduced, the more secure 
will be the interests of the settlement and the better its relations with the Chinese 
authorities.”63 Apparently, Austen Chamberlain believed that the Sino-British 
relations and foreign interests in China could only be secured by introducing gradual 
reforms and changes in the Settlement. As a result, the Shanghai Municipal Council 
not only drastically raised the number of Chinese members in the Council, but it also 
implemented the Chinese criminal codes and procedures in the Settlement in the late 
1920s. The British Foreign Office even compromised with the Nationalist 
government to cancel the companion of the Consular deputy in the Court afterwards. 
Therefore, the Settlement could not openly oppose decisions made by Chinese judges 
who were appointed by the Chinese government later on. Further to the above 
concessions, the Chinese authorities even wanted the Settlement to provide more 
convenience and concession in dealing with arrests of communists and its aftermath.  
In the existing literature, scholars have been pushing hard to investigate the 
internal turmoil in China during the 1920s and inter-war British foreign policies in 
the Far East. Nevertheless, rarely do they connect the above two aspects in the 
context of the Shanghai International Settlement. Concerning Nationalist and 
communist activities in Shanghai, Stranahan and Smith attempt to explain general 
communist strategies and tactics in counteracting the Kuomintang and the Settlement 
authorities. Making good use of the fervid Chinese nationalism, Chinese communists 
in Shanghai initiated mass demonstrations, strikes and even assassinations in order to 
paralyse the Settlement.
64
 Wang Fuqun studies tactics adopted by the Kuomintang 
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agents to counteract communist underground activities.
65
 The strengthening of the 
Kuomintang in Shanghai is also well-noted by other scholars. Parks Coble 
demonstrates how the Nationalist government emasculated the political power of 
Chinese capitalists and fostered the modernisation of economic sector in Shanghai.
66
 
Christian Henriot depicts that the transformation of municipal administrations in 
Kuomintang controlled Shanghai was under the surveillance of the Settlement 
authorities in the 1920s and 1930s.
67
 Frederic Wakeman also illustrates the 
Nationalists government’s attempt to reform the police force in Shanghai based on 
western models.
68
 However, the above authors never reveal to what extent these 
patriotic activities, either led by the Kuomintang or communists, affected British 
diplomatic policies in China.  
Another field that scholars have paid much attention is about British foreign 
policies in the Far East during the inter-war period. Peter Lowe mentions the British 
declining power in the Far East forced Britain to give much concession to the 
Nationalist government.
69
 Whilst studying British diplomacy in Southern China, 
Edumnd Fung suggests that the British Foreign Office anticipated the gradual 
transfer of power from Britain to China in the 1920s provided that the Kuomintang 
government could maintain a stable trading environment to foreign firms.
70
 
Nevertheless, neither Peter Lowe nor Edumnd Fung illustrates how Chamberlain’s 
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conciliatory attitude influenced the governance of the Shanghai Municipal Council. 
Although Robert Self briefly mentions the conciliatory attitude of Chamberlain 
concerning the treaty revision issue of the international settlement, he does not 
explain Chamberlain’s goal and methods behind the scene.71 Meanwhile, Antony 
Best also shows how the spread of communism in the Far East aroused great 
attention of British intelligence departments apart from the Japanese expansion in 
China.
72
 But again, Shanghai is not the focus of Antony Best. Nicholas R. Clifford 
shows how Westerners in Shanghai survived in the face of the Chinese revolution in 
the 1920s.
73
 Yet, how the British authorities dealt with arrests of communists in the 
International Settlement is still not explored.      
Reforms that the Shanghai Municipal Council adopted in the face of the fervid 
Chinese nationalism have been largely neglected in the academic arena. Yao Yuan 
examines gradual cancellations of western judicial privileges in the Settlement legal 
framework. The Shanghai Provisional Court and the Shanghai Special District Court 
were used as her examples.
74
 Besides, Robert Bickers illustrates how British settlers 
gradually surrendered their powers to the Chinese since the 1920s. Nevertheless, 
Bickers primarily studies the localisation of British commercial and religious 
institutions in China instead of the transformation of political and legal aspects.
75
 
Yet, how did concessions made by the British authorities favour the Kuomintang to 
arrest Chinese communists? 
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  In my opinion, it was necessary, if not essential that the British government had to 
allow the Chinese influence to penetrate into the Shanghai International Settlement in 
the 1920s. Thus, I elaborate further on the argument raised by Robert Bickers who 
emphasises the role of the British Foreign Office in seizing the British settlers’ power 
in Shanghai after the 1920s. There is no doubt that the British Empire in China 
survived at the expense of British settlers’ interests.76 Chapter two reveals the goals 
of Whitehall policy makers and methods involved in its formation. An overview 
about the background of politics in Shanghai and the Sino-British relations in the 
early 20
th
 century is shown here. I first discuss how the Chinese nationalism 
paralysed foreign trades in Shanghai. The second section demonstrates the attitude of 
the British Foreign Office in handling the turmoil in Shanghai. Lastly, the final 
section addresses in what ways the Shanghai Municipal Council made political and 
judicial concessions to the Chinese public resulting from the pressure given by 
Britain. 
Nationalist and communist activities in Shanghai 
Located in the mouth of the Yangtze River, Shanghai had great significance for 
British entrepreneurs in the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 century. Several examples can illustrate 
the above statement. Shanghai had an import figure of 548,607,889 Hk. Taels and an 
export figure of 362,220,148 Hk. Taels in 1928.
77
 There were twenty-three shipping 
companies in Shanghai, seven of which were British companies.
78
 Therefore, 
Shanghai contributed a lot for British settlers to earn substantial amount of income in 
China.  
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  Nevertheless, the prosperity of British trade was seriously threatened by the 
intensification of anti-foreign sentiments in China. The seeds of Chinese nationalism 
had already been sowed in China before the early 20
th
 century. According to 
Madeline Hsu, many Chinese reformers began to publish revolutionary and reformist 
journal articles and Qiaokan (僑刊, magazines for overseas Chinese) in the late Qing 
era to advocate western educations, the idea of self-government (自治) and western 
reforms in existing government bodies.
79
 The Ningbo vernacular (寧波白話報), for 
instance, was circulated by Shanghai native place associations which aimed to 
establish a modern China.
80
 Worse still, the First World War further stirred up 
national sentiments in China. More Chinese people became anti-foreign not only 
because of the national self-determination principle advocated by Woodrow Wilson, 
but also because of the Japanese succession to the German sphere of influence in the 
Shandong province.
81
 Under these circumstances, the May Thirtieth Incident, which 
caused heavy casualties for Chinese protestors near the Louza Police station in 
Shanghai, further aroused the antagonism between Chinese and foreign communities 
in China. Chinese editors in Shanghai strongly condemned the Shanghai Municipal 
Council in newspapers and refused to publish the municipal news.
82
   
  Subsequently, stimulated by the above factors, nationalist activities in China were 
more organised than before. Frequent strikes initiated by different labour societies 
not only disturbed the municipality but also interrupted trades in Shanghai.
83
 
Electricity in the city was cut off as a result of strikes agitated by Chinese employees 
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of the electricity department.
84
 Apart from British mills and factories in Shanghai, 
British shipping companies also suffered serious deficit during strikes. Not only were 
loading and unloading procedures suspended, but maintenance works for British 
freighters also came to a halt. Thus, import and export of British cargos in Shanghai 
were terminated. Costs for storing goods also increased.
85
 The British Foreign 
Office was even told that under such condition, “substantial orders for Manchester 
and Bradford goods have been given to German firms.”86 Apart from writing 
communist slogans on the walls in the public area,
87
 communists were keen to 
agitate workers to participate in labour strikes by disseminating inflammatory 
pamphlets everywhere in the Settlement. Daung Ling Sung and Yu Ts Yu, who were 
employees of the Oriental Cotton Mill, 36 Yangtszepoo Road, were apprehended for 
posting inflammatory handbills in premises of that factory.
88
  
  Another means adopted by the Chinese public went against foreign expatriates in 
China was to boycott western commodities. Perhaps the 1925 annual report of the 
Council can describe how tense the situation was at that time.  
 
Chinese dealers were warned that British and Japanese goods found in their 
shops would be liable to confiscation and shipping companies were 
notified that coolies would refuse to handle boycotted goods. These 
decrees were enforced by parties of students who examined goods in stores 
and at wharves and railway stations.
89
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The British American Tobacco Company, whose stocks was seized and sealed up by 
Chinese mobs, experienced at least 40% loss for their total business amount in 
1925.
90
 The deterioration of British economic interests was largely attributed to 
hysterical nationalist activities in Shanghai during the 1920s.  
  Worse still, intimidations on foreigners also paralysed business activities. In 1925, 
59 foreigners and 25 Chinese were attacked by protesters in the form of murders, 
robbery, kidnappings, assaults and threatening letters. Sailors of British ships were 
even singled out for persecution.
91
 Agents of British sugar companies were even 
intimidated by Chinese students and were forced to pay fines to the Chinese 
authorities.
92
 With a view to eliminating party traitors and nationalist agents, the red 
brigade of the Chinese Communist Party had been established before the 1930s. 
Ironically, some innocent civilians in the Settlement were even accidentally killed by 
the Red brigade.
93
 Therefore, the safety of foreigners was under serious threat. 
  As a result, trades and investments in Shanghai were seriously disturbed by the 
fervid Chinese nationalism. Foreigner merchants, especially British businessmen, 
suffered heavy economic loss. Thus, consequences of the Chinese nationalism on 
foreign trades triggered the British authorities and the municipal council to readjust 
their policies in China and Shanghai respectively.  
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The future of the Shanghai International Settlement 
The future of the International Settlement had become more unpredictable and 
worrying since the late 1920s. After defeating different warlords, the Kuomintang 
under Jiang Jieshi’s leadership eventually completed the northern expedition  
北伐 and eventually unified China under a single regime. The event that signified 
the rise of China was the Kuomintang’s recovery on the Hankou 漢口 concession. 
Confronted with massive Chinese demonstrators and Kuomintang supporters, Royal 
Marines soldiers were forced to evacuate British subjects in Hankou and returned 
this British concession to the Nationalists in February 1927.
94
 Meanwhile, the 
strengthening of the Kuomintang regime was also evidenced in the Nanjing incident 
南京事件 happened in March 1927. Whilst entering the city of Nanjing, some 
soldiers of the Northern expeditionary force 國民革命軍 participated in looting 
activities, resulting in some causalities of western subjects.
95
 However, it was 
infeasible, if not impossible, for the imperial powers to solve this dispute by force 
similar to what they did in the case of the Boxer Uprising twenty-seven years earlier. 
Eventually, foreign powers including Britain did not impose any sanctions on China 
in order not to further stir up Chinese hostilities on westerners.
96
 Financial 
compensation made by the Kuomintang government to the foreign powers was a 
symbol showing the Republic of China earned recognitions from countries overseas.  
Undoubtedly, the advance of the Nationalist government in Shanghai also 
pressured the British authorities. With a view to exerting its dominant influence in 
Shanghai, the Nationalist government not only set up yellow unions among the 
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labour classes,
97
 but it also politically emasculated Chinese capitalists in Shanghai.
98
 
Furthermore, Chinese representatives in the Municipal Council were also closely 
connected with the Kuomintang authorities.
99
 Concerning the issue of the 
extraterritoriality, the Chinese government attempted to abolish the unequal treaties 
signed between the Qing government and the foreign powers.
100
 Jiang Jieshi even 
promised Chinese merchants in 1927 that he would restore foreign concessions in 
three years.
101
 The control over the Settlement Court in Shanghai, which symbolised 
the national sovereignty, was anxiously wanted by the Nationalist government.
102
 
More importantly, the use of military force was no longer applicable in 
suppressing disturbances in China since the late 1920s. Unifying China successfully 
by a well-trained armed force, Jiang Jieshi emphasised that the new-established 
Nationalists government would not be frightened by any kinds of violence.  
 
    If foreign powers continued to point their guns towards China, such  
action will fail to protect lives and property of western settlers and it will also be 
harmful on foreign interests. China nowadays is utterly different with herself in 
the 19
th
 century. The National Revolutionary Army 國民革命軍 will not only 
protect foreign subjects, but they will not be afraid of any violence and 
demonstrations. Therefore, it is unnecessary for other countries to dispatch their 
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troops in China.
103
 
 
Not only were Chinese armies been strengthened by 1927, but western powers also 
lacked a consensus in providing additional military reinforcements in defending 
Shanghai because of various reasons.
104
 Meanwhile, after experiencing the 
nightmare of the First World War in the mid-1910s, the British public was weary of 
wars in general. Therefore, neither external nor internal factors favoured Britain to 
engage in any war theatres.
105
 Knowing the impossibility to protect British interests 
in China, the Service Ministries in Britain even informed the Secretary for foreign 
Affairs Austen Chamberlain that “…the forces required for defence may be larger 
than we had supposed… what we have either available or capable of being readily 
made available is not more than enough for Shanghai and Tianjin.”106 As a result, in 
spite of the fact that Britain eventually dispatched troops to Shanghai in early 1927, 
Austen Chamberlain and the British Ambassador to China Miles Lampson 
understood that they could not alleviate anti-British sentiments solely relying on 
military presence. It was because the Shanghai International Settlement and other 
British concessions in China were indeed indefensible. 
Furthermore, the spread of communism in the Far East also aroused anxiety of the 
British government whose economic interests were deeply rooted in China. The 
British authorities believed that Russia “never ceased their efforts to destroy 
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organised society in all civilised countries, first of all and most of all in the British 
Empire itself.”107 Antony best even argues that the existence of the Comintern 
temporarily diverted Britain’s attention from her concern on the Japanese 
aggression.
108
 Whilst showing his opinion to his colleague, the Lord President of the 
Council Arthur Balfour even believed that the Soviets would not only intervene in 
the Chinese politics by expelling other foreign powers, but it would also utilised its 
influence in China to stir up insurgencies in the East Indies controlled by Britain and 
the Netherlands.
109
 In addition, British diplomats also worried about the intrusion of 
communism in British India and Afghanistan due to their geographical proximity to 
China.
110
 Meanwhile, in his dispatch written to the British Foreign Office in 1930, 
the British Consul in Shanghai J.F. Brenan reported that communist outposts near 
Yangtse River would create disturbances in industrial and strategic centres located in 
Hankou and Shanghai. According to the intelligence, well-trained and armed Red 
Partisan detachments were attached to different major cities, waiting for instructions 
from Moscow to instigate mass upheavals in China.
111
 Threatened by communist 
activities, the British authorities in China had to check the expansion of communist 
activities by all means. As a consequence, Britain was keen to express her sympathy 
to the Kuomintang regime which was anti-communist in nature.
112
 Only by 
cooperating with the Kuomintang regime could the British authorities effectively 
alleviate anti-foreign sentiments and could repress the spread of communism in Asia.  
Indeed, the British informal empire in China was on the brink of expulsion and 
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extinction. Nevertheless, surrendering the entire Settlement and the privilege of the 
extraterritoriality to the Kuomintang at once was unwise according to Whitehall 
policy-makers. The British authorities and even King George V recognised that it 
was necessary, if not compulsory, to protect and retain the British sphere of influence 
in Shanghai where enormous British commercial interests was located.
113
 Compared 
to Hong Kong and other British treaty ports in China, Shanghai alone contributed 
£151.53 million out of £200 million of the total British interests in China in 1929. 
British settlers in Shanghai had also obtained approximately 90% of the land owned 
by foreigners between 1901 and 1902. The Butterfield & Swire and the Jardine 
Matheson were even the two main companies dominating coastal trades in 
Shanghai.
114
 Whilst explaining policies of the British Foreign Office in China to his 
colleague Ramsay MacDonald, Chamberlain even stressed that he could not tolerate 
the expulsion of the British presence in Shanghai and Canton if negotiation failed.
115
  
  Moreover, the British government and commercial firms had positive projections 
towards the future of China where massive and vigorous improvements in different 
aspects were shown, in terms of the education, the literature, medal supports, 
athletics and the commerce.
116
 Despite the communist intrusion in the Far East, J. F. 
Brenan firmly believed that China would get rid of communism. Being proud of their 
own cultures and civilisation, the Chinese would not be utterly assimilated by 
communism since “the principles of Marx are foreign to the Chinese conception of 
things.”117 Firmly believing that China was the largest underdeveloped market in the 
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world, the British authorities were encouraged to retain their interests in China where 
economic growths were anticipated.
118
 An increasing demand of foreign goods was 
evidenced by looking at revenue figures. Even though China was on the brink of 
wars in the late 1920s and the early 1930s, customs authorities received increasing 
revenue figures of foreign import returns, rising from 4,120,701 Taels in 1929 to 
4,283,344 Taels in 1930.
119
 The expected prosperity of Shanghai was heavily 
emphasised by Brenan in his report to Lampson. With a view to keeping away from 
the Sino-Japanese hostility, many wealthy classes would seek for refugee with their 
capitals in the International Settlement where protection was secured by foreign 
powers.
120
 Therefore, Brenan believed that once the order was restored, “there 
would be a boom in trade as Shanghai had never known in its previous history.”121 
Therefore, Britain had to be very cautious in relinquishing her privileges in China. 
While illustrating his opinion towards the prospect of China in his report, K. Lung, 
staff of the Perrin’s Limited in Shanghai, urged the British government to treasure 
opportunities to trade with China which was considered by him as the next world 
market.
122
 Lung even believed that it was worthwhile for Britain to declare war on 
Japan for the sake of protecting British interests in China and other parts of the 
British Empire.  
 
    I believe that even a war with Japan would be preferable to letting Japan take                
all the India markets, squeezing England out in Australia, in South Africa, in  
the Dutch Colonies and dominate China!
123
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As a result, given that Shanghai was of paramount importance to Britain, the British 
Foreign Office would therefore asked the Shanghai Municipal Council to provide 
more concessions to the Chinese and to develop municipal administrations in 
response to growing demands of the Chinese society in Shanghai.
124
 
Apart from having tremendous interests and positive projections in Shanghai, the 
British government was also afraid of the nature of the Chinese legal system. British 
settlers never believed that the Republic of China shared similar liberal values and 
autonomous judicial frameworks with the western world. Not only were they dubious 
on the neutrality and the objectivity of the Chinese legal system, but they also had no 
confidence on the autocratic rule of the Kuomintang based on the Continental 
European model. In spite of the Chinese government’s endeavour to modernise law 
codes, the judicial system in republican China still failed to provide independent and 
impartial judgements to British settlers who believed in the Anglo-Saxon legal 
tradition.
125
 A manager of an engineering firm also opposed dispensing with the 
extraterritoriality as the abolition of German extraterritoriality in China during World 
War One was an alert to the British. He also argued the Chinese courts would first 
protect Chinese interests provided that there were disputes between Chinese buyers 
and British firms.
126
 Apart from judicial frameworks, British settlers also had no 
confidence on the type of municipal government practiced by the Chinese authorities. 
Imitating the Continental European model, the Chinese Municipality in Shanghai 
was far from independent and democratic compared to the Anglo-Saxon model 
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which comprised an elected council with legislative and financial controls only.
127
 
Knowing about difficulties in implementing the Anglo-Saxon model in China, 
Lampson believed that the success of the Chinese political transformation not only 
required foreign leadership and control, but it would also take years to accomplish.
128
 
It was impossible for Britain to accept the repudiation of extraterritoriality at once. 
Therefore, British diplomats and merchants insisted on the transfer of political power 
to China gradually depending on China’s reform progress. 
  As pointed out by Lampson and Chamberlain, peace and amity, which were the 
primary concerns of British merchants, were prerequisites for trade in China.
129
 
Therefore, two main principles adopted by the British government in the late 1920s 
were to support a Chinese run-government in Shanghai with foreign involvements 
and to transfer power to the Chinese gradually. It was anticipated by Lampson that a 
municipality of Greater Shanghai would be entitled to govern the International 
Settlement, the French Concession, the harbour and the Chinese districts “under a 
Chinese municipal administration with some form of adequate foreign participation 
in municipal affairs so far as they concern foreign interest.”130 Furthermore, 
Lampson also reassured the need for the gradual sinification of the municipal council 
and other governmental bodies. At the same time the Chinese were educated in 
western theories and practices of a municipal government which would not be 
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harmful to foreign interests.
131
 Subsequently, Miles Lampson concluded that his task 
in China was to strive for a balance between protecting British vested interests and 
the satisfaction of legitimate Chinese national aspiration. Yet Lampson also 
emphasised that the hysterical Chinese could not get all concessions at once. Thus, 
only by transferring power gradually could secure the safety of British economic 
interests in China.
132
 With a view to facilitating Lampson’s negotiation with the 
Chinese authorities, Chamberlain was also pushing hard to seek for the support from 
the British parliament at home.
133
 
  Therefore, the British government employed the strategy with both “reason and 
force” in Shanghai for the sake of saving the empire in the face of the fervid Chinese 
nationalism.
134
 The scenario in Shanghai in the mid-1920s echoed the condition in 
southern China. As Edmund Fung argues in his book The Diplomacy of Imperial 
Retreat, Whitehall politicians adopted the policy of “combining conciliation with 
firmness”, alleviating the Chinese nationalism while protecting British life and 
properties at the same time.
135
 Even before the Kuomintang rose to power, Britain 
began to readjust its foreign policies in China in the mid-1920s. Whilst stationing 
adequate amount of troops to some treaty ports for self-defence, the British 
diplomatic authorities in China initiated negotiations with regional Chinese 
authorities about the issue of the treaty revision.
136
 More concessions were even 
made by the British government after the Kuomintang’s completion of the northern 
expedition in 1928. With the exception of the extraterritoriality, the British Foreign 
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Office was willing to surrender an array of economic and diplomatic privileges to the 
Kuomintang government, relinquishing tariff and taxation, the customs 
administration, the service of China’s debt and leased territories.137 Therefore, the 
reforms that the Shanghai Municipal Council carried out were in line with 
readjustments of British diplomatic policies in different part of China during the 
mid-1920s. 
As a result, forcible measures were employed only to protect British interests in 
case of any emergencies and disturbances in Shanghai. Composed of approximately 
16,000 servicemen from Britain and India, the Shanghai Defence Force was 
dispatched to Shanghai for a self-defence purpose.
138
 Lampson never intended to see 
many British soldiers “kicking their heels in Shanghai” unless their presence was 
really necessary.
139
 Chamberlain was even anxious and dubious that the British 
Consul in Shanghai Sidney Barton would instruct British soldiers to suppress 
Chinese demonstrations which were not a policy of His Majesty’s Government.140 In 
the worst scenario, the British government prepared for evacuating all British 
inhabitants and properties in China, including Lampson himself.
141
 When conditions 
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became more stable and negotiations were effective in China, the Cabinet began to 
pressure Chamberlain to reduce the number of troops in August 1927.
142
 Later, 
Chamberlain eventually agreed with the Secretary of State for War Laming 
Worthington-Evans that it was unnecessary for the British military authorities to keep 
a massive number of soldiers in China in 1929.
143
 Obviously, British military 
presence in Shanghai in the late 1920s was mainly defensive in nature and was 
different from British troops employed to invade Beijing during the Boxer uprising 
in 1900.  
  Conversely, Lampson and Chamberlain agreed to start liberal and peaceful 
negotiations with the Chinese authorities with regard to the issue of the treaty 
revision. Before the Kuomintang controlled the entire country effectively, 
Chamberlain had authorised Lampson to initiate negotiations with the Nationalist 
regime concerning the future of Shanghai in 1927.
144
 Recognising foreign privileges 
in China as a kind of political servitude, Lampson agreed that the extraterritoriality 
and all other treaty questions should be abolished gradually.
145
 Regarding the 
retention of Shanghai as a commercial centre, Frederick Whyte advocated to secure a 
stable socio-political environment for British economic interests at the expense of 
sacrificing some political power. He held a view that the British authorities in 
Shanghai should prepare other opportunities for greater Chinese involvements in the 
municipal administrations in the future.
146
 In fact, Lampson understood that an array 
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of political and judiciary issues originating from the extraterritoriality might further 
agitate the Sino-British hostility in Shanghai.
147
 Though the British authorities were 
ready to relinquish some of their privileges, it didn’t mean a total submission to the 
Chinese. Provided that the safety of British interests was guaranteed, the British 
government was willing to reach different agreements with the Chinese authorities 
about the gradual abolishment of certain degree of foreign rights in Shanghai.
148
 
Unquestionably, the British only gave up relatively insignificant privileges at the 
very beginning. The more stable and reformed China was, the more concessions the 
British would made.
149
 As a result, the British Foreign office pressured the Shanghai 
Municipal Council to meet Chinese demands by carrying out internal reforms in the 
Settlement. In the following section, I will examine significances of the 
reconstruction of the judicial institutions in Shanghai which would favour the 
Shanghai Municipal Police and the Kuomintang authorities to arrest and extradite the 
communists in the future. 
Legal reforms of the International Mixed Court 
Confronted with unfavourable circumstances which seriously disturbed trades 
and investments in China, the British Foreign Office planned to alleviate the 
Sino-British hostility by gradually transferring power back to the Chinese. 
Apparently, British officials believed that the Sino-British relations and foreign 
interests in China could only be secured by introducing gradual reforms and changes 
in the Settlement. Politically, the British Foreign Office pressured the Shanghai 
Municipal Council to include more Chinese members in municipal managements in 
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the mid-1920s as mentioned by Robert Bickers.
150
 British merchants echoed the 
British government’s decision by showing their supports to the Chinese in the 
Ratepayer Annual Meeting.
151
 Thus, the Settlement authorities first reached a 
consensus with the Chinese in 1926 to allow three Chinese councillors to join the 
council.
152
 Five years later, the Shanghai Municipal Council even agreed to add two 
more places for the Chinese in the council, making five Chinese councillors in 
total.
153
 Undoubtedly, appointing pro-Kuomintang Chinese members in the council 
was the first step for the Nationalist government to penetrate its influence into the 
Settlement in the following decade.  
Yet, compared to political reforms, judicial reconstructions was of utmost 
importance leading to the incarceration, the extradition and the reformation of 
communists. With regard to legal frameworks in the International Settlement, both 
the British and the Chinese authorities had undergone an endless process in 
discussing the shift of judicial power by the mid-1920s. In fact, before the 
Kuomintang regime rose to power in 1927, the Shanghai Municipal Council and the 
British diplomatic authorities negotiated with Sun Chuanfang 孫傳芳’s warlord 
government about the repudiation of the extraterritoriality. This was a consequence 
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of the fervid Chinese nationalism caused by the May Thirtieth incident in 1925.
154
 
The International Mixed Court 會審公廨, which was dominated by westerners since 
its establishment in 1869, was renamed as the Shanghai Provisional Court 上海臨時
法院 after the Rendition Agreement became effective in 1927, attaining a foremost 
step in returning part of legal authorities to China. With the exception of cases which 
involved the right of consular jurisdiction, all civil and criminal cases in the 
International Settlement would be tried in the Provisional Court and its successive 
institution.
155
 After the expiry of the first agreement in 1930, the Nationalist 
government and other western diplomatic bodies reached a consensus to renew the 
agreement. Not only was the Provisional Court reshuffled into the Shanghai No.1 
Special District Court 上海第一特區地方法院, but the Jiangsu High Court No.2 
branch 江蘇高等法院第二分院 was also established inside the Settlement in 1930 
to deal with appeal cases. Aide from the International Settlement, the French 
concession also reached an agreement with China with regard to the transfer of 
judicial power at the same time. The Shanghai No.2 Special District Court 上海第二
特區地方法院 and the Jiangsu High Court No.3 branch 江蘇高等法院第三分院
were founded to deal with first trials and appeal cases respectively. From then on, 
judicial systems of two foreign concessions almost run in line with that of China by 
1930s.
156
 
During the transformation of Settlement’s legal frameworks in the 1920 and the 
1930 decade, the Nationalist government exerted its profound influence in judicial 
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institutions of the International Settlement. Thanks to Yao Yuan’s effort, we can 
understand the increasing dominance of the Kuomintang regime in the settlement 
court through studying the evolution of the International Mixed Court.
157
 In the 
following paragraph, I examine how thee reorganisation of the settlement court fit 
into the context of the arrest of communists.  
  Concerning the application of legal systems, Chinese law codes and procedures of 
gradually replaced those of the former Mixed Court. Firmly believing that 
implementing Chinese legal regulations in foreign concessions was indisputable, 
Lampson even thought that applying Chinese laws in British courts in China would 
be an excellent way to initiate the revision of the unequal treaties.
158
 Although the 
Shanghai Provisional Court began to enforce Chinese legal law codes drafted by Sun 
Chuanfang’s warlord government in the Settlement, established rules of procedures 
of the former Mixed Court 會審公廨訴訟慣例 and terms of the rendition 
agreement were also taken into consideration.
159
 By the 1930s, the Shanghai No.1 
Special District Court only executed the civil and criminal codes of the Republic of 
China 中華民國民法、中華民國刑法 and their associated legal procedures 中華民
國民事訴訟法、中華民國刑事訴訟法 in accordance with the agreement made 
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between the British and the Chinese authorities.
160
 Besides, jails inside the 
Settlement had to run in line with Chinese prison regulations. The Shanghai Special 
District Court had an authority to decide whether convicts in the Settlement should 
be incarcerated in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol or other Chinese prisons outside 
foreign concessions.
161
 The following chapters in this thesis show that the 
Nationalist regime fully availed itself of the Chinese criminal codes and procedures 
to arrest, to extradite and even to convert communist members living in the 
International Settlement.  
Moreover, the Kuomintang authorities had absolute controls over appointments of 
important personnel of the Settlement Court. Taking advantage of the internal turmoil 
in China during the 1911 Revolution, consular bodies took over the management of 
the International Mixed Court and privately assigned approved Chinese candidates as 
magistrates.
162
 Nevertheless, the practice of appointing judicial personnel underwent 
tremendous change after the May Thirtieth incident. According to the rendition 
agreement signed in 1926, the Chinese government reserved a right to appoint a 
president 庭長 and judges 推事 of the Provisional Court, as well as judges of the 
Court of Appeal 上訴庭推事.163 After 1930, the renewed agreement even 
empowered the Chinese authorities to designate their candidates for the position of a 
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registrar 書記官長 which was in charge of financial and administrative works of the 
court.
164
 As a result, trials and the administrations of the Settlement court were 
under heavy surveillance of the Chinese government. Appointed by the Nationalist 
regime, magistrates in the Settlement were subject to the influence of the 
Kuomintang authorities. No wonder why many western settlers never believed 
Chinese judicial system was competent to provide independent and unbiased 
judgements.
165
 As shown in later sections, the political inclination of the court was 
particularly obvious when communists were tried by pro-Kuomintang magistrates.  
  Most importantly, the practice of consular representatives sitting jointly in the 
court 會審 and watching proceedings 觀審 were completely terminated by 1930. 
The existence of consular personnel in the court could be traced back to the time 
when the International Mixed Court was established in 1869. [Please refer to 
appendix 5] Provided that cases were consisted of disputes between westerners and 
Chinese, consular bodies would send their representatives to try Chinese magistrates 
appointed by the Qing government. Owing to the discontinuance of the Qing 
Dynasty after 1911, consular deputies even interfered in cases concerning purely 
Chinese interests.
166
 In spite of the fact that the rendition agreement in 1926 limited 
consular personnel’s involvement in different cases in specific circumstances,167 
                                                 
164
 Yao Yuan 姚遠，A study of the Shanghai Special District Court《上海公共租界特區法院研
究》，81 
165
 G.W. Swire, The Possibilities of the Shanghai Negotiations, 14
th
 April, 1932, Avon paper, 3  
166
 (The problem of legal control) 〈司法管轄問題〉，Wu, Chuanyi 吳圳義，[Shanghai Zujie Wenti]
《上海租界問題》The problem of the Shanghai International Settlement (Taipei: Zhengzhong 
bookstore [正中書局], 1981), 175 
167
 “(iii) In criminal cases which directly affect the peace and order of the International Settlement, 
including contraventions of the Land Regulations and Bye laws of the International Settlement, and in 
all criminal cases in which the accused is in the employ of a foreigner having extra-territorial rights, 
the senior consul may appoint a deputy to sit with the judge to watch the proceeding. (v) In cases in 
which a foreigner having extra-territorial rights or the Shanghai Municipal Council is the plaintiff in a 
civil action, and in criminal cases in which a foreigner having extra-territorial rights is the 
complainant, the consul of the nationality concerned or the senior consul may send an official to sit 
jointly with the judge in accordance with the treaties.” See Article 1, “consular committee’s revision 
of modified Chinese proposal of July 2, 1926”, in Foreign Office files for China, ref.: FO371/11686, 
49 
 
 
consular deputies still exerted enormous influence in decisions made by the court in 
many important and controversial cases.
168
 With a view to expressing their 
disagreements with judges appointed by the Chinese government, consular officials 
and their deputies could even record his objections.
169
 The authority of the president 
and magistrates were therefore severely undermined by the presence of consular 
personnel. Eventually, the repudiation of consular officials’ presence in the court 
allowed Chinese magistrates to be exempt from foreign interference.
170
 Thus, the 
Kuomintang successfully overcame this hurdle in order to implement its instructions 
in the International Settlement. 
In accordance with Lampson’s idea, the adequate retention of western influence 
was still necessary for the sake of protecting foreign interests in the Settlement. 
Although the Chinese government recovered most of its legal power in the settlement 
court, the issue concerning the execution of court orders still revealed the remaining 
western dominance in the settlement judiciary. Indeed, it was true that procurators 
檢察官 employed by the Chinese government were authorised to carry out 
prosecution procedures by virtue of articles from 103 to 186 of the Chinese Criminal 
Code after 1930. Nevertheless, the prosecution power of Chinese procurators was 
inapplicable to cases which were processed by the Shanghai Municipal Police or 
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were within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Court.
171
 Therefore, the preservation 
of municipal police’s prosecution power could possibly safeguard interests of foreign 
settlers in the Settlement. Yet, the municipal police were almost cooperative with the 
Chinese authorities in dealing with arrests and the extradition of communists in the 
International Settlement.  
  It was of paramount importance that the reorganisations of the Settlement judiciary 
since the mid-1920s had significant impact on arrests of communists coordinated by 
the Chinese and the Settlement authorities. The neutrality and the impartiality of the 
court in the Settlement were infringed in consequence of the Kuomintang’s 
interference. The implementation of Chinese law codes and procedures in the 
Settlement allowed the Chinese authorities to handle communist suspects in 
accordance with inhumane regulations and the political indoctrination. Not only did 
the Chinese criminal code 中華民國刑法 authorise enforcement officers to arrest 
any suspects involved in any kinds of activities against the internal security of the 
republic 危害民國, but the regulation governing the reformatories 反省院條例 
also forced non-repentant political offenders to relocate from the Settlement jail to 
the Chinese reformatories. Next, China’s appointments of judicial personnel also 
obstructed the judicial independence of the settlement court. Whilst dealing with 
political cases, Chinese magistrates favoured the Chinese government by extraditing 
communists found in the Settlement to the Kuomintang authorities. Blamed for his 
failure to secure the successful extradition in a communist case, a president of the 
court was even dismissed by Jiang Jieshi.
172
 Last but not least, the cancellation of 
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consular personnel’s involvement in judicial cases allowed Chinese influence to 
penetrate fluently into the settlement court. The following chapters show hardly 
could the municipal police refuse to carry on court orders except for cases consisted 
of foreign interests. Thus, the above political and judicial reforms made by the 
Settlement authorities formed the backdrop for arresting communists. 
In the nutshell, the situation of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the British 
Foreign office in the 1920s could fit into the context stated by John Darwin in his 
book The Empire Project. London had to readjust its diplomatic policies based on 
local circumstances. Before the 1920s, the British government had no interest to 
intervene in the politics of the International Settlement and granted autonomy to 
British subjects in China. When the Chinese nationalism became more fervid, the 
British government began to seize back the power from British communities because 
the existence of its informal empire in China was in danger. 
Eventually, no wonder British economic interests in China survived at the expense 
of the political and judicial power of the Settlement. British settlers, including the 
council staff and the municipal police were forced to accept such reality. The 
appointments of new Chinese councillors who had close connections with the 
Kuomintang first weakened western influence inside the council. More importantly, 
the implementation of Chinese legal codes and prison regulations in the International 
Settlement not only prevented the Shanghai Municipal Council from protecting its 
own Chinese residents in arrests and the extradition procedure, but it also forced the 
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municipal gaol to transfer its political offenders to a Chinese reformatory in Soochow. 
Worse still, the Kuomintang regime even pressured the Settlement authorities to 
provide convenience for arresting and extraditing communist convicts by violating 
formal legal procedures. The following three chapters reveal how British expatriates 
became faithful allies in eliminating communists not only because of their 
anti-Bolshevik beliefs, but also because of their fear about the strengthening of the 
Kuomintang government supported by the extreme Chinese nationalism.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ARREST 
 “‘In case of bookshop selling anti-government books, no charge should be preferred against the shop 
proprietor or manager unless the Police can prove that the accused knowingly and intentionally 
propagates doctrines contrary to People’s Three Principles. Failure to examine books by the 
proprietor or manager before the same is offered for sale is not sufficient to constitute an offence.’ In 
executing warrants issued by the Shanghai Special District Court at the instance of the Chinese 
authorities, it will not be necessary to observe the terms of the above advice.”173 
 
                            T.P. Givens, Officer i/c Special Branch, Shanghai Municipal Police 
 
The first episode that illustrated readjustments of British imperial policies in 
Shanghai was arrests of communists. Before going into details of arrests, we have to 
understand the context of the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force in the 
face of communist intrusion. In what ways did the idea of Britishness affect the 
perception of the Settlement authorities on communists? Racially, Gary B. Magee 
and Andrew S. Thompson regarded British settlers overseas as the kith and kin of the 
British in the United Kingdom. The broad sense of “Britishness” facilitated the 
construction of social networks as it provided a sense of pan-imperial and cultural 
unity among British migrants in different colonies.
174
 The principle of 
“Ethnic-British Sameness” raised by Stuart Ward also suggests that white settler 
community residing or working in the empire shared same ties of blood and 
culture.
175
 Thence that British expatriates in Shanghai adopted similar attitude with 
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their kith and kin at home towards communists was reasonable. In spite of the fact 
that spreading communist ideas was largely tolerated in the metropole, communism 
was never prevalent in British societies. Andrew Thorpe explains reasons for the 
unpopularity of communism in Britain during the inter-war years in his book. Not 
only did communists scare capitalists by advocating the idea of ‘social democracy’, 
but Britain also recovered fairly from the First World War compared with other 
belligerent states.
176
 Interests of workers and trade unions were also represented by 
the British Labour Party which was the forerunner of labour movements. 
Subsequently, the British Communist Party never won supports from the British 
public. As an ally of communists who shared some similar social values, the Labour 
Party even alienated communists in the election in the 1920s.
177
 Throughout the 
inter-war period, there were only three Members of Parliament from the British 
Communist Party since its establishment in 1920.  
  Moreover, the internal development of communism in Britain threatened survival 
of British interests in the world. John Callaghan and Ben Harker describe many 
communist activities inside and outside Britain in their co-edited book.
178
 In fact, 
many British communists even provided assistance for colonial subjects exploited by 
westerners throughout the British Empire.
179
 As one of historians studying 
communism in Britain, East Wind’s author Buchanan argues that China itself was a 
fascination in the views of British leftists although backwardness was the prevailing 
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perception on China in the 1920s.
180
 Thus, such idea aroused sympathy among 
leftists in the western world and motivated many communists to help China in the 
20
th
 century. Undeniably, British communists tried their best to pressure the British 
government to adopt lenient policies towards China. In the 1920s, with a view to 
preventing invasion from taking place in China, the “Hands off China” movement 
successfully forced the government to put the Shanghai Defence Force in a purely 
defensive role for protecting British nationals in China. It was not until the 1960s that 
British leftists withdrew their supports. It was because they finally understood that 
the People’s Republic of China was an autocratic regime as shown in different 
political movements.
181
 Recently released KV2 series files in the National Archive 
disclose how British intelligence departments such as the MI5 spared no effort to 
keep many European communist notables under heavy surveillance in response to the 
amalgamation between communism and nationalism in British colonies overseas.
182
 
Therefore, Britain closely monitored movements of many notable communists, 
providing the intelligence to police and the intelligence authorities throughout the 
British Empire.  
Furthermore, the nature of colonial police forces in the British Empire also 
contributed to arrests of communists. In an imperial context, not only did policemen 
pay more attention to the interest of the sovereign state, but political cases were 
always connected to criminal levels.
183
 This was particularly true when British 
expatriates were eager to establish their authorities in colonies or sphere of influence 
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at the beginning of colonisation.
184
 Georgina Sinclair argues in her work At the end 
of the line that the escalation of the colonial police power revived again during the 
post-war decolonisation period. With the intensification of the violence in 
independent movements, colonial police forces obtained greater power in developing 
intelligence and counter-insurgency units for the sake of the empire’s survival.185 
Sinclair even described policing the declining empire as a kind of “dirty war” 
compared to “the English style of policing by consent.”186 Georgina mainly focuses 
on military and intelligence aspects to justify her argument which shows the 
expansion of the colonial police power. However, she places little emphasis on the 
relationship between the judicial system and the police power. It was true that the 
British informal empire in China was at risk because of the spread of communism. 
Antony Best illustrates British intelligence departments were preoccupied by the 
expansion of communism in the Far East during the 1920s.
187
  
As part of imperial policing networks, the Shanghai Municipal Police also took a 
negative view towards communism. The International Settlement therefore began to 
apprehend communists interrupting the social stability in Shanghai since the 
mid-1920s. For example, those communists or agitators who stirred up labour strikes 
and distributed inflammatory pamphlets to civilians at the Settlement would be taken 
to custody, waiting for trials in the Mixed Court.
188
 Besides, informed by different 
foreign consulates, the municipal police had also kept an eye on movements of 
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different western communist agents in Shanghai.
189
 Indeed, a sophisticated 
intelligence network was built between the municipal police, French concession 
police, foreign embassies,
190
 and even colonial police forces overseas.
191
 Equipped 
with heavy weapons and armoured vehicles, the Reserve Unit, which was described 
by Leroy Thompson as the first Special Weapons and Tactics team (SWAT) in the 
world, was also founded to suppress mass demonstrations, strikes and disturbances in 
the settlement.
192
 [Please refer to appendix 4] Meanwhile, with the hope to pacify 
the fervid Chinese nationalism after the outbreak of the May Thirtieth incident in 
1925, the Shanghai International Settlement, foreign consulates and Sun Chuanfang’s 
Jiangsu provincial government jointly signed the Mixed Court Agreement in 1926.
193
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Subsequently, the implementation of Chinese legal codes and procedures in the 
International Settlement established the legitimacy for the Nationalist Government to 
request the Settlement for assistance when arresting communists later.
194
 However, it 
is worth noticing to discuss how the mentality and procedures of the Shanghai 
Municipal Police varied in apprehending communists after the arrival of the 
Nationalists who were extremely anti-communist. 
  In spite of their endeavours to restore the history of the Shanghai Mixed Court in 
the existing literature, scholars have neglected methods and procedures employed by 
the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force in tackling the issue of arresting 
communists in Shanghai. The attitude of the British and the Settlement authorities on 
the nationalism and the communism in Shanghai has been attached with greater 
weight by different scholars. Robert Bickers argues that British settlers in Shanghai 
were forced to compromise with the Chinese in various respects under the pressure 
from the British Foreign Office since the late 1920s.
195
 Nevertheless, focusing 
mainly on the localisation of British commercial and religious sectors in China, 
Bickers places less emphasis on the transformation of political and legal activities in 
foreign concessions between 1927 and 1937”.196 Thus, the execution of police 
power of the Shanghai Municipal Police during the rise of Jiang Jieshi remains 
unexplored. Leroy Thompson makes a good attempt to study reactions of the 
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municipal police in dealing with mass demonstrations under the turmoil attributed to 
different political movements. Indeed, police riot squads were deployed to suppress 
mass demonstrations and strikes agitated by communists.
197
 Yet Thompson’s book 
merely depicts the municipal police’s strategic planning and utilisation of weapons 
on crowd controls. How to curb down the sources of unrest through legal procedures 
is still unexamined.
198
 
  In addition, the perspective of the Nationalist regime in arrests was also 
unexplored. Frederic Wakeman attributes the failure of the modernisation of 
bureaucracy and institution in Shanghai to the “lamentable durability of 
governmentalised autocracy” under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi.199 Although 
Frederic Wakeman illustrated the collaboration between the municipal police, French 
police and Chinese intelligence agents in arresting communists, he mainly intends to 
use this example to explain the stagnancy of regular police works in Chinese 
territories and radical rightist ideologies possessed by Jiang’s officers.200 
Nonetheless, criminal procedures employed by the municipal police in handling 
communist arrests were not included in his chapter about the reds.  
  Strategies and tactics employed by the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai 
during the 1920s and 1930s are well-noted by S.A. Smith and Patricia Stranahan. The 
former focused on the united front period when the Nationalists were still an ally of 
communists, whereas the latter studied the decade after the split between the 
Kuomintang and the reds in 1927. Smith highlights efforts of communists in 
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mobilising the mass to openly revolt against warlords and westerners. The leading 
role of the communist party in agitating disturbances in the May Thirtieth incident in 
the International Settlement and armed uprisings against warlord are examined by 
Smith.
201
 Yet, what happened after 1927 is utterly omitted by the author. 
Conceivably, Stranahan further explores the changing patterns of communist 
activities in Shanghai during the Nanjing decade. Driven underground in response to 
political suppressions, Shanghai communists began to abandon pure Marxist idea 
taught by the Commintern, and ingratiated themselves with other patriotic 
organisations to fight against the Kuomintang and imperialists.
202
 In spite of the fact 
that Stranahan reveals the alliance of the Chinese and the Settlement police in 
apprehending communists since the early 1930s, she does not explain judicial 
mechanisms executed by the municipal police behind the scenes.
203
 
  By looking at a legal perspective, Yao Yuan investigates the institution of the 
Settlement judicial system and the ambivalence between the Chinese authorities and 
legal departments of the Settlement in the Shanghai Special District Court. Citing 
arrests of communists as one of her examples, Yao mainly focuses on the extradition 
to illustrate the political calculation of the municipal police. The process of the 
apprehension and the issue of arrest warrants are not found in her book.
204
 Most 
importantly, Yao’s inability to consult court proceeding documents and special 
branch files of the municipal police becomes a major weakness of her book. Studying 
the Chinese criminal justice, Klaus Mühlhahn argues that the evolution of legal 
regulations in China was based on changing social conditions in the country. During 
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wars and revolutions between the 1920s and 1940s, regular legal procedures and 
standards in China were replaced by “the politicisation and the brutalisation of the 
criminal justice”.205 Nevertheless, Mühlhahn neither discusses whether his argument 
is still valid in the context of the Shanghai International Settlement, nor investigates 
if the settlement police force was influenced by the autocracy of the Chinese 
authorities.  
Not only was the foreign presence in Shanghai threatened by the fervid Chinese 
nationalism, but it was also endangered by communist assassination incidents in the 
Settlement during the early 1930s. The argument of this chapter is to reveal 
readjustments of British imperial policies in Shanghai throughout the late 1920s and 
1930s by making legal concessions in arresting communists. I also argue that the 
Shanghai Municipal Police had to rely on the strengthened Nationalist government to 
suppress communist activities for the the International Settlement’s survival. The 
loose and simplified criminal procedures were employed by the Shanghai Municipal 
Police during arrests of communists. Aside from using formal legal channels, the 
Settlement police also utilised illegal channels to cope with the Nationalists in 
apprehensions. In addition to their failure to execute warrants accordingly, the 
municipal police even arrested some communist suspects without acquiring formal 
approvals from the Shanghai Special District Court. The violation of criminal 
procedures signified the diminishing authority of the municipal police in the judicial 
system of the Settlement and paved the way for further concessions shown in 
chapters about the extradition and the reformatories. Yet, the municipal advocate and 
some of senior police officers still attempted to maintain the judicial independence of 
the International Settlement by reasserting the need to carry out any actions in the 
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light of the legal procedure. This chapter also analyses the ambivalence between the 
front-line police constables and the council staff about the issue of arresting 
communists. The infringement of the legal autonomy in foreign concession was 
eventually inevitable when the law and order of the Settlement was threatened by the 
communist intrusion. 
Complex legal procedures 
  Since the northern expedition was almost completed in April 1927, the Shanghai 
Municipal Council recognised the legitimacy of the Kuomintang in ruling over 
China.
206
 Frightened by an immediate communist invasion after General Sun 
Chuanfang in Shanghai was defeated in March 1927, the chairman of the municipal 
council Stirling Fessenden decided to cooperate with the Kuomintang to suppress 
communist activities in Shanghai. He allowed the Shanghai Green Gang, which was 
affiliated with the Kuomintang, to pass through the International Settlement and 
eventually to purge all communist bodies in Zhabei 閘北 according to instructions 
given by the Kuomintang.
207
 According to Stranahan, the Settlement authorities 
even provided the Kuomintang with the intelligence to shut down communist bodies 
in Chinese territories.
208
 This incident was later known as the “Shanghai massacre of 
1927”上海清黨. 
  From the above paragraph, it seems that the settlement authorities facilitated 
suppressions of communist activities in Chinese territory when Jiang Jieshi first 
came to power in 1927. However, the attitude of the municipal police was utterly 
opposite when the Chinese government requested the Settlement to provide more 
assistance to apprehend communists in the Settlement. Meanwhile, in spite of the 
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promulgation of modern Chinese criminal codes and procedures in Shanghai in 1928, 
the Chinese authorities did not enforce them strictly.
209
 Therefore, it was not 
surprising that there were different expectations for the Chinese and Settlement 
authorities in arresting political criminals living in the International Settlement. It 
was undoubted that complex legal procedures of the Settlement would intensify the 
confrontations between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities during arrests of 
communists. 
  The first legal controversy was the acquisition of arrest warrants from the court in 
the Settlement. Although the Chinese intelligence and police agents had been 
allowed to take part in arrests since the mid-1920s, they still had to acquire warrants 
issued by judicial authorities before reporting to police stations in the Settlement.  
  Before the arrival of the Nationalists, warrants had become a significant part of 
legal frameworks in apprehensions. According to “the Rules of procedure 1914 and 
1919 of the International Mixed Court in Shanghai”, the municipal police were the 
prosecution authority and were entitled to apply to the court for a warrant of arrest 
against people violating decrees.
210
 During an arrest, police officers were even 
requested to show a warrant to an accused.
211
 Arrests without warrants could only be 
accepted by the court if cases involved flagrant delictors 現行犯 who were 
“pursued by cries of any person”, or “possessed dangerous weapons and important 
properties.”212 Likewise, the Chinese criminal procedures promulgated in 1928 also 
stated that an arrest should be made with a warrant against an accused who was 
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“strongly suspected of having committed an offence”.213 A warrant must also be 
presented to an accused during an arrest.
214
 However, a flagrante delictor who 
owned destructive weapons or stolen property, or was committing a crime at the 
scene, could be legally arrested by policemen without any warrants.
215
 Indeed, 
before the 1930s, it was true that the municipal police sometimes apprehended 
communists without warrants provided that flagrant delictors were involved in 
crimes. Loo Yih Noong 羅亦農, a communist leader agitating many strikes in the 
Settlement, was arrested by the municipal police merely based on a report of a 
female called Shih Hwa in April 1928.
216
 Communists conducting meeting in the 
Settlement were also apprehended by policemen without presenting any warrants.
217
 
On 9
th
 August 1927, representatives of the Nationalist Military Headquarter and the 
municipal police raided 910A East Yuhang Road which was the residence of an 
armed communist. The wanted man was missing but plenty of pistols, ammunition 
and hatchets were seized in his room. Nine men found on the premise were arrested 
pending on a warrant for their extradition.
218
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Therefore, theoretically, in most of criminal cases, the Settlement and the Chinese 
police authorities should obtain warrants issued by the court before apprehending 
anyone. This arrangement should also be applicable to communist suspects who were 
sued for “against the internal security of the state” 內亂罪219 unless they were 
classified as flagrant delictors. However, since the promulgation of the law, the 
Chinese authorities did not enforce their criminal procedures accordingly when 
handling political offenders. After the strengthening of the Kuomintang, many 
communists were often arrested, imprisoned and even executed by the Chinese 
military authorities without undergoing any regular legal processes in any formal 
legal institutions. Arrested by members of “the Committee to Eradicate Communists” 
in Shanghai, a young female communist was taken to a military headquarter for trial. 
She was eventually executed by the order of General Yang Hu.
220
 The lack of formal 
legal procedures in the context of handling communist cases coincides with 
Mühlhahn’s argument. It was because formal legal structures in China were replaced 
by “politicisation and brutalisation of criminal justice” during wars and 
revolutions.
221
 
  Aside from the judicial differentiation, the antagonism between the Settlement and 
the Chinese authorities was also attributed to the nature of different police models. Dr. 
Von Kiebtner, who was an ex-adviser employed by Jiang Jieshi to train Chinese 
police officers, was interviewed by the Municipal Police in December 1929. 
He analysed disparities between the municipal police and the Chinese police 
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authorities when apprehending criminals. According to his observation and 
experience, Dr. Kiebtner believed that it was necessary for Settlement policemen to 
obtain sufficient evidence and authority before arresting anyone. He explained his 
idea to the municipal police by comparing different police systems in various 
countries. 
 
…the police system in the French Concession and the Settlement are 
contrary to police systems in China and in Germany, from which latter 
country China has copied, any of her police methods, in so far that the 
Police of the French Concession and the Settlement have no power to 
punish, whereas the police in Chinese controlled territory have power to 
arrest and detain a man indefinitely on mere suspicion, irrespective of 
whether a complaint has been made in a charge laid against the prisoner.
222
 
 
Dr. Von Kiebtner further illustrated that the Chinese authorities even regarded the 
detention methods employed by Settlement policemen in Shanghai as “a 
manifestation of weakness.”223 Indeed, the British judicial system actually did not 
favour arrest without warrants in the 1930s, provided that an accused was not a 
flagrant delictor. Ho Chi Minh 胡志明, one of the founders of the Vietnam 
Communist Party, was apprehended by the Hong Kong Police Force in 1930. In 
accordance with the decision made by the Privy Council in London, the detention of 
Ho was illegal due to the absence of a warrant. Eventually, Ho was acquitted of the 
charge against him. Ho was even allowed to travel outside Hong Kong.
224
 Despite 
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the fact that the Hong Kong Police shared similar political interests with the Chinese 
authorities and the Shanghai Municipal Police, the British judicial system, which was 
free from political control, still emphasised on the importance of fair trials for 
everyone regardless of their political affiliations. 
  As a result, the International Settlement could hardly show any “sympathy” to the 
Chinese authorities when the Kuomintang came to power. It was necessary for 
Chinese agents to apply for warrants from the Provisional Court before apprehending 
communists in the Settlement. Such principle of arrest was confirmed after the 
municipal police officers at the Hongkew Station assisted the Chinese authorities to 
arrest Tsho Meu Teong in 1124 San Siu Li, Broadway on 5
th
 July, 1927, by virtue of a 
warrant issued by General Pai Chung Hai. Tsho Meu Teong not only failed to match 
the person stated in the warrant, but his books found at the premise also contained 
nothing about communism. Therefore, the Commissioner of Police Edward Barrett 
recommended to the municipal council that “in future dispatch warrants of this 
description (issued from the Chinese authority) be dealt with only after reference to 
the Provisional Court from whom a warrant must be obtained setting forth the name 
and charge against the accused.”225 Thus, the municipal police would promise the 
Chinese authorities to initiate any arrest only after the Chinese had applied for 
warrants from the Provisional Court at the Settlement. On 16
th
 July, 1927, the 
Dalbank in 29 Szechuen Road was raided and sealed by Settlement policemen who 
received a dispatch warrant endorsed by the Provisional Court warrant from the 
Chinese authorities.” The warrant indicated that this bank was assisting 
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communists.
226
 Even requests of banning the reactionary literature in the Settlement 
must be first sent to the Provisional Court.
227
 Subsequently, orders would be issued 
from the court to the municipal police in order to make prohibitions become 
effective.
228
 On the other hand, apprehension requisitions would be rejected if the 
Chinese failed to present warrants issued by the Settlement Court. On 7
th
 September, 
1927, the Nationalist East Front Military Headquarter requested assistance from the 
settlement to arrest a communist suspect called Chou Pao-yuen. As they did not 
obtain a warrant from the Provisional Court and failed to show any descriptions, their 
requisition was eventually rejected.
229
  
In addition, the municipal police would only abide by details stated in warrants. 
Indeed, the Chinese Criminal Procedures stated that before an apprehension began, a 
warrant should be issued specifying clearly about the information of the accused 
such as his / her full name, sex, residence, facts of the case and reasons for an 
arrest.
230
 [Please refer to appendix 7] According to the Kuomintang intelligence 
chief Xu Enceng 徐恩曾, Settlement policemen would refuse to cooperate with his 
men provided that details of the accused was inaccurate.
231
 Before requesting for 
assistance, Chinese agents had to state clearly in a warrant about the personal 
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particulars of an accused such as his / her age, appearance, address and even room 
number. Even though an accused immediately jumped to another flat next to the 
reported location, the municipal police would not continue their search. This strict 
and inflexible practice was still in used occasionally in the 1930s when the 
relationship between the Settlement and the Chinese authorities was improved.
232
 
While reporting to General Jiang Jieshi, the chief of the Public Safety Bureau Wang 
Zhenxing 黃振興 admitted that although the municipal police were willing to 
provide assistance to arrest communists living in the Settlement, formalities and 
procedures for these arrests were still onerous.
233
  
Subsequently, Chinese intelligence departments were less efficient in carrying out 
their arrests due to judicial barriers set by the Settlement. This eventually intensified 
the hostility between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities. As a consequence, 
complex legal procedures led to illegal arrests of Chinese military and intelligence 
officers. On 10
th
 August, 1927, a few nationalist soldiers attempted to take a 
communist suspect called Hung Tai-nyeu into custody without noticing Settlement 
policemen. The Senior Consul’s Deputy not only protested for the extradition 
decision, but he also criticised these Chinese soldiers for kidnapping Hung. It was 
because the arrest was conducted without a proper warrant.
234
 Again, on 24
th
 
October, 1927, six Chinese detectives arrested three alleged communists near the 
North Szechuen Road and took them to Military Headquarter without noticing the 
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municipal police.
235
 Apart from apprehending Chinese suspects, the Nationalist 
government even illegally arrested British subjects such as Hong Kong Chinese and 
British Indians in the International Settlement without informing the municipal 
police. The Chinese government did not release these innocent people until the 
British embassy interfered in these cases.
236
  
  Likewise, never did the Kuomintang cooperate with the municipal police when 
arresting Indian seditionists who advocated the independence of British India.
237
  
Since the Chinese authorities refused to provide assistance to arrestiIndian 
nationalists, the municipal police illegally apprehended Indian suspects in Chinese 
controlled territory without informing Chinese policemen.
238
 This illegal arrest even 
aroused strong discontent and criticisms among Indian communities in Shanghai on 
the Chinese government in 1930.
239
 
  In short, the Shanghai Municipal Police’s desire to maintain the judicial autonomy 
of the International Settlement caused inefficiency for arresting communists wanted 
by the Chinese government. The antagonism between the International Settlement 
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and the Nationalist government would continue until the early 1930s when the 
Shanghai Municipal Police gradually realised that the safety of the Settlement was 
seriously threatened by communist assassination cases in Shanghai.  
 
Security crises and the Red Brigade 
The early 1930s were a watershed that illustrates how the policy of the 
International Settlement was changed when arresting communists. In accordance 
with Stranahan, the shifting attitude of the municipal police could partly be explained 
by the increasing communist propagation on foreign troops in the 1930s.
240
 Some 
police constables of the municipal police even engaged in communist activities.
241
 
Besides, since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the new united front policy 
employed by communists to ally with patriotic organisations in Shanghai further 
worsened the turmoil.
242
 It seems that purifying law enforcement officers and 
eliminating the source of contamination became more important for the Shanghai 
Municipal Police.  
  Nevertheless, I suggest that the survival of the Settlement and the imperial 
presence strengthened the determination of the municipal police to remove 
communists. Confronted with a mixture of the nationalism and the communism in 
China, British expatriates could no longer maintain their existence by themselves 
alone. The inability of the municipal police to deal with communist assassination 
incidents in the Settlement inevitably forced itself to cooperate with the Chinese 
authorities wholeheartedly when apprehending communists. Indeed, such view is 
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recognised by Fredrick Wakeman who stresses that the Settlement was more willing 
to provide its “entire help and collaboration in the campaign against the Chinese 
Communist Party” because of British settlers’ intention to check communist advance 
in the city.
243
 As a result, the deadlock between the Settlement and the Chinese 
authorities to arrest communists was solved in the early 1930s because the internal 
security of the Settlement was severely threatened by communist murder cases.  
Indeed, Nationalist agents and traitors of the communist party were the targets of 
the red brigade. Nevertheless, it was undeniable that punishing communist traitors 
and Chinese agents not only led to massacres of their families, but it also 
unintentionally brought heavy casualties to civilians living in foreign concessions. 
Therefore, foreign concessions became more unstable.  
Murder was a common method employed by the red brigade to kill their targets. 
Gu Shunzhang 顧順章, who was once the head of the communist red brigade, was 
arrested by the Chinese authorities in Hankou in 1931. The Nationalist government 
soon made good use of the intelligence provided by Gu to shut down communist 
bases throughout the country.
244
 With a view to taking revenge on behalf of their 
comrades, the red brigade interned the Gu’s family living in the International 
Settlement soon after Gu’s surrender. Eventually, Zhou Enlai 周恩來, the future 
premier of the People’s Republic of China, ordered his subordinates to strangulate 
almost all family members and some friends of Gu and buried their corpses 
underground.
245
 Knowing that Gu’s family and friends were assassinated, the 
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Chinese intelligence departments contacted the municipal police and French police 
for excavating bodies buried in foreign concessions in late November 1931.
246
 
According to the police daily report, at least seven corpses were unearthed at depths 
up to about 8 feet at 91-A Sinza Road 新閘路 of the International Settlement within 
three days.
247
 Propagated by media and press in Shanghai and overseas, this 
assassination incident not only caused humiliations on the Shanghai Municipal 
Council, but they also challenged the ability of Settlement policemen in maintaining 
the law and order in the Settlements.
248
 When visiting Gu Shunzhang and Chinese 
intelligence departments in Nanjing after this assassination incident, officers of two 
Settlement police forces were informed more about details of communists meetings, 
murders and kidnappings in foreign concessions. Feeling shameful and ignorant, 
Settlement policemen promised to try their best to cooperate with the Chinese 
government to arrest communists in the future.
249
  
  The red brigade was also convicted of assaulting people in the public. Taking 
revenge for their comrades, red brigade members killed some Chinese intelligence 
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agents on the street in the Settlement and Chinese territory in the early 1930s.
250
 
Worse still, civilians and policemen of the Settlement were sometimes killed 
accidentally. On 27
th
 September, 1934, two red brigade members openly shot a 
communist traitor Xiong Guohua 熊國華 inside a ward of Lester Chinese Hospital 
仁濟醫院. During their escapes, red brigade members shot policemen, killing two of 
them. One of pedestrians was killed by stray bullets. Totally, this assassination 
incident caused six casualties, of which four people were killed and two people were 
injured. The Red brigade escaped successfully afterwards.
251
 Frightened by the 
assassination of Xiong, the public and policemen took cover behind any objects on 
the street. The atmosphere in foreign concessions became tense. Feeling unable to 
solve the problem alone, Settlement policemen urgently asked the Chinese Public 
Safety Bureau for assistance to arrest communist fugitives.
252
 
  To conclude, increasing number of assassination cases forced the municipal police 
to reinforce their cooperation with the Chinese government to suppress communist 
activities in Shanghai. The Settlement authorities understood that communist 
disturbances occurred in foreign concessions and Chinese territory were inevitably 
inter-related with each other. Settlement policemen had to ally with the Nationalist 
government to encounter the rising communist threat. In consequence, the municipal 
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police were more willing to give their helping hands to the Chinese government to 
apprehend communists in the 1930s, even though they had to violate legal 
procedures. 
A trustworthy partnership 
The communist threat helped to strengthen the relationship between foreign 
concessions and the Kuomintang government in the early 1930s. The Shanghai 
Municipal Police would cooperate with the Chinese authorities to apprehend 
communists by all means. Indeed, it was true that many policemen in different 
stations were mobilised to spot any possible political offences in their districts. In 
April 1931, deputy commissioners Springfield (Divisions) and Aiers (Crime and 
Special Branches) requested their detective colleagues in all districts to fully 
cooperate with Special Branch officers in cases of any arrests relating to political 
offenders. According to instructions, policemen should categorise political offences 
as criminal cases. District detectives not only had to take part in arrests, but they 
were also asked to prepare crime diaries and other legal documents for trials.
253
 It 
was obvious that more police departments were involved in handling political 
offences, extending from the Special Branch to all police stations. Concerning 
judicial proceedings of arrests, not only did Settlement policemen employ formal 
ways to arrest communists, but they also occasionally violated criminal procedures in 
order to make arrests become more effective and efficient. The collaborative 
relationship between the Settlement and the Chinese authorities was only forced to 
terminate after Japanese invasion in Shanghai in 1937. 
  By virtue of the Chinese criminal procedures, the municipal police were 
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authorised to arrest flagrant delictors without obtaining any warrant. On 22
nd
 
September, 1932, the Shanghai Public Security Bureau provided the intelligence to 
the special branch of the municipal police about a communist meeting. Detective 
sergeant Moore and his two colleagues from the Special Branch were instructed to 
proceed directly to the premise located in Penang Road without asking police 
stations nearby for assistance. No legal dispatches were mentioned in the police 
report. Even Sergeant Moore himself admitted that “this procedure was adopted in 
view of the urgency of the call.”254 Eventually, nine communist suspects at the 
meeting were arrested on the scene and escorted to Pootoo Road Police station.
255
  
  Meanwhile, the municipal police and Chinese intelligence departments responded 
quickly to some assassination cases without applying for warrants from the 
Settlement court. After Xiong Guohua and several police and civilians were shot by 
the red brigade on 26
th
 September, 1934, a memorandum was immediately signed 
between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities concerning the arrest of red 
brigade members. The memorandum stated that the Chinese Public Security Bureau 
not only would get these communist criminals extradited, but it would also 
coordinate all actions in this arrest operation against the red brigade.
256
 Eventually, 
the red brigade leader Kwang Wei-an 鄺惠安 and other ten convicts were arrested. 
Plenty of weapons were seized in two foreign concessions.
257
 Again, the court was 
                                                 
254
 Detective Sergeant Moore, “Raid made on premises situated at 32 Chien Shing Faung, Penang 
Road, by members of the Special Branch on September, 22, 1932”, in “Copies of crime diaries - cases 
arising out of raids or arrests”, ref. D4056, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 
1894-1944; Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st-30th September, 1932 , ref.: 
U1-1-1187, 23rd September, 1932, 226 
255
 Detective Sergeant Moore, “Raid made on premises situated at 32 Chien Shing Faung, Penang 
Road, by members of the Special Branch on September, 22, 1932”, in “Copies of crime diaries - cases 
arising out of raids or arrests” 
256
 Xiaomie Gongfei Hongduian Zhi Jingyanjianshu〈消滅共匪紅隊案之經驗簡述〉The experience 
in eliminating the red brigade of the communist party in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo
《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang 
257
 27 pistols, 26 magazines, 2 bombs, 1003 rounds of ammunition, 1 dagger, 1 steel vest and a 
quantity of communistic literature were seized. Several of the pistols seized have been identified as 
77 
 
 
uninformed about this arrest until the Chinese authorities applied for the extradition 
of offenders.
258
 The law and order were restored following the extradition of these 
criminals to the Kuomintang.
259
 There were more examples showing that the 
municipal police shut down communist meetings and assassination corps merely 
based on the information provided by the Chinese authorities in the Police 
Intelligence Reports.
260
 
  Moreover, arrests with court warrants continued to be practiced by the municipal 
police. Provided that warrants were issued by the Settlement Court at the request of 
the Chinese authorities, communists would be taken into custody regardless of their 
ranks and identities. Tsiang Khe Zung 蔣開成, whose name appeared in the court 
warrant possessed by the Chinese Public Service Bureau, was arrested by the 
municipal police on 27
th
 March, 1934.
261
 The accused was suspected to be a 
communist because his name was found in a name list possessed by a communist 
prisoner arrested by the Chinese authorities. Also, influential communists could not 
avoid being arrested if their personal particulars matched the details stated in 
warrants. The case against the Kiangsu Provisional Committee 江蘇省中央政治局 
of the Chinese Communist Party on 26
th
 June, 1934 was a good example as stated in 
the evaluation report of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics in Taipei. Three 
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hours before the arrest, Chinese intelligence agents Pan Zhe 潘哲, Chen Shuping 陳
叔平 and You Dingyi 游定一 provided accurate the address and other relevant 
materials of communist suspects to the Settlement in order to apply for arrest a 
warrant 簽辦排票.262 The Shanghai Municipal Police would initiate this arrest after 
receiving a warrant from the court. Although Chinese intelligence agents were still 
doubtful of the willingness of the municipal police to cooperate at first, 
apprehensions were eventually carried out in Chengtu and Gordon Roads Districts 
successfully.
263
 The secretary general Li Zhusheng 李竹聲, the chief of organisation 
department Yang Tiansheng 楊天生, the president of All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions Yuan Jiayong 袁家鏞 and at least other ten communists were taken into 
custody. Plenty of documents and radio appliances were seized. Names of communist 
suspects matched with details written in arrest warrants. All of them were finally 
handed over to the Chinese authorities.
264
 Since the collapse of the Kiangsu 
Provisional Committee and especially Li Zhusheng’s surrender in June 1934, no 
major communist headquarters were re-established due to heavy surveillance of the 
Settlement and the Chinese authorities. From then on, communists could only 
survive in Shanghai through taking part in patriotic campaigns against 
imperialism.
265
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Yet, there were limitations if law enforcement officers solely relying on details of 
warrants during apprehensions. In some conditions, the municipal police failed to 
execute warrants because a person stated in a warrant was absent. On 31
st
 March, 
1932, a reactionary called Doo Tien I’h 杜天一 was wanted by the Public Safety 
Bureau. Armed with court warrants no. 4106 and 4107, the municipal police and 
representatives of the Public Safety Bureau raided Burlington Hotel at 305 Bubbling 
Well Road. However, before the arrival of the policemen, Doo had had left his room 
in the previous evening.
266
 Knowing that the arrest was in vain, the municipal police 
had to return the search warrant to the Court.
267
 Worse still, hardly could policemen 
confirm the identity of the accused in accordance with the information stated in the 
warrant. This was because the accused may intentionally provide false information to 
policemen. After experiencing a failure to arrest a communist, detective sergeant 
Moore illustrated the difficulty of executing the warrant.  
 
… for apart from the name or names contained thereon we have no means 
of identifying the wanted persons. There is nothing to prevent a wanted 
man giving a false name and we have no means at our disposal to disprove 
his words for invariably the Public Safety Bureau detectives know nothing 
of the person wanted and less of his habitual address.
268
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As shown from the above source, neither could the municipal police nor the Public 
Security Bureau verify a statement made by an accused because of the lack of 
evidence. Therefore, it could be inferred that the failure of apprehensions caused by 
judicial restrictions led to Settlement policemen’s violation in legal procedures when 
arresting communists in the future.  
Given that the formal apprehension method could not make arrests become 
effective, the municipal police decided to carry out arrests through ignoring details of 
warrants. Although Yao Yuan argues that there were serious legal confrontations 
between the Chinese government and the International Settlement after the 
establishment of the Shanghai Special District Court in the early 1930s, Yuan never 
analyses the antagonism between senior officials of the municipal council and their 
police force.
269
 The first example that illustrates the rejection of the court order was 
to execute an expired warrant against a communist printing work called Dah Dong 
大同印刷局 in September 1931. Issued by the court on 22nd August, 1931, the 
warrant was only valid for a short period of time. However, failing to implement the 
warrant at once, the Special Branch not only refused to return the unused warrant to 
the court, but they even deferred the arrest to more than two weeks later. 
Subsequently, nine people were arrested. Plenty of reactionary literature was 
seized.
270
 Noticing the violation of legal procedures, deputy commissioner (crime) 
not only doubted the legitimacy of the search held by the Special Branch with an 
expired warrant, but he also reemphasised to his colleagues that “the first duty of any 
officers who has a warrant to execute is to ascertain its contents to act in accordance 
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with”.271 Nevertheless, detective inspector J.W. Prince defended their violation by 
explaining that his men and the Chinese officers had to “keep the place under 
surveillance until an opportune time availed.” He also attributed the delay to the late 
response of the Chinese authorities.
272
 Eventually, two of the accused were 
extradited to the Chinese authorities.
273
 
  Aside from executing an expired warrant, the Special Branch also arrested people 
whose names did not appear in warrants. Acting on the authority of search warrants 
issued at the instance of the Public Security Bureau, the Special Branch attempted to 
find a communist called Tsiang Na Soong 蔣耐松, and “the person in charge of the 
Four Combined Bookstore 四合書局” at Foochow Road in late January 1931. It was 
suspected that Tsiang Na Soong was seeking refuge inside the abovementioned book 
shop. After their arrival, the policemen were told that the manager was absent. As a 
result, Special Branch officers arrested a shop assistant called Er Lai-zoong 歐來崇, 
who was temporarily in charge of the bookstore.
274
 Yet, even the assistant municipal 
advocate Mr. Paul Y. Ru 汝保彝 who worked for the Shanghai Municipal Council 
condemned the Chinese authorities and the municipal police. It was because they 
apprehended an innocent shopkeeper with a warrant without stating the name of the 
actual person they wanted. According to Mr. Ru, arresting people with a nameless 
warrant was actually contrary to the Chinese criminal procedures.
275
 In fact, this was 
not the only incident for the Special Branch to go against the advice made by the 
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municipal advocate concerning arrests of communists. The municipal advocate King 
S. Kum requested the municipal police should never prosecute any bookstore 
managers selling the reactionary literature unless policemen could prove that 
“offenders” knowingly and intentionally propagated doctrines opposite to the 
People’s Three Principles. Mr. Kum further illustrated that “failure to examine books 
by the manager before the same is offered for sale is not sufficient to constitute an 
offence.”276 Ironically, in response to Mr. Kum’s suggestion, the Chief of Special 
Branch T.P. Givens [Please refer to appendix 6] ordered his men to ignore the above 
advice, on the condition that they were executing warrants issued by the Shanghai 
Special District Court at the instance of the Chinese authorities.
277
 Apparently, 
although the Special Branch had to violate the legal procedures, they was willing to 
provide their assistance to the Chinese government when arresting communists. 
  Apart from bookstore assistants, the Special Branch also employed similar 
methods to arrest well-known communist leaders. Chen Tou Seu 陳獨秀, one of the 
founders of the Chinese Communist Party, was wanted by the Chinese government. 
Possessed with the court warrant against Zai Zau-san and “ten other associated 
people”, the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Public Safety Bureau arrested Zai 
Siau-san 謝少珊 and his four comrades at 210 Tshung Yang Li, East Yuhang Road, 
on 15
th
 October, 1932.
278
 During interrogation, Zai Siau-san not only betrayed his 
comrades by telling the policemen residential addresses of other communists in the 
Settlement, but he was also willing to report the confidential information to General 
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Jiang Jieshi in person.
279
 As a result, on 16
th 
and 17
th
 October, the municipal police, 
the Chinese authorities and French policemen jointly raided four more places located 
in two foreign concessions and arrested six more communists, including Chen Tou 
Seu. However, these convicts were rejected to employ any lawyers for their defences. 
Some accused protested emphatically to the court concerning the unjust legal 
procedure of the arrest. The 7
th
 accused Wong Siau-tsung 王曉普 showed his strong 
remonstrance to the judge: 
 
        There is no warrant for my arrest. The police arrested me on the off   
chance that I may have been also concerned in the case against the other  
accused and I have not been given the chance to protect myself. I now  
speak in order that I may be afforded that opportunity. There is no  
warrant issued for my arrest.
280
 
 
The judge not only failed to raise any concrete charges against the accused with 
flimsy evidence, but he also acquiesced the municipal police to apprehend people 
based on a warrant only stating the name of Zai Siau-san. Eventually, the Shanghai 
Special District Court agreed to extradite all eleven accused to the Chinese 
authorities, in spite of the fact that it had the authority to try this case in the 
Settlement. In order to thank for the efforts made by the municipal police, General 
Jiang Jieshi decided to reward the Settlement authorities by providing special bonus 
to the Settlement through the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. 
Eighteen policemen and clerks, fourteen of which belonged to the Special Branch, 
shared a total of four thousand dollars.
281
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  Last but not least, the municipal police sometimes even apprehended communists 
without applying for any warrants. The municipal police received a phone call from 
the Chinese authority on 17
th
 July, 1932. Knowing that Hyui Se Kung 徐錫根 was 
an important offender wanted by the Nanjing government, a Special Branch 
policeman and his two colleagues of the Louza Police Station immediately joined 
representatives of the Public Safety Bureau who were waiting outside Room 5 of the 
Tsing Soo Lodging House at Hupeh Road..
282
 Subsequently, Hyui Se Kung and his 
comrade Hu Tung Sheng 胡同聲 were taken into custody during the raid. Not until 
the arrest was over did the municipal police advise the Public Security Bureau to 
procure a warrant from the Court on 18
th
 July. They were handed over to the Chinese 
authorities afterwards.
283
 Another example was shown in the arrest of a communist 
agent called Wong Kyung San 王金山 for distributing the reactionary literature on 
9
th
 August, 1932.
284
 Two Public Service Bureau policemen visited the West 
Hongkew Station at 5.50am and requested Settlement policemen at the station to 
provide assistance to arrest Wong. When challenged for their failure to present a 
warrant from the court, these Chinese police officers emphasised that detective 
inspector Ross of the Special Branch “waived the matter” and asked them to carry on 
the arrest without a warrant.
285
 Eventually, Wong was apprehended in the room 
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located at East Dong Ka Loong. The extradition of Wong to the Chinese territory was 
permitted by the Settlement Court on 12
th
 August, 1932.
286
 
In conclusion, it is hoped that this chapter can provide contributions to the 
academic arena in the following two directions. I argue that the increasing 
cooperation between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities after the surrender of 
Gu Shunzhang was in the form of illegal arrests. Not only did Settlement policemen 
actively initiate more raids on different communist bases, but they also made arrests 
become more effective and efficient by ignoring the legal authority of the Settlement 
Court. The simplified arrest procedure would favour both the Kuomintang and 
foreign concessions to consolidate their power in Shanghai.  
The second offering that this chapter furnishes is to discuss the role of imperial 
policing in the early 20
th
 century. In this chapter, I suggest that the municipal police 
themselves had to actively participate in suppressing communist activities with the 
Chinese authorities for the sake of the Settlement’s survival. Also, I argue that 
readjustments of the British imperial policies in China were not uninterrupted in the 
process. The determination of municipal advocates and some senior police officers in 
defending the criminal procedure depicted their attempts to maintain their values and 
privilege in China. It took some time for British settlers to adapt to changing 
circumstances in China in the 1920s.  
  This chapter about arrest reveals the beginning of British readjustments in China 
and paves the way for illustrating treatments of communists in the forms of the 
extradition and the reformatory. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXTRADITION 
“… as they [Shanghai Municipal Police] are conducting the prosecution in a case in which the 
Chinese authorities are directly interested, the British authorities are not in a position to intervene… if 
we were to become a party to the arrangement proposed we may, in the absence of any satisfactory 
guarantee to the contrary, find ourselves accused, in the Soviet press and elsewhere, of an attempt to 
defeat the ends of justice and making Chinese national interests subservient to our own narrower 
interests.”287 
J.P. Brenan (The British Consul in Shanghai) 
 
This chapter emphasises the weakened judicial autonomy of the Settlement when 
the Shanghai Municipal Police was requested to extradite different people to the 
Chinese authorities. Although communists arrested in the settlement would be tried 
in the Shanghai Provisional Court, the Kuomintang authorities always insisted the 
settlement policemen to hand over communist convicts to them. By doing so, the 
Kuomintang hoped to suppress communist activities effectively. Nevertheless, 
extradition requests unavoidably infringed the legal independence of the 
International Settlement which was protected by the extraterritoriality. In the existing 
literature, the extradition of criminals in Shanghai during the republican era has 
largely been ignored. Most literature mainly focuses on the alliance between the 
Settlement and the Chinese authorities to suppress communist and reactionary 
activities. Frederic Wakeman and Patricia Stranahan suggest that there was an 
increasing cooperation between different police forces in Shanghai after the Gu 
Shunzhang affair.
288
 But never do they discuss mechanisms for arrest and extradition 
procedures in detail. Perhaps Yao Yuan is the only one attempted to analyse how the 
extradition procedure worked in the Shanghai Special District Court after 1930. 
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Indeed, many foreign judicial privileges were cancelled when the British and the 
Chinese authorities signed the second rendition agreement. However, the Shanghai 
Municipal Police still preserved the prosecution power in the Settlement Court. As 
Yao notes, the Shanghai Municipal Police was still in its position to defend foreign 
interests in the Settlement. With a view to protecting its limited legal authority, the 
municipal police would use the reason of insufficient prima facie to reject extradition 
requests in some communist cases, such as Chen Rongxi 陳榮喜 in 1930. When the 
municipal police believed that someone like Deng Yanda 鄧演達 threatened the 
security of the Settlement, they were very happy to hand over him to the Chinese 
authorities despite lack of evidence.
289
 However, Yao mainly relies on memoirs 
written by a former municipal advocate and legal reports published by the Council. 
In her research, she never makes good use of any official dispatches and private 
correspondences written between British diplomatic officials, the secretary of 
Shanghai Municipal Council, municipal advocates and senior police officers, let 
alone court proceedings records and crime diaries in the SMP Special branch files. 
She largely ignores the fact that the Settlement authorities were deprived of their 
extradition power by the late 1920s. After reading the British Foreign Office files, the 
Secretariat files of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the SMP Special Branch files, 
I argue that the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force relinquished their 
judicial autonomy to extradite non-residents and bona-fide residents as a result of 
diplomatic pressure from Britain and China in the late 1920s.  
Non-residents 
  Due to the neutrality of the International Settlement, many Chinese convicts fled 
to the Settlement for protection after committing crimes in Chinese territory. 
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Regarding non-residents as outsiders of the Settlement, the Shanghai Municipal 
Police never cared about their safety. After confirming that any criminals were 
associated with cases in Chinese territory, the Shanghai Municipal Police would 
extradite these convicts to the Chinese authorities. This practice was also applicable 
to communists seeking refuge in the Settlement.
290
 Nevertheless, according to Police 
Advocate Mr. R.T. Bryan, non-residents had to be tried in the settlement court before 
being handed over to the Chinese authorities. Some evidence was required when 
applying for extradition.
291
 Hsia Jen-chang was one of examples illustrating how the 
extradition procedure worked in a non-resident context. Being a close follower of a 
Hankow communist leader called Chen Yien-nien, Hsia was arrested by the Shanghai 
Municipal Police in July 1927 based on the request of the Chinese authorities. The 
suspect failed to prove his residential address in the Settlement after his arrest. The 
policemen proved that Hsia was a paymaster supporting communist activities in 
Shanghai because $3,8000 cash was discovered in his canvas bag.
292
 Therefore, the 
court ordered the settlement authority to hand over Hsia and his money to the 
Chinese Special Military Court. General Yang Hu decided to execute Hsia in the 
Lunghua jail 龍華監獄 on 19th July, 1927.293 Apparently, the Shanghai Municipal 
Police would not oppose any extradition requests for non-residents if the Chinese 
authorities could present some evidence in the settlement court. 
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  Extraditing non-residents was not uncommon in Shanghai throughout the late 
1920s. Whilst preparing for a report of criminal condition in the Settlement, 
commissioner of police E.I.M. Barret showed the figure of extradited communists to 
the chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Seventy-two suspected 
Communists were handed over to the Chinese Authorities between 13
th
 April, 1927 
and 21
st
 February, 1928.
294
 [Please refer to appendix 8 and 9] This could reflect the 
generosity of the municipal police to extradite communist suspects to the Chinese 
government.    
Nevertheless, feeling anxious to eliminate communists, the Chinese government 
was not satisfied with existing extradition arrangements regulated by the 
International Settlement. The Chinese authorities suggested that when extraditing 
communist criminals who were not residents of the Settlement, extradition request 
should be exempt from any trials.
295
 Apparently, the judicial autonomy of the 
Settlement would have been damaged if the Settlement Police accepted this demand.  
  After considering the pros and cons of the proposal raised by the Chinese 
authorities, the Shanghai Municipal Police showed its consent to them. 
Commissioner E.I.M. Barret understood that rejecting Chinese requests would hinder 
the cooperation between Chinese and Settlement policemen in Shanghai. He was 
afraid that the Chinese authorities would retaliate against the municipal police by 
prolonging the process for extraditing criminals wanted by the municipal police. In 
his opinion, only by providing a reciprocal arrangement could the municipal police 
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obtained necessary assistance from its Chinese counterparts in the future.
296
 It was 
his hope that the Chinese authorities could also provide effective assistance when the 
municipal police requested the extradition of some gangsters fled to Chinese 
territory.
297
 Indeed, the Chinese authorities also played a significant role in 
maintaining the law and order in the Settlement. According to Barret, 116 criminals 
were extradited from Chinese territory to the Settlement between May and November 
in 1928.
298
 Therefore, the municipal police certainly could not lose such an 
important ally when policing the International Settlement. 
  More importantly, the British imperial presence would have been threatened if the 
settlement failed to settle the discontent of the Chinese authorities about their 
extradition requests. E.I.M. Barret warned the Shanghai Municipal Council about the 
outcome for refusing extradition demands raised by the Chinese authorities. Not only 
would the International Settlement be regarded as “a base for the dissemination of 
communist propaganda”, but the Nationalist government might also be encouraged to 
accelerate its diplomatic process for abolishing extraterritorial rights.
299
 In fact, there 
were no exaggerations for the assumption made by Commissioner E.I.M. Barret. 
According to the political intelligence report printed in July 1927, reliable 
intelligence disclosed that the Nationalist government had a strong determination to 
regain its control in two foreign concessions in Shanghai. During a meeting in the 
General Chamber of Commerce, General Jiang Jieshi told Chinese merchants that he 
would not only carry out reforms in Chinese territory, but he would also attempt to 
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restore the Shanghai International Settlement within three years.
300
 Therefore, 
failing to extraditing the non-residents to the Chinese would possibly cause adverse 
effects on foreign interests in Shanghai. 
  Subsequently, Commissioner E.I.M. Barret drafted a proposal to the Shanghai 
Municipal Council showing how compromises would be made in response to the 
Chinese authorities’ request. He recommended that the Commissioner of Police 
should be entitled to extradite any political offenders who were not living in the 
Settlement for more than six months. On this occasion, it was not essential for a 
suspected communist to undergo a long legal process which would delay his / her 
extradition to the Chinese authorities.
301
 Believing that the Commissioner of Police 
should never have such “privilege”, the Police Prosecuting Solicitor R.T. Bryan 
emphatically opposed to this proposal.
302
 Yet, Commissioner E.I.M. Barret’s 
resolution was eventually accepted. The Shanghai Municipal Police could extradite 
communist suspects who were not residents of the Settlement to the Kuomintang 
authorities without undergoing any legal process. In 1931, the new Commissioner of 
Police R.M.J. Martin even authorised divisional officers and Special Branch officers 
to handle extradition cases of communists in the Settlement since 1931.
303
 
The case of Tsang Ong Lai and Au Sai Ts in April 1933 illustrated how Barret’s 
proposal was implemented. Informed by other communist convicts arrested earlier, 
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the Public Security Bureau requested the municipal police to extradite Tsang Ong Lai 
and Au Sai Ts who were associated in communist activities in Chinese territory.
304
 
Living in the settlement for less than one year, both Tsang and Au failed to prove 
their residential addresses in the Settlement.
305
 During interrogation, although both 
suspects denied involving in any communist cases, they admitted that they knew one 
of communist convicts called Hong Tuh Sung. Hong was apprehended by the 
Chinese authorities previously. Persuaded by this evidence, senior police officers of 
the B division extradited these two suspects to the Public Safety Bureau without 
undergoing any legal procedures.
306
 In the face of the Chinese nationalism, the 
judicial autonomy of the Settlement was infringed as the municipal police had to 
meet the Kuomintang’s demands in extraditing non-residents without undergoing 
formal legal procedures. However, this was not the only example to reveal the failure 
of the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force in defending their legal 
independence. 
Bona fide residents 
After the completion of the northern expedition, surrenders of other warlords 
provided an opportunity for Jiang Jieshi to concentrate his efforts to suppress 
communist activities. Many communists in Chinese territory in Shanghai were killed 
in the famous “Shanghai massacre of 1927” which was initiated by Jiang. Yet, this 
did not mean the end of the spread of communism in Shanghai. The Kuomintang 
attempted to eliminate the remaining of communists seeking refuges in foreign 
concessions. In February 1928, the Commissioner of Foreign affairs for Kiangsu Quo 
Tai-chi sent a letter to the International Settlement, warning the Council about the 
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intrusion of communists in the International Settlement.  
 
…having no way of executing their projects in Chinese territory where  
        strict precaution is taken, they (communists) are posting slogans and     
conducting a counter propaganda campaign in the Settlement... there is  
a likelihood of the public order being menaced.
307
  
 
The Kuomintang hoped that the Shanghai Municipal Council and consular bodies 
could take necessary measures to suppress the spread of communism in the 
International Settlement. Subsequently, the Chinese authorities even urged the 
municipal police to extradite their bona fide residents who were suspected of 
engaging in communist activities in Chinese territory. After receiving a request from 
the Chinese military authorities, the Commissioner of Police sought instructions from 
the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council to decide whether it was legitimate 
to hand over a well-known resident to the Kuomintang.
308
 Nevertheless, such 
request inevitably violated the law in the Settlement because “only under the most 
exceptional circumstances would the council permit any resident in the Settlement to 
be handed over directly to the Chinese authorities”.309 Moreover, these residents 
must be taken before the Provisional Court. Only a strong prima facie case would the 
court consider to extradite residents to the Chinese authorities.
310
 The police 
advocate Mr. Bryan even suspected that the Kuomintang had some “ulterior motives” 
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to request the extradition of their residents.
311
 Abiding by legal practices of the 
Settlement, the municipal police therefore refused the request raised by the Chinese 
garrison commander. 
As a matter of fact, bona fide residents had long enjoyed the judicial protection in 
since the Shanghai International Settlement was established. They were always 
considered by the Court as a very important factor. Therefore, they were given 
special privileges to be tried by the Mixed Court. According to the legal tradition of 
the Settlement, a great difference was found in extraditing bona fide residents and 
non-residents. When asking for the extradition of non residents, the Chinese 
authorities just had to provide “some evidence” to support the charge. On the 
contrary, handing over bona-fide residents required a substantial prima facie case.
312
 
Apparently, it was extremely difficult to demand the extradition of the bona-fide 
residents who were well-protected by the judiciary system of the Settlement. 
  The failure to settle the extradition of bona-fide residents unavoidably caused 
endless quarrels between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities as reflected in 
the court proceedings. In August 1927, a 53 year-old Chinese Pawnbroker called Ong 
Tah Yuen, who had lived in the Settlement for over 32 years, was put in a trial in the 
Shanghai Provisional Court by a Chinese soldier. [Please refer to appendix 10] The 
Provisional Court ordered the Shanghai Municipal Police to hand over Ong to the 
Chinese government because evidence showed that Ong knew a famous communist 
called Cheu Chien.
313
 Considering that the evidence was insufficient to reveal the 
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connection between the accused and any communistic affiliations, the consular 
deputy emphatically opposed to the Judge’s decision.314 
Therefore, similar conflicts continued to take place in the Provisional Court 
between 1927 and 1929. In spite of Chinese representatives’ endeavours to prove 
linkages between plenty of residents and communist activities in Chinese territory, 
the Shanghai Municipal Police and the consular deputies still refused to extradite 
bona fide residents to the Chinese authorities. Indeed, whether the prima facie 
evidence was sufficient to allow extradition depended on the interpretation of the 
consular deputies. Meanwhile, the Provisional Court was subject to the influence of 
the Chinese government after 1926 as a result of the rise the Chinese nationalism. 
Indeed, according to Tahirih Lee, Chinese merchants and officials wanted to put the 
settlement court under their control but at the same time “retained its western-style 
procedures and its freedom to enforce local laws and customs”.315 In 1927, their 
wish came true when the Provisional Court formally replaced the International 
Mixed Court. Magistrates in the court were appointed by the Kuomintang 
government. It was true that judges failing to accomplish “missions” of the higher 
Chinese authorities would be punished by the Chinese government. The Provisional 
Court president Lu Xingyuan 盧興源 was dismissed on 9th October 1927 because of 
his failure to hand over a number of alleged “communist” residents in the Settlement 
to General Bai Chongxi 白崇禧. Knowing that the judicial independence of the 
Provisional Court was seriously infringed as reflected in this dismissal, the consular 
bodies unanimously complained to the Chinese government. This could show how 
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tense the condition was as a result of the controversy of extradition.
316
 Neither 
Settlement policemen nor the Chinese authorities were willing to give way to each 
other. Deadlock remained between these two parties.  
Perhaps sometimes it was the fault of the Chinese authorities for abusing the 
extradition procedures in order to suppress reactionaries in Shanghai. However I 
argue that political factors were main obstacles hindering the extradition of bona fide 
residents. Firstly, it was the obligation of the Shanghai Municipal Council to offer 
protections to its bona fide residents as they were usually taxpayers of the Shanghai 
International Settlement. During the visit of the British Minister to China Sir Mile 
Lampson in 1929, the former chairman of the council Mr. Fessenden explained to 
Lampson concerning the issue of protecting residents of the Settlement. 
 
…the Chinese residents in the settlement were entitled, in return for  
the payment of municipal rates and taxes, to the fullest measure of  
protection the municipal authorities were able to afford them, that if  
they did not receive this protection they would be liable to be “bled  
white” by their own authorities, and that in that case property values in  
the settlement would slump disastrously.
317
 
 
Therefore, in the council’s perspective, residents who contributed to the economic 
prosperity of the International Settlement should deserve the protection from the 
International Settlement regardless of their nationalities and races. 
  More importantly, the principle of political neutrality had long been upheld by the 
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Mixed Court since the establishment of the Shanghai International Settlement. On 
19
th
 August, 1927, when the Chinese military authorities requested the extradition of 
nine Chinese residents of the Settlement on suspicion of engaging in communist 
activities, consular deputy Stevens declined their demand. He emphasised that the 
political neutrality of the Settlement should never be submitted to Chinese military 
factions.
318
 
Actually, the Mixed Court and the consular bodies had had a tradition in not taking 
sides when dealing with political cases before 1927. As A. M. Kotenev pointed out in 
his book Shanghai: Its mixed court and council in 1925, “it [the Mixed Court]’s 
jurisdiction was localised strictly to a Treaty territory, which in its very substance 
was neutral as a portion of land set aside for the residence of foreign merchants, 
peaceful traders, but not politicians and belligerents.”319 Even though there was 
sufficient prima facie evidence, the Settlement still did not have to “warrant the 
unconditional surrender of the accused to the native authorities.”320 The case of 
Wong Tsz-ting in October 1913 could illustrate the importance of the neutrality 
stated by the consular deputies. Wong was wanted by the Chinese government 
because he was suspected of agitating disturbances against the Republic of China. 
Knowing that Wong was a bona fide resident of the settlement, magistrates of the 
Mixed Court transferred this case to the consular bodies because such political 
accusation was outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
321
 Instead of authorising 
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extradition, the consular body eventually expelled this political offender outside the 
Settlement.
322
 
In fact, Shanghai was not the only British concession receiving extradition 
requests from the Kuomintang authorities after the completion of the Northern 
Expedition. As early as in late 1927, the British Commissioner of Weihaiwei 威海衛 
Reginald Johnston 莊士敦 was urged by the Chinese authorities in Shandong 山東 
to provide assistance to arrest and to extradite ten Chinese communist suspects to 
Chinese officials.
323
 Similar to the response of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 
Reginald Johnston was sceptical towards the Kuomintang’s requests not only 
because Chinese prosecution authorities failed to present convincing evidence, but 
also because the ruthless and barbaric Chinese government “obeyed no law” in their 
governance. As a responsible government, the British authorities in Weihaiwei 
refused to hand over any of their temporary or permanent residents on suspicion of 
engaging in communist activities to the Kuomintang in order not to create any 
innocent cases.
324
 However, how to settle the discontent of the Chinese authorities 
was also one of major concerns of Reginald Johnston. Eventually, with a view to 
proving that Weihaiwei was not a reactionary base against the Kuomintang, Reginald 
Johnston decided to banish any people wanted by the Chinese government, provided 
that evidence was shown.
325
 Therefore, British officials in Weihaiwei actually shared 
similar neutral perspective with the International Settlement in Shanghai concerning 
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the extraditions of political offenders when the Kuomintang first rose to power in 
1927. The British concession in Weihaiwei was finally returned to China in 1930, 
allowing the Kuomintang to control over the entire Shandong province. 
Until June 1929, the International Settlement still firmly kept their commitments 
towards their bona-fide residents and upheld their principle of political neutrality in 
China. Then, who could make a change on the policy of the Settlement authorities? 
In the face of the diplomatic pressure from the Nationalist government, the British 
Foreign Office understood that its foreign policies in China must be changed. 
Interfering in municipal administrations of the Shanghai Settlement was needed 
although British officials recognised insecure sentiments among British communities 
in Shanghai. The Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain reminded his colleagues 
about the need to make diplomatic concession for China.
326
 As mentioned in chapter 
2, the settlement court had undergone significant transformations even before the 
Kuomintang rose to power. In 1930, not only were magistrates and important 
administrative personnel in the courts appointed by the Nationalist government,
327
 
but interventions of the consular representatives were also cancelled in the court.
328
 
The settlement court inevitably gave judgments favouring the interest of the 
Nationalist government when handling political cases. On the other hand, the 
Shanghai Municipal Council and the diplomatic bodies could not openly oppose 
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decisions made by the court. Despite its reluctance, the council theoretically had to 
follow the orders given by the court to hand over communists to China. 
Apart from revising the legal system of the Settlement, the British Foreign Office 
even sent its officials to pressure British expatriates in Shanghai. The British 
Minister to China Sir Miles Lampson visited Shanghai in May 1929. With a view to 
preventing the intensification of anti-foreign sentiments, Lampson persuaded the 
chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council H.E. Arnhold, and the police advocate 
Mr. Bryan to abandon their stubbornness in protecting Chinese residents. 
 
…it had never been the policy of His Majesty’s Government that  
Chinese residents in the Settlement should be withdrawn from the  
jurisdiction of their own authorities, and that in our view the paramount  
consideration in the problem of the provisional court was the  
maintenance of law and order in the Settlement by the municipal  
authorities, which did not prima facie appear to include the protection of  
Chinese residents against the operation of Chinese courts.
329
 
 
Finally, they reached an agreement. It was unnecessary for the Shanghai Municipal 
Council to protect their residents against the orders of the Shanghai Provisional 
Court, provided that these orders were given following due legal process and not by 
external administrative action.
330
 
in China by pleasing the Chinese at the expense of the judicial autonomy of the 
International Settlement. The extradition of Settlement residents in the 1930s echoes 
what Robert Bickers argues concerning the British government’s nationalisation of 
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Sino-British relations between the late 1920s and the early 1940s.
331
 There is no 
doubt that the Settlement authorities were abandoned by the British Foreign Office. 
Weakened judicial power of British expatriates also connects to the argument raised 
by Edumnd Fung. He believes that Whitehall policy-makers had prepared for gradual 
transfer of power from Britain to China. By doing so, Britain wanted to maintain a 
stable political condition in China, allowing British commercial interest to growth in 
the inter-war period.
332
 
  Without supports from the British Foreign Office, the council had to hand over its 
Chinese residents to the Chinese authorities if the Kuomintang could provide enough 
evidence to support the charges. Holding the despatch warrant issued by the 
Shanghai Special District Court, the Soongwu Military Headquarters asked for the 
extradition of Wong I’h Bae living at 93 Annam Road in the Settlement in April 1931. 
During the arrest, the municipal police and the Chinese authorities failed to find 
Wong when they reached the above address. Instead, Lee Sau Chi, who claimed 
himself as a translator of a bookstore and resided in the Settlement for 1.5 year, was 
discovered in the premises. Plenty of communist literature was seized in his 
premise.
333
 He was then taken to the court for trial afterwards. Military officers of 
the Soongwu command not only showed a testimony of a communist convict called 
Zoh Tsing Ih, but they also presented a telegram sent from Hunan 湖南 proving that 
Lee was the chairman of the Hunan Soviet Communist.
334
 The police advocate Mr. 
Kum had no objection to hand over the accused based on evidence provided by the 
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Chinese authorities. Finally, Lee Sau Chi was extradited to the Chinese authorities on 
4
th
 May, 1931.
335
         
  In short, the Shanghai Municipal Council not only lost its judicial autonomy in 
protecting their Chinese residents, but it was also deprived of its principle of political 
neutrality which was established in the mid-19
th
 century. 
The jurisdiction of the Settlement 
  Undoubtedly, jurisdiction was the most crucial component guaranteed in the 
extraterritoriality which protected foreign interests in China. The police advocate Mr. 
Bryan pinpointed that “A crime committed in the International Settlement is triable 
in the Provisional Court only unless the complainant is a French citizen.”336 The 
judicial independence in the Settlement was still secured after the Rendition 
Agreement was signed between Britain and China in 1926. Clause 1, section 1 of the 
Rendition Agreement stated that “with the exceptional of cases which in accordance 
with the treaties involve the right of Consular jurisdiction, all civil and criminal cases 
in the Settlement shall be dealt with by the said Provisional Court.”337 
  Before experiencing the diplomatic pressure from Britain, the Shanghai Municipal 
Council stood firm to uphold the court’s jurisdiction limit for cases created in the 
Settlement. The Settlement authorities even ignored the extradition requests from the 
Chinese authority. In September 1928, 23 students and agitators were arrested by the 
municipal police because they distributed inflammatory, rebellious and communistic 
pamphlets on the street. Chinese Garrison Commanders asked for the extradition of 
these Chinese. The Provisional Court, which was under the influence of the Chinese 
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authorities, allowed the extradition.
338
 However, the police advocate Mr. Bryan 
regarded this extradition order as void and invalid because the court had no right, and 
power to order defendants to be handed over to China provided that this crime was 
committed inside the Settlement.
339
 The consular deputy Stevens also emphasised 
that the Provisional Court in the Settlement shared equal status with other courts in 
Chinese territory.
340
 Therefore, on 6
th
 September, 1928, Commissioner of Police Mr. 
Barret not only refused to extradite the suspects to the Chinese Authorities, but also 
demanded the Provisional Court to try this case.
341
 
Sometimes, even Chinese magistrates working for the Nationalist government also 
upheld the legitimacy of the Provisional Court to execute its legal authority in the 
International Settlement. They thought some of the Kuomintang’s extradition 
requests were unreasonable. On 9
th
 December 1928, 28 people were arrested at 877 
Peking Road in the International Settlement because their premises contained plenty 
of posters and pamphlets which were anti-capitalists, anti-government and 
communist in nature.
342
 Jiang Jieshi informed the provisional court that these 
convicts were important communists and had to be extradited to the Chinese 
authorities.
343
 However, the Public Safety Bureau failed to present any evidence 
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showing that these convicts were associated with any crimes in Chinese territory.
344
 
Not only did the Shanghai Municipal Police and the consular deputies oppose the 
extradition request,
345
 but the judge of the appeal court He Shizhen 何世楨 also 
explicitly showed his disagreement to the Chinese authorities. With a view to 
defending the spirit of the judicial independence of the Settlement court and the 
reputation of the Chinese government, He Shizhen believed that the Shanghai 
Provisional Court, which was entitled by the Chinese government to handle cases 
inside the settlement, was in its position to try this case which had no connections 
with any crimes in Chinese territory.
346
 The consular deputy S.L. Burdett also 
showed his consent to He Shizhen.
347
 Eventually, all convicts were released except 
one person called Wang qing 王清.  
  Nevertheless, such impregnable principle was challenged when people wanted by 
the Chinese authorities were significant to the intelligence of communist activities in 
China. The case of Mr. and Mrs. Noulens was a good example to illustrate the 
judicial infringement of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Mr. and Mrs. Noulens, who 
resided in the settlement for fifteen months, were arrested by the Shanghai Municipal 
Police according to the intelligence provided by the police force in Singapore in 1931. 
[Please refer to appendix 11] 
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  Indeed, it was undeniable that Mr. Noulens not only communicated with different 
communists in China, but he was also connected with communists overseas. Plenty 
of confidential communist documents were discovered in his apartments. Maps 
indicating locations of communist army and nationalist army in China, illustrations 
on the internal structure of workmen’s factories in Shanghai, correspondence written 
between red unions and the Far Eastern Head Office of the communist party were 
also found in his personal belongings. Based on testimonies made by surrendered 
communists, the Chinese Garrison authorities believed that Noulens sent communists 
to reinforce the red army in Kiangsi and remitted money to support local communist 
activities in different part of China. He also rented several apartments for unknown 
purposes.
348
 Understanding the importance of Noulens with the Chinese Communist 
Party, the Chinese authorities requested the extradition of this couple and prepared to 
put them under trial at a Chinese military court. This couple was charged of 
“infringing the safety of the Republic of China”. The Shanghai Special District Court 
allowed the extradition request but the accused were still taken into custody in the 
Settlement, pending on the verification of their nationalities.   
  Although Noulen had a close connection with Chinese communists, it was 
debatable to hand over him and his wife to the Chinese authority. Apparently, the 
accused committed their crimes in the Settlement without directly visiting Chinese 
territory in person. Dr. Wilhlem, who was the lawyer of the couple, challenged the 
validity of the extradition order because his clients never went to China’s inland 
provinces. “How could they have committed aggressions in the Kiangsi and other 
provinces?”349 Besides, the Kiangsu 2nd Branch High Court was entitled to deal with 
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the cases created in the Settlement by virtue of article 2 of the new Provisional Court 
Agreement.
350
 The municipal police not only insisted that the case of Noulens was 
within the jurisdiction of the International Settlement and but it also urged the 
Kiangsu 2
nd
 Branch High Court to deny the request made by the Chinese Garrison 
authorities.
351
 
  Meanwhile, the arrest of Noulen and his wife became a hot topic in the British 
metropole. In accordance with Antoinette Burton and Andrew Thompson, pressure 
groups in Britain always urged the government to carry out reforms by drawing upon 
imperial matters from the Empire.
352
 After Noulen and his wife were extradited, the 
British authorities still received complains and suggestions from pressure groups. 
The League Against Imperialism and for National Independence asked the British 
government to exert its influence to the Shanghai Municipal Council. It hoped that 
the council could guarantee a fair trial in this case and assured the safety of these two 
Europeans.
353
 The Howard League for Penal Reform and the Independent Labour 
Party also approached the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary John Simon 
concerning the treatment of Noulen in Chinese jail.
354
 
  Nevertheless, the British consular bodies were not sympathised towards 
Noulens couple. They were afraid that British intervention in this case would be 
utilised by communist presses to vilify the British imperial presence and to stir up 
anti-British sentiments among the Chinese. The British consul in Shanghai J.F. 
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Brenan explained why the British consulate in Shanghai did not give a helping hand 
to Mr. Noulen and his wife. 
 
… as they [the Shanghai Municipal Police] are conducting the  
prosecution in a case in which the Chinese authorities are directly  
interested, the British authorities are not in a position to intervene… if  
we were to become a party to the arrangement proposed we may, in the  
absence of any satisfactory guarantee to the contrary, find ourselves  
accused, in the Soviet press and elsewhere, of an attempt to defeat the  
ends of justice and making Chinese national interests subservient to our  
own narrower interests.
355
    
 
Sir Miles Lampson also showed his agreement and appreciation to Brenan who 
might have prevented the British authorities from suffering another diplomatic 
crisis.
356
  
Without supports from the British diplomatic bodies, the attitude of the  
Shanghai Municipal Police was changed concerning the extradition of Noulen couple. 
After proving that Noulen and his wife were not nationals from any foreign powers, 
the Shanghai Municipal Police agreed to hand over both of them to the Chinese 
authorities on 12
th
 August, 1931.
357
 The police advocate Mr. Kum, who used to 
emphasise that Kiangsu High Court 2
nd
 Branch should have the right to hear this case 
of Noulens, completely changed his standpoint and gave his countenance to this 
extradition order. 
 
It is true that during the hearings, I maintained that the Kiangsu High  
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Court, second branch, did have jurisdiction over the Noulens case, and  
that the case should be tried here, but as Noulens’ criminal activities  
extended to many provinces in China, other Chinese courts have  
concurrent jurisdiction over the case also... A prima facie case against  
the accused was established to the satisfaction of the Court and the  
Council.
358
 
 
Commissioner of Police F.W. Gerrard even refused to provide protections to 
Noulen and his wife who resided in the Settlement for 1.5 year. He denied Noulen 
Couple’s citizenship in the Settlement.359 Thus, the Shanghai Municipal Council was 
forced to give up their insistence in defending the jurisdiction of the International 
Settlement even though the crime was committed inside the Settlement. The British 
authorities considered that the impact of anti-British sentiment would be far more 
important than the judicial autonomy of the Settlement. Therefore, British expatriates 
were again abandoned by British diplomats. 
  To conclude, the British informal presence in Shanghai survived at the expense of 
the judicial independence of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Indeed, the Shanghai 
Municipal Police still possessed the prosecution power in order to protect foreign 
interests in the Settlement. Prosecutors appointed by the Chinese government could 
not intervene in the cases which were handled by the municipal police.
360
 As Yao 
Yuan suggests, the Settlement authorities would refuse to hand over some suspected 
communists to China if the Kuomintang authorities failed to provide “sufficient” 
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evidence.
361
 Ru Baoyi 汝葆彝, a former municipal advocate working for the 
Shanghai Municipal Council, even pointed out that the settlement authorities could 
reject any extradition request as they reserved the right to define whether the Chinese 
authorities provided sufficient prima facie.
362
 Only by extraditing communists based 
on adequate evidence could the Council retain its legal authority in the settlement.
363
 
Given the massive amount of cases recorded in the Special Branch Files, it is true 
that this chapter cannot completely examine how many extradition cases relating to 
communist activities were rejected because of insufficient evidence.  
Yet, what this research has shown is that the era representing absolute judicial 
dominance of the Shanghai Municipal Council was gone. In the face of the fervid 
Chinese nationalism, the Council first authorised its police force to hand over 
suspects who were non-residents to the Chinese authorities without undergoing any 
trials in 1928. Before the intervention of the British diplomatic bodies in late 1929, 
the Shanghai Municipal Council could reject any extradition requests relating to 
residents or cases in the Settlement, regardless of the sufficiency of evidence 
provided by the Chinese authorities. However, the British Foreign Office not only 
abolished the intervention of the consular deputies in the court, but it also warned the 
council not to provide protections to their Chinese residents on suspicion of engaging 
in any criminal activities in Chinese territory. Last but not least, the jurisdiction of 
the Settlement was no longer protected by Britain as reflected in the case of Noulen 
couple. Committing no crimes in China’s inland provinces, Noulen was wanted by 
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the Kuomintang because he was of paramount importance to the Chinese Communist 
Party. The extradition of these communists not only caused no harms to British 
interests in Shanghai, but they could also alleviate the tense relationship between 
Britain, the Shanghai International Settlement, the Kuomintang government and the 
Chinese public. The extradition of communists shown in this chapter reveals that the 
judicial neutrality and autonomy of the International Settlement was weakened. It 
was because the council had to hand over communists to the Kuomintang which 
would torture its political opponents in the future. It was apparent that the Shanghai 
Municipal Council and its police force had become part of police networks of the 
Nationalist government by the late 1920s. Therefore, I argue that British imperial 
policies in Shanghai were readjusted at the expense of the judicial autonomy of the 
International Settlement in the 1920s and 1930s.  
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CHAPTER 5 
REFORMATORIES 
“We feel that the Regulations governing Houses of Reflection do not come with the category of good 
laws. They also seem to be unfair, and to practically deprive Chinese citizens of the right of free 
thought and speech.”364 
                                                    R.J. Ryan (The Municipal Advocate) 
The completion of arrest and extradition procedures doesn’t mean the end of the 
story. Reformatories were another channel disclosing the cooperation between the 
Shanghai Municipal Police and the Chinese authorities when handling political cases. 
In fact, although the Chinese government captured many communists extradited by 
the Settlement authorities, the “appetite” of the Nationalist government was still 
voracious. Thus, in the 1930 decade, communist convicts who served or were serving 
their sentences in the Ward Road Gaol became next targets wanted by Chinese 
officials. But the ambition of the Chinese authorities to acquire communist prisoners 
in the Ward Road Gaol would unquestionably undermine the neutrality of the 
Shanghai International Settlement.  
    In fact, due to the lack of sources, there are just a few scholars studying detail of 
reformatories in China. In the existing literature, only the research conducted by 
Klaus Mühlhahn and Frank Dikötter can provide us with brief glances on the history 
of reformatories during the republican era. Mühlhahn discusses reformatories in a 
legal context. Criminal justice was closely connected with the development of 
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Chinese society in terms of law codes, courts and penal system. Thus, the 
assimilation of legal institutions in response to changing social circumstances was his 
main focus. He argues that the reformatories were found in order to deal with the 
consequences made in wars and revolutions.
365
 Focusing in a narrower sense, 
Dikötter emphasises the evolution of Chinese penal systems from the Qing Dynasty 
to the end of the republican era. In particular, he studies the significance of changing 
cultural and social customs of prisons in modern China. With a view to repealing the 
extraterritoriality, the establishment of reformatories and the restructure of prisons, 
were reformative means employed by the Nanjing government to re-educate its 
fellow countrymen who were always regarded as barbarous and uncivilised in the 
eyes of westerners.
366
 However, neither Mühlhahn nor Dikötter discusses the case of 
reformatories in the context of the Sino-British relations. They also did not mention 
relocations of political prisoners from the Shanghai International Settlement to 
Chinese reformatories. They neglect the fact that the Shanghai Municipal Council’s 
recognition on Chinese reformatories was actually a trade-off between the survival of 
the western economic dominance in China and the strengthening of the Nanjing 
government.  
  This chapter not only discusses the loss of judicial autonomy of the municipal 
police, but also depicts the decay of humanitarian ideas emphasised in the penal 
system of the Settlement. Although there is no evidence showing Britain’s 
intervention in the municipal council, the positive attitude of the British authorities 
on the formation of Chinese reformatories should not be neglected. I argue that 
sending political convicts imprisoned in the municipal gaol to Chinese reformatories 
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in the 1930s shows readjustments of British imperial policies in China. It was 
because the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force could no longer uphold 
its legal authority in the International Settlement. 
Reformatories in republican China 
According to Klaus Mühlhahn, Chinese criminal justice in the 1930s and 1940s 
was severely infringed by consequences of wars and revolutions. Political 
departments not only overrode judicial institutions but also intervened in legal 
procedures. Military and secret services began to imprison political offenders in 
different detention centres, bypassing formal legal procedures.
367
 Indeed, after the 
success of the northern expedition in 1928, the Kuomintang not only attempted to 
eliminate communists militarily, but it also tried to transform thoughts of captured 
communists. There was no doubt that correcting social misbehaviour of convicts was 
one of aims for setting up reformatories.
368
 However, transforming ideas possessed 
by political prisoners was more important for reformatory staff.
369
 Subsequently, the 
Regulation Governing Reformatory 反省院條例 was promulgated by the Chinese 
government on 2
nd
 December, 1929.
370
 The Chinese authorities regarded the 
following “anti-revolutionaries” had to be imprisoned in reformatories. 
 
         1. Those completed half of their sentence for the crime of  
“Anti-revolution” and felt repented. 
         2. Those finished their sentence but did not feel regret for  
their faults against the 1911 revolution. 
3. Those were imprisoned by the Court under one year’s  
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sentence concerning the crime of “Anti-revolution”. 
         4. Those were subject to the regulations for repenting  
communists, article no. 8 
5. Those sentenced by Nationalist Party Headquarters
371
 
 
A sentence for each term was six months. The maximum confinement period was 
five years. Prior to the end of each term, prisoners would be assessed by the Board 
of Review. The Board, which was composed of Nationalist party representatives 
(The word “Tangpu” 黨部 was used by the municipal council to describe party 
representatives of the Nationalist Party. “Tangpu” will be used hereafter), judges of 
the High Court and presidents of reformatories, reserved the rights to decide 
whether a prisoner should be released based on his / her reforming progress.
372
 No 
matter political convicts repented or not, it was possible for them to transfer from 
detention centres or prisons to reformatories where political indoctrination was 
provided. More importantly, judging in accordance with their own logic and 
preference, the Nationalist Party reserved final rights to decide who should be sent 
to the reformatories and lengths of the confinement period. Although the 
reformatories were theoretically controlled by judicial institutions, party 
headquarters and military agents were the main authorities operating these 
reformatories.
373
 
  Since the late 1920s, the Nationalist government had set up plenty of 
reformatories throughout the country. Including the Metropolitan Reformatory in 
Nanjing established in March 1937, there were at least twelve reformatories built in 
different provincial capitals controlled by the Chinese government.
374
 Scales of 
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reformatories varied and depended on actual conditions of different locations. A 
reformatory in a city like Suzhou 蘇州, for example, was very small. There was 
only 259 prisoners who were divided into six groups in 1935.
375
 Locating near the 
headquarter of the Chinese Communist Party in the Jiangxi province 江西省, the 
Kiukiang reformatory 九江反省院 kept about 13,000 ex-communists in January 
1935.
376
 The establishment of reformatories in different provinces could disclose 
the determination of the Nationalist Party to suppress communism in China by 
transforming thoughts of ex-communists.  
  Apart from providing vocational training similar to what other prisons provided, 
Chinese reformatories mainly implanted pro-Kuomintang political beliefs to their 
prisoners. The Three Principles of the People 三民主義, civic education, evils of 
communism, and national history were subjects taught in reformatories.
377
 It was 
mandatory for prisoners to attend lectures and seminars provided by reformatory 
instructors. Clearly, the Nationalist Party was keen on completely removing 
communist ideas kept by political offenders. Its next targets were communist 
convicts imprisoned in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol managed by the Shanghai 
Municipal Police. 
Dilemma of the Shanghai Municipal Council 
  In Chinese controlled territory in Shanghai, the local party branch followed the 
orders of the Nationalist Party not only by accepting surrenders of communists, but 
also by reforming them in different prisons. Composed of party, military and judicial 
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representatives, the “Surrendered communists investigation committee” 上海市共黨
自首案件審查委員會 and the “Shanghai Committee to Examine Cases of 
Surrendered Communists” were formed to process surrender applications of 
ex-communists in Shanghai in September and in November 1934 respectively.
378
 
Acting in accordance with the Regulations Governing Reformatory,
379
 the above 
authorities would examine repentant communists carefully in a case by case basis. 
Six months after their establishment, these authorities received 120 applications. 
After approved by the Kuomintang, ex-communists would be sent to reformatories. 
Upon the completion of their sentences, communist convicts would receive 
certificates proving their repentance to join the Communist Party.
380
  
  In addition, the Nationalist Party in Shanghai also engaged in educational missions. 
In May 1936, the Committee for re-educating political prisoners in Shanghai 上海政
治犯教誨委員會 was established to re-educate communist convicts imprisoned in 
different prisons controlled by the Chinese authorities in Shanghai.
381
 Members of 
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this committee visited Chinese prisons and gave lectures to communist convicts 
about the Three Principles of the People. By doing so, they hoped they could 
remould the thoughts of political offenders”.382  
  In short, the Nationalist Party in Shanghai faithfully followed instructions of the 
Nanjing government. It attempted to transform the thoughts of political offenders. 
Communist convicts incarcerated in the municipal were also affected by this policy 
promulgated by the Nanjing Government.  
Political prisoners including communist convicts in the Settlement were 
imprisoned in the Ward Road Gaol in the 1920s and the 1930s. The Gaol branch of 
the Shanghai Municipal Police was responsible for the management of all prisons 
controlled by the Shanghai Municipal Council. In 1931, there were approximately 
486 wardens to supervise 7552 prisoners in the Ward Road Gaol and Amoy Road.
383
 
Among these prisoners, only a small number of them were categorised as political 
prisoners. According to the record of a French police report, there were 243 political 
offenders incarnated in Chinese prisons and gaols of the two foreign concessions in 
1936, 42 of which were imprisoned inside the Ward Road Gaol of the International 
Settlement.
384
  
  Subsequently, the Settlement court requested the Shanghai Municipal Council to 
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hand over the “anti-revolutionary” political prisoners in accordance with section two, 
article five of the Reformatory regulation.
385
 These prisoners were almost released 
on expiry of their terms of sentence and failed to show any repentance.
386
 Indeed, it 
was very unusual that prisoners completing their terms of imprisonment had to be 
confined again in other penal institutions. Nevertheless, the Nationalist Party insisted 
that imprisoning these convicts in reformatories was necessary. Fearing the rising 
influence of communist prisoners after finishing their sentence, the Chinese 
authorities wanted to purify the thoughts of these political convicts before their 
release.
387
 Thus, from the Chinese government’s perspective, sending these convicts 
to reformatories was for the sake of its national security.  
  Yet, the council’s response was very negative at the beginning. In his reply to the 
acting municipal advocate and the Commissioner of Police, J. R. Jones, the secretary 
of the council, strongly rejected the request of the Chinese authorities.  
         
It is obvious that the Council cannot dispose of prisoners except    
according to the sentence of the court…The Council cannot give  
instructions in accordance with the [2
nd
 Branch Kiangsu High Court]  
President’s request.388 
 
Undoubtedly, the council was in a dilemma for handing over its political prisoners 
in the Settlement. Indeed, the judicial autonomy of the Settlement would have been 
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infringed if the council made this promise for China. But if the council refused to 
make a concession, it would have faced the diplomatic pressure from the Chinese 
government.  
  Nevertheless, no reformatories were particularly established for remoulding 
peoples’ thoughts in the penal system of the Settlement at that time. The Ward Road 
Gaol and the Amoy Road Gaol were the only two prisons incarnating adult convicts 
in the Settlement. Although there was a reformatory administered by the municipal 
police, it was only used to imprison juvenile males and was not run along the line of 
Chinese reformatories.
389 So, the council could not dispose of communist convicts to 
reformatories in Chinese territory which were not a part of penal institutions in the 
Settlement.  
  More importantly, J. R. Jones strongly emphasised the significance of the legal 
autonomy in the Settlement. He explained to the Commissioner of Police about the 
impossibility to satisfy Chinese demand by saying that “it is obviously wrong for the 
Council to hand over a prisoner upon his release for examination by Tangpu or 
anyone else…”390 Traditionally, the legal authority of the Court was supreme and 
independent when the International Settlement was established. Before the 
disbandment of the Mixed Court in 1927, the jurisdiction of the Court was 
implemented according to the rules of 1869.
391
 The Sub-prefect was entitled to 
adjudicate all civil and criminal cases involving Chinese subjects. He had the right to 
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examine, to detain and even to punish Chinese convicts.
392
 Although Chinese Court 
had replaced the Mixed Court by the early 1930s, the council still denied that the 
judgment of a Sub-Prefect could be interfered and dominated by representatives of 
the Nationalist Party. Even though the court could summon witnesses and experts,
393
 
Tangpu could hardly be distinguished as either one of them. It was because personal 
mentalities were subjective and private. Therefore, the Kuomintang’s request on 
sending communist convicts in the Settlement to Chinese reformatory was rejected 
by the council which attempted to defend the legal independence of the Settlement.  
However, it seems that the British government was unsympathetic about handing 
over communist prisoners to Chinese reformatories. In the early 1930s, the British 
Foreign Office was well informed about the news concerning the establishment of 
reformatories in China. The British Consul General in Nanjing, for example, notified 
the British Minister to China Alexander Cadogan that more than 13,000 red bandits, 
who received military, vocational, and ideological training, were “converting into 
loyal Chinese citizens” in the Jiujiang reformatory in November 1933.394 After 
finishing his visit in Southern China in September 1935, a British military attaché 
called Lieutenant Colonel Lovat Fraser wrote a report concerning the intelligence of 
the Chinese civil war to the British Embassy in Beijing. In his first sentence of 
comments about the reformatory, he heavily criticised communists for bringing 
“appalling economic conditions” in China to “a very great extent”.395 British 
investments in China were inevitably disturbed by these communists who agitated 
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thousands of strikes, demonstrations and riots in different treaty ports. Communists 
were thus enemies of the British and the Chinese governments. Perhaps, the 
mentality of the British authorities towards reformatories can be realised by 
analysing the opinion of Fraser on the Jiujiang reformatory. 
 
        This Reformatory is undoubtedly doing good work, but the class of  
people with which it has to deal makes progress extremely slow and  
problematical. The ultimate success of the undertaking will rest in the  
hands of the Provincial officials, and the treatment that they made out to  
the prisoners on their return to their home.
396
 
 
  Clearly, this British Officer fully recognised and supported the Nationalist party’s 
transformation works on communist prisoner of wars. His report implied that British 
officers agreed with Jiang Jieshi’s actions in suppressing communism in the Republic 
of China. Fraser further pointed out that the accomplishment of this project relied on 
capabilities of local officials in reformatories. Therefore, communist disturbances on 
British investments in China could explain why the British authorities did not 
interfere in the treatments of communist prisoners in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol 
and in the Soochow reformatory.  
Diplomatically, the British government had already limited the penal power of the 
International settlement since the signing of the second rendition agreement in 1930. 
According to Article VII of the agreement: 
 
        All prisoners now serving sentences in the prisons attached to the  
Chinese court now functioning in the International Settlement and those  
sentenced by the Courts established under the present agreement shall  
serve their sentences either in such prisons in the Settlement or in  
Chinese prisons outside the Settlement… The prisons in the Settlement  
shall be operated, as far as practicable, in conformity with Chinese  
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prison regulations and shall be subject to inspection by officers  
appointed by the Chinese judicial authorities.
397
 
 
With the approval from the British Foreign Office, jails in the Settlement had been 
amalgamated to the Chinese penal system since 1930. Chinese prisoners were even 
allowed to finish their sentences either in the municipal gaol or in Chinese prisons. 
Tsu Kyi Sing, a prisoner incarcerated in the Settlement, requested successfully to 
complete the rest of his sentence in the Jiangsu No.2 prison in Chinese territory 
during the early 1930s.
398
 Although Frank Dikötter argues that some Chinese prison 
regulations in the Settlement were not practically and strictly enforced, he ignores the 
fact that the Settlement faithfully practiced the Regulations for Governing 
Reformatories in the Settlement.  
  Thus, the Shanghai Municipal Gaol in the Settlement began to connect with 
Chinese reformatories in the early 1930s. As the department which was responsible 
to imprison political convicts, the Shanghai Municipal Police concurred with the 
implementation of the Regulations of Governing Reformatories in the Municipal 
Gaol. According to Extra-Commissioner of Police R. M. J. Martin, there would be 
“no objection offered by this department (Gaol branch) to the President’s 
proposal”.399 The acting municipal advocate King S. Kum not only recognised the 
standpoint of the municipal police, but he also suggested that “I can see no objection 
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to the Court’s sending offenders to the reformatory at Soochow”.400 He fully agreed 
that once political convicts in the municipal gaol were due for release, they should be 
examined in the Court. If the Court believed that these convicts were not truly 
repented, they would be sent to the Soochow reformatory.
401
 Mr. Kum even 
persuaded the council secretary who thought China’s request was unreasonable to 
carry out the instructions stated in the Rendition Agreement.  
 
        … the Regulations Governing Reformatories are applicable to the   
Chinese Courts in the Settlement by virtue of the Rendition Agreement.  
Since there is no such form of Reformatory in the Settlement, the Court  
by virtue of Article VII of the Rendition Agreement, has power to order  
a prisoner to serve his sentence outside of the Settlement.
402
 
 
Therefore, the independence of the penal system of the Settlement was infringed by 
the Chinese authorities. 
  With regard to the judicial autonomy of the Court, Mr. Kum did not think that the 
involvement of Kuomintang representatives in legal proceedings was an 
infringement. He only regarded these Tangpu members as “experts conducting an 
investigation for the Court.” The final power to dispose of the prisoner, in his opinion, 
is vested in the Court.
403
 Another municipal advocate R. J. Ryan also emphasised 
that reformatory regulations did not violate the Land Regulations and by laws 
because Tangpu members only provided testimonies and consultations for judges 
without interfering judgments of the Court.
404
 Nevertheless, it was undeniable that 
opinions of Tangpu members were actually decisive and significant to affect the 
                                                 
400
 “Dispatch written from King S. Kum (Acting Municipal Advocate) to R. M. J. Martin (Extra 
Commissioner of Police) 29
th
 November, 1932”, ibid. 
401
 Ibid 
402
 “Dispatch written from King S. Kum (Acting Municipal Advocate) to J. R. Jones (Secretary 
General), 21
st
 December, 1932”, ibid. 
403
 Ibid. 
404
 “Dispatch written from R.J. Ryan (Municipal Advocate) to J. R. Jones (Secretary General), 1st 
February, 1933”, Ibid. 
124 
 
 
thoughts of magistrates. Even Mr. Kum admitted that “it is practically impossible for 
gaol staff to make any observation as to whether a political prisoner is liable to 
commit such an offense (communism) again after he is released.”405 Thus, law 
enforcement officers in the Settlement had no objective ways to distinguish the 
mentalities of political prisoners. Even though judgments were theoretically decided 
by the Court, the role of Tangpu members was still very important to influence 
judges. The neutrality and the judicial autonomy of the Court in the Settlement were 
therefore damaged by the Chinese government.  
The destination was Soochow 
As a result, the Municipal Gaol began to hand over different communist prisoners 
to the Chinese Reformatory in Soochow in early 1933.
406
 Non-repented political 
offenders who were due for release were urgently wanted by the Nationalist Party. In 
fact, prisons under Chinese administration in Shanghai also invited Tangpu to 
evaluate the mentalities of their prisoners when they were due for release.
407
 Zhang 
Junhua 張俊華 and Zhao Yinghua 趙映華, who were political offenders 
imprisoned in the Shanghai Jiangsu High Court No.2 Prison, were classified as 
“repentant” and were released after examined by Tangpu.408 Similarly, as one of 
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components of the Chinese penal system, the Ward Road Gaol in the International 
Settlement also invited Tangpu to examine its communist prisoners before their 
releases. According to a study of the Shanghai Academy of Social Science, at least 
four communist convicts were transferred from the municipal gaol to the Soochow 
reformatory due to their insistence on their communist convictions.
409
  
  Cao Diqiu 曹荻秋, who was a communist prisoner in the municipal gaol and later 
the mayor of Shanghai after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, was 
an example showing how the Regulation for Governing Chinese Reformatory 
worked in the Settlement during the 1930s. He was arrested on 17
th
 March, 1932 by 
the municipal police during a raid in a communist base located at 385 Changping 
Road and 370 Changping Road.
410
 A large quantity of stamps, documents and 
communist literature such as pamphlets commemorating the anniversary of the Paris 
Commune were discovered in this base. Bearing the charge of propagating 
communism, Cao and his two comrades were later sentenced to five-year 
imprisonments in the municipal gaol by the Kiangsu High Court.
411
 Prior to the 
completion of his sentence in April 1937, Cao was firstly transferred from the 
municipal gaol to a detention centre of the Chinese Court in the Settlement. Then, an 
agent was sent from the Kuomintang to examine his thought. Comments of the 
Chinese authority on Cao after an interview were as follows: 
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        His attitude was fair; however, he refused to confess his faults committed   
in the past. He did not have any expressions after our persuasion.    
At last, he just promised not to engage in political activities.
412
 
 
When writing a biography for her husband, Cao’s wife Shi Bin 石斌, showed her 
compliment to Cao, praising his loyalty towards the Communist Party.  
 
        After finishing his five-year sentence, Diqiu did not think that he  
committed any crimes. He then united all communist convicts to  
struggle with his enemies after the Kuomintang imprisoned him again in  
the Soochow reformatory.
413
 
 
Eventually, due to his insistence on his communist faith, Cao was  
handed over from the Settlement Gaol to the Soochow reformatory on 26
th
 April, 
1937. Clearly, the Nationalist Party took an important role in affecting the judgment 
of the Court in this case. This incident also shows that the municipal police faithfully 
executed the decision made by Tangpu members.  
  Another person spotted by the Chinese authorities was Zhou Lipo 周立波 who 
was a proof-reader in a factory.
414
 Later, He was also a famous leftist writer in the 
People’s Republic of China. Posting anti-government handbills outside the Universal 
Printing Shop at No. 650 Sinza Road, Zhou was arrested by the municipal police on 
6
th
 February, 1932. Plenty of communist literature was also discovered by detectives 
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in his premise.
415
 On 25
th
 April 1932, Zhou was prosecuted by the Settlement 
authorities with the charge of “propagating communism”. He was eventually 
sentenced to the municipal gaol for two years and six months. A one-year deduction 
of sentence was granted to Zhou during an amnesty afterwards.
416
 Prior to his 
release in December, 1933, the municipal gaol invited Tangpu members to examine 
Zhou about his thoughts. Facing strong persuasion from Tangpu, Zhou Lipo still 
firmly refused to confess to Chinese officers concerning his former involvements in 
communist activities.
417
 He was then sent to the Soochow Reformatory for another 
seven months’ imprisonment.  
As the Special Branch files show, Zhang Yunqing 張雲卿 was apprehended 
because of his membership of the Left Wing Cultural League 中國左翼作家聯盟 on 
17
th
 March, 1932. He was inspected by Tangpu members in the 2
nd
 Branch Kiangsu 
High Court in 1937.
418
 After being incarcerated in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol for 
five years, Zhang was classified by Kuomintang representatives as a non-repented 
person. In April 1937, judges of the Shanghai Special District Court and the 
Shanghai Municipal Police were informed by the Kuomintang that Zhang had to be 
sent to the Soochow Reformatory for re-education.
419
 In short, the implementation 
of reformatory regulations was an infringement on the penal system in the Settlement. 
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More importantly, Tangpu members’ influence over judgments of the Court 
inevitably destroyed the judicial autonomy of the International Settlement. 
Apart from transferring non-repented communist convicts, the council also 
assisted the Chinese authorities to transfer repentant political offenders to the 
Soochow Reformatory. According to the Regulations for Governing the Reformatory, 
any repentant political convicts who had served half of their sentences (later one 
third was also accepted), were welcome to continue their sentences in Chinese 
reformatories.
420
 Indeed, prisons in Chinese territory had already implemented this 
law code after its promulgation. Zhou Jinhai 周金海, who finished one third of his 
sentence in the No.2 Prison in Shanghai, was applauded by Chinese wardens as kind 
and repentant. He was then recommended by the prison to continue his sentence in 
the Soochow reformatory in February 1936.
421
  
  Again, the Shanghai Municipal Council, which was tied by the rendition 
agreement, also implemented reformatory regulations in Settlement jails. Working in 
line with Chinese regulations, wardens of the municipal gaol encouraged political 
prisoners to move to the Soochow reformatory. Xu Jianlou 徐建樓, who had been 
incarcerated in the Ward Road Gaol for more than one year in spring 1937, depicted 
how wardens worked side by side with the Chinese government. 
 
        The Gaol authority announced a decision made by the Nationalist  
Party to us. Any political convicts, who had served half or one third of  
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their sentences, were eligible to continue their sentences in Chinese  
reformatories.
422
 
 
Ultimately, three to four communists submitted their applications to the municipal 
gaol.
423
 
  Again, Tangpu interfered in the administration of the municipal gaol as they had 
the power to decide which convicts were repentant. All prisoners who applied for 
relocation in Chinese reformatories must be examined by Tangpu. Only confessed 
prisoners would be sent to the reformatory. Liu Jun 劉俊, who was a political 
prisoner in the Ward Road Gaol in 1936, could prove about this issue.
424
   
Undoubtedly, such practice would attract attentions of communist prisoners. It was 
because they would be released after six months’ imprisonments in a reformatory. It 
was really good news for some of these communist convicts who felt desperate after 
being imprisoned for a long time. Yao Jianai 姚家礽, who wrote slogans on walls 
and distributed plenty of communist literature at the Yulin road in November 1935, 
was sentenced to a three-year imprisonment in the Ward Road Gaol.
425
 According to 
Yao, a deputy governor of the gaol and some wardens announced to political 
prisoners in spring 1937 that if they were willing to go to Chinese reformatories, they 
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would be released earlier than they expected.
426
 Eventually, although the majority of 
prisoners ignored these officers, two communists still wanted to move to Chinese 
reformatories.
427
  
  Zhang Zongshun 張宗順, who was also a member of the Left Wing Cultural 
League, adopted a totally different attitude compared with his comrade Zhang 
Yunqing mentioned earlier. Showing his confession to the Kuomintang authority, he 
made a personal request that he was willing to receive re-education in a Chinese 
reformatory.
428
 
Apart from relocating its own prisoners to Chinese reformatories, the Shanghai 
Municipal Police also provided escorts for transferring political offenders from other 
Chinese prisons in the Settlement to the Shanghai railway station. These offenders 
would be sent to the Soochow reformatory based on requests made by the Chinese 
authorities. The Chinese No. 2 Prison recommended Lin Ziming 林子明, Chen 
Cihang 陳慈航 and Zhuming 朱明 to continue their sentences in Chinese 
reformatories outside the Settlement in July 1935.
429
 This was because these three 
prisoners were willing to confess all their “sins”. Relocating these prisoners from 
Shanghai to Soochow definitely required the assistance from the Settlement 
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authorities in Shanghai. Inevitably, Chinese wardens and these three prisoners 
needed to pass through the Foreign Concessions, the International Settlement and the 
Zhapei area controlled by the Chinese government. Before the relocation took place, 
the Chinese No.2 prison contacted the Shanghai Municipal Police for escorting these 
prisoners. 
 
        On 3
rd
 August at 8am, we will escort Messrs. Lin Zimu to the Soochow  
Reformatory. Before that, a police wagon is going to pass through 
Boulevard de Montigny (敏體尼蔭路, located in French Concession) and 
Xizang Road (西藏路, located in the International Settlement), before 
getting on a train at the Zhabei Railway Station. Please asked your police 
officers to allow us to pass through the Settlement and provided any 
assistance to them if needed.
430
 
 
Subsequently, not only did the French Concession Police borrow a police wagon for 
transporting these wardens and prisoners, but the Shanghai Municipal Police and the 
Public Safety Bureau also provided escorts to these Chinese personnel to pass 
through the International Settlement and Chinese territory.
431
 
In short, the Shanghai Municipal Gaol became a part of the penal system of the 
Chinese government. The interference of Tangpu members and the collaboration of 
wardens in the Ward Road Gaol revealed the weakened judicial power of the 
Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force. It was because they lost their rights 
to release their political prisoners incarcerated in the Settlement. Moreover, the 
municipal police even helped to escort convicts of Chinese prisons to the railway 
station when they were on their way to the Soochow Reformatory. Therefore, the 
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municipal police and its prison were under the control of the Chinese authorities to a 
large extent. Legal autonomy in the Settlement was severely infringed.  
Degeneracy of humanitarian treatment 
Civilising the Chinese was one of the missions behind the theory of the White 
Men’s burden when the British started to rule over their colonial subjects.432 The 
penitentiary institution was an example illustrating the magnificence of the British 
civilisation.
433
 A British Mixed Court Assessor even bragged the Council’s 
administration on prisons was “in the interests of civilisation so that China might 
learn that punishment can be effectual without the employment of barbarous methods 
which are in vogue throughout the Empire.”434  
  Indeed, perspectives on western penal systems had experienced drastic changes 
since the late 18
th
 century. Due to humanitarian ideas proposed by Enlightenment 
philosophers, prisoners were regarded as components of a society. Therefore, they 
deserved humane treatments in prisons. Subsequently, reforming penal systems in 
different countries symbolised a sense of modernity to wipe out savageness and 
backwardness.
435
 As William Forsythe observes, the drastic change of British penal 
system in the 19
th
 century was attributed to the contribution of the evangelicals and 
the associationists. Both of them agreed that there should be alternatives to rectify 
faults made by prisoners other than physical punishments. The evangelicals 
emphasised that “the value of every human being” should be in line with God’s 
commandments whereas the associationists suggested providing rewards and 
encouragements to prisoners.
436
 As a result, the management of penitentiaries in the 
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United Kingdom had already undergone tremendous reforms and modifications since 
the 19
th
 century. Likewise, British expatriates were committed to enlighten the 
Chinese by reforming the penitentiary in different British concessions.  
  Since the British occupied China in the mid-19
th
 century, a series of “China Ports 
Prison Regulations” had become effective in different treaty ports and British 
territories in China. The Ward Road Gaol, which was located in the Shanghai 
International Settlement influenced by British settlers, abided by the “Shanghai 
Prison Regulation” drafted by the British Foreign Office. All British prisoners 
benefited from this prison regulation.
437
 Even though Chinese prisoners were not 
under the protection of this regulation, a British pressure group in the 1930s also 
showed its concern on the treatment of Chinese prisoners in the municipal gaol. After 
inspecting the Ward Road Gaol, Miss Margery Fry, who was the secretary of the 
Howard League for Penal Reform, wrote a long evaluation report to the British 
Foreign Office criticising the management of the municipal gaol when incarcerating 
Chinese prisoners. Miss Fry was concerned about the physical and mental conditions 
of the Chinese in the municipal gaol.
438
 The Howard League for Penal Reform, 
which was a London-based pressure group, demanded the British government to 
reform penal systems and to modify criminal codes. In accordance with Andrew 
Thompson, pressure groups in Britain were influential to affect imperial policies of 
the British government.
439
 Sharing similar language and culture, British citizens at 
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home had the same Britishness and close connections with British settlers overseas. 
Therefore, the British at home had initiatives to involve in the decision-making 
process of imperial policies. Thus, Miss Fry’s comments could pressure the British 
Foreign Office and the Shanghai Municipal Council to improve the administration of 
prisons in the International Settlement.  
Although sometimes conditions were disgusting in the Ward Road gaol,, the 
municipal council still provided humanitarian services to prisoners physically and 
spiritually. When lots of prisoners suffered from serious diseases, the Commission of 
Public Health suggested building a prison hospital to cure patients in the gaol.
440 
While some medical officers attributed the cause of health problems in the prison to 
the insufficiency of food and nutrients, the council was then advised to provide maize, 
sorghum and even cod-liver oil in the diets of prisoners.
441
  
  More importantly, the ideas and thoughts of prisoners in the Settlement were well 
respected. Even though the council prepared educational trainings for the juvenile 
males incarcerated in the municipal reformatory, these youngsters could still decide 
whether to join or not. Whilst responding to Miss Margery Fry’s criticisms, the 
chairman of the council Harry Arnold even considered to employ specially-trained 
teachers and to widen curricula assisted by the Education department.
442
 Thus, not 
only were the wills of prisoners respected, but syllabi were also diverse and broad. 
  Reading was also permitted with little restrictions. According to the Shanghai 
Prison Regulations, British prisoners not only could read books prepared by the 
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Council in the gaol library, but they were also allowed to request somebody to buy 
different literature such as books and newspapers for them to read in prisons. Apart 
from religious and language works such as the Bible and Anglo-Chinese dictionaries, 
political offenders in the municipal gaol were even allowed to read political, 
philosophical and socialist literature. 
 
…We asked the Gaol authority to buy some books for us. Most of the  
books we wanted were the masterpieces of Marxism, such as  
the Anti-Dühring, the Critique of the Gotha programme, the Dialectical  
materialism, Shen Zhiyuan 沈志遠’s political economy, Li Da  
李達’sMaterialist Dialectics, Ai Siqi 艾思奇’s Public Philosophy.  
The warden who bought these books for us was ignorant of these books.  
He just thought these works were relevant to history, economic studies and  
philosophy. When everybody in the prison saw these “spiritual food”,  
they not only felt excited, but also decided to study hard.
443
 
 
According to Liu Jun, communist convicts were also allowed to form study groups to 
learn political, cultural and Chinese revolutionary theories. Some communists even 
gave lectures on sensitive topics such as “The nature and missions of Chinese 
revolutions”, “Political economy” and “Materialist Dialectics”.444 Political 
interventions on the thoughts of prisoners were minimal. Undoubtedly, criminals in 
the Settlement were deprived of their personal freedoms due to their violations on the 
law and order. Yet, their dignities and self-esteems were well-respected in the 
Shanghai Municipal Gaol. 
  Ironically, the Shanghai Municipal Council which was largely influenced by 
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western penal reforms had to send its communist prisoners to the Soochow 
Reformatory where inhumane treatments were found. [Please refer to appendix 12] 
In fact, even the municipal advocate R.J. Ryan also expressed his disagreement and 
denial in handing over prisoners to a Chinese reformatory. 
 
        We feel that the Regulations governing Houses of Reflection  
(the establishment of reformatories) do not come with the category of good 
laws. They also seem to be unfair, and to practically deprive Chinese 
citizens of the right of free thought and speech.
445
 
 
Paradoxically, some prisoners in the Soochow reformatory praised and thanked for 
the efforts of their instructors for freeing themselves from the communist 
“contamination”. A prisoner claimed himself became healthier because “the training 
in this reformatory made him feel relaxed, pleased and gratified”.446 He further 
pointed out that the Soochow reformatory enabled him to discover his absolute faith 
and to foresee a brighter future.
447
 
Indeed, the above narratives were only an incomplete picture of the story. Behind 
the scenes, prisoners in the Soochow reformatory experienced lots of inhumane 
treatments which could hardly be found in the municipal gaol. Memoirs of prisoner 
and annual reports of some Chinese reformatories can justify that there were no 
exaggerations for Mr. Ryan’s statement in describing the negative nature of the 
Regulations Governing Chinese reformatory. 
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  Similar to the municipal gaol, Chinese reformatories also provided prisoners with 
education opportunities. However, not only were their lectures mandatory, but 
curriculum of these lectures had an implication to remould the political ideologies of 
prisoners. In the Soochow reformatory, prisoners would be requested to attend 
different lectures based on their educational levels. The reformatory offered eleven 
courses across a wide range of disciplines such as craftsmanship, commence, 
physical education. Five of which such as “Doctrine of Dr. Sun”, “Three Principles 
of the People”, “political science”, “framework for establishing the state” and 
“Military lecture” were related to politics.448 Sharing similar curriculum content, the 
Shanxi reformatory 山西反省院 could give us a glance at objectives of their 
lectures in its annual report. Apart from teaching prisoners basic vocational and 
technical skills, instructors of the reformatory attempted to implant the ideologies of 
the Kuomintang to political offenders. “The evil of communism”, “reverence for Dr. 
Sun Yat Sin”, “the goal of the Chinese revolution” and “the circumstance of the 
international relations” were lecture topics favouring the perspective of the 
Kuomintang.
449
 Six out of twenty-one hours per week were spent to teach the above 
ideas in the reformatory in 1933.
450
 One of the convicts incarcerated in the Soochow 
Reformatory even depicted the lesson about “Three Principles of the People” as a 
course teaching people to become “obedient and loyal slaves”.451 As a consequence, 
political offenders had no alternative ways to express their political ideas. They had 
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to accept the ideas written in the “Three Principles of the People”.  
  Teaching materials were also carefully selected in different courses. Due to the 
political natures of the courses, reformatory staff used Kuomintang official’s written 
works as their textbooks. “The Three Principles of People” 三民主義 and the 
“National Reconstruction” 建國方略 written by Dr. Sun Zhongshan was the main 
references for prisoners to study in the lesson about party ideology.
452
 Moreover, 
correspondences written between the Nationalist government, the Kuomintang Party 
and different provincial government departments were even selected as the main 
references in Chinese language classes of the Shanxi reformatory.
453
 Also, although 
reformatories provided different kinds of magazines and books for prisoners to read, 
literature about Kuomintang ideologies formed the majority of books in the 
library.
454
 Thus, prisoners were subject to political assimilation in reformatories 
because they could only read literature published by the Kuomintang. 
As the main ideology upheld by the Kuomintang and the Nationalist government, 
the Three Principles of the People was drafted during the 1911 revolution. It was the 
first slogans advocated by anti-Qing revolutionaries and later it became the 
fundamental “creed” of the Kuomintang. There were three components inside this 
political doctrine. Nationalism (民族 Minzu) meant Chinese people, including other 
ethnic minorities, should be free from foreign interference. Secondly, citizens in 
China deserved democracy (民權 Miquan) to exert their influence in public policies 
of their own country. Lastly, “people’s livelihood” (民生 Minsheng) represented the 
idea of equalisation of land ownership based on a fair taxation system.
455
 The above 
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doctrines indicated that the Three Principles of the People was not necessarily 
anti-communist. Dr. Sun Zhongshan even allied with the Chinese Communist Party 
to fight against warlords in the early 1920s. It was Jiang Jieshi who added his 
personal anti-communist sentiment into the Three Principles of the People in order to 
accomplish his plan to eliminate communist activities. 
  Not only did the syllabi and the reading materials of the lectures imply political 
meanings, but the themes of the extra-curricular activities were also problematic. 
Apart from regular lectures, different reformatories also organised debates, 
symposiums and seminars.
456
 Most of the topics for these activities were politically 
oriented. For example, the debate topics in the Shanxi Reformatory in 1933 included 
“Freedom of thought”, “Students should not interfere in politics” and “the urgent 
need for China to promulgate a constitution”. Preconceptions favouring the rule of 
the Nationalist Party were also disclosed in subjects of different symposiums. 
Prisoners not only discussed the ways to unify China and to accomplish party rule, 
but they also needed to talk about the reasons for the inapplicability of class struggle 
in China.
457
 Thus, the Chinese authorities intentionally designed pro-Kuomintang 
curriculum for their students in reformatories. By remoulding the thoughts of 
prisoners, Chinese reformatories attempted to remove their anti-government 
sentiments towards the Kuomintang.  
  Subsequently, assessments followed afterwards. Apart from taking monthly tests 
and quizzes,
458
 prisoners were also required to submit homework regularly 
concerning political issues. Prior to exam periods, prisoners had to submit articles 
showing how they felt repentant about their previous involvements in communist 
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activities. The Shanxi reformatory also asked their prisoners to write book reviews 
based on written works published by the Kuomintang authorities.
459
 According to 
the minute of the education committee in 1933, political offenders were required to 
write book reviews on “A brief history of Premier Sun” 總理傳略, “The Military 
ethics of soldiers” 軍人精神教育 and “The provisional constitution of the Republic 
of China” 中華民國臨時訓政約法.460 Yuan Yelie 袁也烈, who was once a 
political prisoner in a reformatory, still remembered “The Philosophy of Life” 唯生
論 written by a famous Kuomintang member Chen Lifu 陳立夫 was also inside the 
list of the assigned literature in the Soochow Reformatory.
461
 The prisoners were 
given one month only to finish writing their reviews. Instructors would mark and 
comment on their works at the end of each month.
462
  
  Moreover, individual interviews were also held to examine prisoners. Meeting 
prisoners in person, reformatory staff would observe the behaviours of their prisoners. 
Proper “guidance” would be given to prisoners if their thoughts failed to match with 
the standard of the Nationalist government.
463
 Clandestinely, some prisoners even 
worked as collaborators of reformatories behind the scenes. These collaborators 
acquired the intelligence from other prisoners. Reformatory instructors were 
therefore well-informed about the mentalities and the political points of view of 
different prisoners. They could even know whether a prisoner was truly repented.
464
  
  By experiencing the above assessments, political prisoners were trained to 
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abandon their own idea and thoughts. They were forced by reformatories to 
recognise the legitimacy of the Kuomintang to rule over China. These communist 
prisoners were deprived of their rights to think, to analyse and to express. After the 
completion of their sentences in reformatories, there were no guarantees that they 
would be released. Communists would only be set free when reformatory instructors 
believed that they were truly repented. Indeed, only very few people could leave 
reformatories after they finished their sentence. A witness in the Soochow 
reformatory even described that being incarnated in the reformatory was actually a 
kind of “life imprisonment”.465 The power to discharge political offenders was 
solely rested on the reformatory instructors. Whether these communists truly 
repented or not, they all experienced different levels of mental tortures during their 
detentions in Chinese reformatories. It was indeed ironic that the Shanghai Municipal 
Council and its police force, which adopted western humanitarian treatments in their 
prisons, allowed their communist prisoners to endure spiritual exploitations in 
Chinese reformatories. 
Although the municipal advocate Mr. Ryan was sympathetic to the communist 
prisoners incarcerated in the Soochow reformatory, he still urged the Shanghai 
Municipal Council to implement the rendition agreement accordingly. He thought 
that the Chinese authorities would only have been satisfied if the council was willing 
to implement reformatory regulations in the settlement.  
 
They are Chinese law, however, as such should be enforced in the  
Settlement. If the council should refuse to cooperate with the Court to  
the extent above outline, we feel that it would be impinging upon the  
Rendition Agreement. You will agree, we believe, the Council should do  
its utmost to uphold the agreement so that it can more easily persuade  
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the Chinese to carry out their part of its provisions.
466
 
 
Eventually, most of the communist prisoners in Chinese reformatories were not 
released until a compromise was made between the Nationalist Party and the 
Communist Party during the outbreak of the 2
nd
 Sino-Japanese War in August 1937. 
This was because both parties recognised the need to concentrate their resources to 
fight against the Japanese in China.
467
 
  To conclude, the British imperial presence in Shanghai during the 1930s suffered a 
significant setback. First of all, the judicial independence and neutrality of the 
Settlement were infringed again because the municipal gaol became a part of the 
Chinese penal system. Inside the Settlement, there was never a penal institution 
established for remoulding the thoughts of prisoners. Before the rise of the 
Kuomintang in 1927, detention was used as the only means to punish communists 
agitating strikes and demonstrations in the Settlement. Therefore, interference from 
Tangpu members damaged the judicial independence of the International Settlement.  
  Moreover, the tolerance of the municipal council on inhumane treatments of the 
Soochow reformatory also violated western penal traditions. Inside the municipal 
gaol, adult prisoners and juvenile males were well-respected physically and mentally. 
Even political offenders were permitted to read and learn with loose restrictions. 
Nevertheless, political indoctrinations in Chinese reformatories contradicted to 
humanitarian ideas advocated by many westerners. The tolerance of the Shanghai 
Municipal Council on this issue was a compromise in response to the rise of the 
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Kuomintang in China.  
Last but not least, the role of the British Foreign Office was also remarkable in this 
incident. Although there was no evidence showing direct British interventions in the 
issue on reformatory, the rendition agreement and the positive comment made by the 
British military officer on the Jiujiang reformatory demonstrated the recognition of 
the British government on the Regulations Governing Reformatory.  
  This chapter showed how the British government readjusted its imperial policies in 
China by integrating Settlement jails into a part of the Chinese prison system. As a 
result, Britain’s economic interests could survive at the expense of the judicial and 
penal independence of the Settlement in the 1930s. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
The main theme of this thesis is to reveal readjustments of British imperial policies 
in Shanghai between 1920s and the 1930s. In order to retain its economic influence 
in China, Britain had to pacify the Kuomintang through withdrawing its protections 
from British expatriates in Shanghai. The legal autonomy of the Settlement was 
largely infringed. Therefore, I argue that decolonisation took place in Shanghai 
during the inter-war period. It was because British settlers could no longer exercise 
their western legal values in Shanghai. Consequently, British legal supremacy in 
China almost came to an end.   
Indeed, there was no doubt that the Shanghai Municipal Police had become “a 
trustworthy ally” of the Nationalist government by 1927 not only by participating in 
arrests, but also by sacrificing their legal authority in the forms of prosecution, 
extradition, and penal power. Similar to what Georgina Sinclair observes in other 
colonial police forces during the post-war period, most of the frontline officers of the 
municipal police were very collaborative with the Chinese government to apprehend 
communists. This was because their main obligation was to retain the existence of 
foreign interests in the Settlement. As the intelligence department of the Shanghai 
Municipal Police, the Special Branch coordinated arrests between their colleagues 
and the Chinese authorities, targeting communists hiding inside the Settlement. 
During many arrests, both the Settlement and Chinese authorities violated the 
Chinese criminal procedures as many of the arrest orders were executed based on 
suspicions and provisional requests from the Chinese intelligence departments. 
Details stated in court warrants were largely ignored. Perhaps, some police officers in 
the settlement may believe that only by violating formal legal procedures could they 
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suppressed communist disturbances effectively. Yet, this did not mean that the 
municipal police obtained greater power in policing Shanghai. Instead, the 
Kuomintang was the authority in deciding who should be arrested and what actions 
should be carried out according to its interpretation on different communists. 
However, British settlers outside the police network felt frustrated to go against 
unreasonable demands raised by the Chinese. They were very helpless when they 
knew the British Foreign Office did not stand by them in the issues on extradition 
and reformatory. Attempting to uphold the legal procedures of the Settlement, British 
expatriates in Shanghai failed to secure diplomatic supports from the British 
authorities. In fact, the British diplomatic bodies had begun to revise the judicial 
regulations of the International Settlement with the Kuomintang since 1927. 
Subsequently, British expatriates were deprived of many legal privileges in the 
Settlement court. In 1929, knowing that the council tried to protect their Chinese 
bona fide residents on suspicion of joining communist activities, British officials 
pushed hard to persuade council to relinquish its protections offered to these Chinese 
in order not to offend the Kuomintang. The British Minister to China Sir Miles 
Lampson even visited Shanghai and explained Britain’s policies to the Chairman of 
the council. The Shanghai Municipal Council therefore had to extradite any people to 
China if there was sufficient evidence found. Later, Lampson and his colleagues 
decided not to interfere in the case of the Noulen couple even though it was within 
jurisdiction of the Settlement court. Moreover, the link established between the 
Shanghai Municipal Gaol and the Soochow Reformatory also contradicted to the 
humanitarian values possessed by the council and British pressure groups. Political 
indoctrinations imposed on prisoners in the Soochow reformatory were utterly 
unacceptable in the eyes of many westerners. Interference of Kuomintang party 
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members in deciding who should be sent to the reformatory also damaged the 
judicial independence of the Settlement. However, the municipal council still had to 
follow the rules stated in the Chinese prison regulation due to the fact that the 
settlement abided by the rendition agreement signed between Britain and China in 
1930. British expatriates in the council had been abandoned by their sovereign state 
by the late 1920s. Thence, readjustments of British imperial policies in China could 
explain why the Council faithfully implemented the unreasonable instructions given 
by the Kuomintang in communist cases in spite of their reluctances.  
I also argue that the periodisation of the British decolonisation could be dated back 
to the 1920s. China’s infringement on the judicial independence of the Shanghai 
International Settlement was an important and vigorous case study to compensate the 
limitations of Bickers’ argument. It is because this case showed the intrusion of 
Chinese influence was not only in commercial and evangelical sectors, but also in 
judicial system of the Settlement. Even in a political level, the Kuomintang’s 
influence was not just restricted to those Chinese members appointed in the Shanghai 
Municipal Council. The Chinese government also affected the treatments of their 
political enemies seeking refuge in the Settlement. The Shanghai Municipal Council 
was forced to extradite its convicts to the Kuomintang and to transfer its prisoners to 
Chinese reformatories. The tolerance of the Council and its police force on the 
infringement of the judicial independence in the Settlement was actually far beyond 
the aim of the municipal police for maintaining internal security in the Settlement. 
Most importantly, they accepted such fate accompli mainly because they had to 
satisfy the political incentives of the Kuomintang government. Thence, the 
International Settlement inevitably became a part of policing networks of the 
Nationalist government in China during the Nanjing decade. Political offenders 
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incarcerated in the municipal gaol were either encouraged or forced to continue their 
sentences in the Soochow Reformatory. They experienced several years of sufferings 
by intensive political indoctrinations. Worse still, people regarded by the 
Kuomintang as important communist convicts would be immediately extradited from 
the municipal police to the Chinese authorities. Many of them were eventually 
executed by different organisations affiliated with the Kuomintang. Also, it was 
sometimes extremely difficult to prove whether people were engaged in “communist 
activities” because membership was always personal, private and subjective. Having 
no ideas in whether suspects threatened “the internal safety of the Republic of China”, 
the Shanghai Municipal Police could only follow the comments and evidence 
provided by the Chinese authorities in many cases. Assisted by the Shanghai 
Municipal Police, the Kuomintang was able to effectively suppress the spread of 
communism not only in Chinese territory, but also in the International Settlement.  
  It was not until in 1937 that the cooperation between the Settlement and Chinese 
authorities terminated when Jiang Jieshi was forced to ally with the Chinese 
Communist Party as a result of the Xian incident 西安事變 and the Japanese 
invasion in China. The Kuomintang began to release communists imprisoned in 
Chinese reformatories by mid-1937. Later, Chinese territory in Shanghai was even 
occupied by Japanese troops after Kuomintang’s defeat in the Battle of Shanghai in 
November 1937. The collaboration between the Settlement and the Chinese 
authorities to arrest communists in Shanghai eventually came to a halt. Besieged by 
Japanese forces for four years, two foreign concessions in Shanghai were also 
annexed by Japan in December 1941 when the Pacific finally broke out. 
  The elimination of communist activities in Shanghai would pave the way for 
consolidating the Kuomintang’s power. In my opinion, the loss of the judicial 
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autonomy in the Settlement was as important as the transfer of political sovereignty 
from Britain to its colonial subjects during the post-war era. Therefore, it is hoped 
that my research can contribute to the academia by suggesting that the beginning of 
the British decolonisation in Asia is dated back to the 1920s in Shanghai. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
MAP OF THE SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT IN THE 1935
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 http://maps.bpl.org/id/m8780, accessed on 31
st
 July, 2015 
150 
 
 
APPENDIX 2 
 
CORE MEMBERS OF THE SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL IN THE EARLY 
1940s
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APPENDIX 3 
 
SCENE NEAR LOUZA POLICE STATION 老閘巡捕房 IN NANKING ROAD AFTER 
THE MAY THIRTIETH MOVEMENT IN 1925
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accessed on 31
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APPENDIX 4 
 
RESERVE UNIT (RIOT SQUAD) OF THE SMP AND THEIR “RED MARIAS”471 
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st
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APPENDIX 5 
 
TRIAL IN THE SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL MIXED COURT IN THE LATE 19
th 
CENTURY OR EARLY 20
th
 CENTURY
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 Note a consular deputy sits next to the Chinese judge in the court proceeding. 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/28/International_Mixed_Court_at_Shangh
ai7.jpg/800px-International_Mixed_Court_at_Shanghai7.jpg , accessed on 31
st
 August, 2015 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
PORTRAIT OF CHIEF DETECTIVE INSPECTOR PAT GIVENS
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 http://robertbickers.net/2015/02/17/what-shall-we-call-chiang-kai-shek, accessed on 31
st
 July, 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
A WARRANT SAMPLE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST SPECIAL AREA 
IN SHANGHAI
474
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
474
 Warrant No. 1300 issued by Judge Feng at the request of the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau 6
th
 
February, 1934 in “Return For Cancellation Of Warrants Nos. 1300 And 1301”, ref. D5675, Shanghai 
Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
FIGURES SHOWING EXTRADITION OF COMMUNISTS FROM THE 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT TO CHINESE TERRITORY BETWEEN13/4/27 AND 
23-6-27 
475
 
 
Date Arrests Charge How Dealt With 
13-4-27 1 Intimidation 40 days imprisonment 
14-4-27 1 Inciting to strike & 
threatening to murder  
5 months imprisonment 
11-4-27 1 Selling communist 
newspaper 
Cautioned 12-4-27 
28-4-27 1 Distributing 
inflammatory handbills 
Handed over to Chinese 
Authorities  
29-4-27 11 Suspected Communists Do 
30-4-27 6 Do Do 
8-5-27 3 Do Do 
10-5-27 2 Do Do 
13-5-27 3 Do Do 
25-5-27 1 Do Do 
25-5-27 1 Intimidation 6 months impri. 
13-6-27 6 Suspected communists Handed over to Chinese 
Authorities 
23-6-27 5 Do Do 
24-6-27 6 Do Do 
8-7-27 4 Do To be released on Ching 
Hwa Shing Shoe 
makers Shop signing 
bond 14-7-27 
19-7-27 1 Do Handed over to Chinese 
Authorities 20-7-27 
23-7-27 2 Do Do 
27-7-27 4 Do Do 
28-7-27 2 Do Do 
4-8-27 1 Do Do 
                                                 
475
 “Letter written by E.I.M. Barret to the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 29th February, 
1928” in communist activities in Settlement in Shanghai Municipal Council, 上海公共租界工部局
總辦處關於共產黨活動：牛蘭案, 1928-1932 Communist activities: The case of Noulen, ref.: 
U1-3-3434, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 (Shanghai: Unpublished 
document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive). 
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10-8-27 10 Do 9 dismissed owing to 
lack of evidence. 1 to be 
detained for 6 months at 
the deer of Hope. 
10-8-27 1 Do Accused to be released 
of personal bond for 
good behaviour 
21-8-27 1 Distributing 
communistic handbills 
10 months impri. 
23-6-27 5 Posting communistic 
posters 
18 months each, 
22-10-27 
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APPENDIX 9 
 
FIGURES SHOWING EXTRADITION OF COMMUNISTS FROM THE 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT TO CHINESE TERRITORY BETWEEN 23/8/27 AND 
21-2-28
476
 
 
Date Arrests Charge How Dealt With 
23-8-27 1 Possession of 
Communistic literature  
10 months’ 
imprisonment, 22-12-27 
5-9-27 3 Printing of 
Communistic literature 
9 months’ 
imprisonment, 25-11-27 
13-10-27 1 Possession of 
Communistic literature 
Handed over to Chinese 
Authorities 
8-11-27 2 Posting of Communist 
Posters 
4 years and 6 months 
each 
22-11-27 2 Possession of 
Communistic literature 
1
st
 one year & 4 months, 
2
nd
 dismissed 
24-11-27 3 Intimidation 14 months each 
23-11-27 1 Possession of 
Communistic literature 
6 months, 6-12-27 
27-11-27 2 Intimidation 14 months each 
6-12-27 4 Do 2 fined $30 or 30 days 
impt., 2 fined $20 or 20 
days impt. 
19-12-27 2 Do 3 months each or $100 
22-12-27 1 Intimation & inciting to 
murder 
7.5 years, 17-1-28 
23-12-27 1 Intimidation & 
distributing pamphlets 
5.5 years. 17-1-28 
6-1-28 2 Intimidation Withdrawn 
6-1-28 1 Distributing Handbills Fined $10 or 10 days 
impt. 
7-1-27 1 Intimidation Fined $20 or 20 days 
impt. 
12-1-28 2 Do Cautioned and released 
11-1-28 2 Do Fined $20 each 
                                                 
476
 Ibid 
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13-1-28 2 Do 4 months each 
20-2-28 1 Do Dismissed 
17-2-28 12 Suspected Communists Handed over to 
Garrison Commander 
for trail 
20-2-28 2 Do Do 
21-2-28 3 Do Do  
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APPENDIX 10 
 
NEWSPAPER CUTTING SHOWING OPPOSITION OF CONSULAR DEPUTY IN A 
CASE INVOLVED A RESIDENT OF THE SETTLEMENT IN THE LATE 1920s
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APPENDIX 11 
 
PORTRAIT OF HILAIRE NOULENS (ALSO KNOWN AS JAKOB RUDNIK) AND HIS 
WIFE IN CHINESE JAIL IN 1937
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 https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2a/Jakob_Rudnik_and_his_wife.jpg , , 
accessed on 31
st
 August, 2015 
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APPENDIX 12 
 
CONDITIONS INSIDE THE SOOCHOW REFORMATORY
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 Xu Jingzong 徐景宗, Jiangsu Fanxingyuan 江蘇反省院 (Soochow Reformatory) in Liangyou 
《良友》 The companion pictorial, No.102 (Shanghai: Liangyou Tushu Gongsi 良友圖書公司
Companion publisher company limited , 1935), 11 
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